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Mass ethnic violence, including genocide and ethnic cleansing, can take a variety 
of forms, but sexual violence often remains a key and defining feature. In the 
Bosnian war of 1992-1995 following the break-up of Yugoslavia, it is estimated that 
between 20,000 and 60,000 rapes were committed; and estimates are that between 
250,000 and 500,000 rapes were committed during the Rwandan genocide in 
1994. And yet the experiences and needs of these survivors of sexual violence can 
often remain marginalised through post-conflict reconstruction processes and 
beyond. Drawing on ethnographic and multi-method research, this dissertation 
explores and contrasts the post-conflict experiences of women who suffered from 
wartime sexual violence in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the programmes 
offered by key NGOs that continue to work with them. Focusing on policies and 
experiences of re-integration and the creation of a sense of social belonging, I show 
that these women represent a distinct category of civilian victims of war, whose post-
conflict needs and experiences are often marginalized by both their states and their 
communities.  
The thesis’ empirical core draws on ethnographic fieldwork, which included 
participant observation of ten key NGOs, four focus groups with HIV-infected 
individuals and women survivors of sexual violence, semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews with 17 survivors, 23 NGO staff and a Rwandan government 
representative, as well as informal conversations with all of these actors and 
members of the local communities. This ethnographic data was complemented and 
contextualized with official statistics, as well as government and NGO documents, 
and with interviews conducted at UN Women and the UN Trust Fund. 
The main substantive findings of this dissertation are that following the end of the 
ethnic violence in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the two states embarked on very 
different post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Rwanda has been characterized by an 
important process of nation-building, with the state outlawing ethnicity in favour of 
national unity, and implementing gender-sensitive policies to promote women’s 
rights. In contrast, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state implemented policies mostly 
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geared towards state-building, based on the rationale that the institutionalisation of 
ethnicity could only truly be accommodated through strong state institutions. The 
dominance of ethnic politics however overshadows other political agendas, such as 
gender policies, policies that have still not lead to transformative changes at the local 
level. These macro-policies importantly influence post-conflict experiences, most 
especially those of women who had survived sexual violence.  
My findings are suggestive of the complexity of the post-conflict experiences of 
the women I met, mostly in terms of social reintegration, where the macro-policies of 
post-conflict reconstruction continue to powerfully shape both their everyday lives 
and the work done by the NGOs. In Rwanda today, the women I interviewed mostly 
wish to be fully socially accepted and treated as part of their communities, with the 
NGOs offering them holistic support. But in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the women I 
interviewed today mostly demand legal recognition by the state, with the NGOs 
actively lobbying for this on their behalf. And yet, due to a shared experience of 
continuing everyday marginalization within both societies, as civilian victims of war, 
in both places the women often rely on NGOs to negotiate their social position 
within their states, nations and communities. This mediation role is structurally 
complicated by the NGOs’ relationships to donors and to the pressures of the state in 
which they operate. The impact of this is that through their mediation role NGOs 
reconstruct the women’s experiences in order to align with the priorities of the 
international donors and states in which they operate. Consequently, the contrasts 
between the work done by NGOs in each country are clearly visible, despite the 
similarity of the war crimes experienced: Rwandan NGOs actively seek to increase 
women’s empowerment within their social community, while the Bosnian NGOs 
actively aim to increase the women’s voices within more explicit political agendas. 
The thesis’s key theoretical or intellectual contribution, therefore, concerns its 
relevance to intersectional scholarly work on post-conflict and gender studies. More 
specifically, my findings suggest that a shift occurred immediately following the end 
of the armed conflicts, where the women who had experienced wartime sexual 
violence and who were socially located outside the scope of justice of their ethnic 
enemies, suddenly found themselves outside the scope of justice of their own ethnic 
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or national communities. Extending Mann’s (2004) and Opotow et al’s (2005) 
typologies of ethnic violence and moral exclusion, I then develop a specific 
framework for understanding the underlying moral shifts experienced by the 
survivors of sexual violence. In doing this, I seek to capture this gendered moral and 
social relocation and its consequences on the everyday lives of the women and the 
NGOs that work with them. This forms the basis for my theoretical contribution that 
the women moved from ethnic women to moral outcasts in the aftermath of the 
ethnic violence, and that this exclusion is contextually shaped since the priorities for 
social reintegration are different in Rwanda to BiH. Addressing these priorities then 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis explores the post-conflict experiences of some women who survived 
wartime sexual violence, and the efforts of some key NGOs who work with them. 
The conceptual focus is on social belonging and social reintegration, analysing how 
these women are socially reintegrated within their ethnic and national communities 
in the aftermath of the violence, and how the NGOs mediate this reintegration. 
This research sits at the intersection between the fields of gender studies and 
nationalism and conflict studies. Indeed, as the stories of these women will 
demonstrate, their lived experiences are embedded within the ethnic politics and 
gender norms of their respective countries and their local communities. As a 
researcher interested in genocide and ethnic violence on the one hand, and women’s 
rights on the other, researching women survivors of sexual violence allowed me to 
anchor my personal interests as a feminist and an engaged citizen on the situation of 
vulnerable groups affected by war, conflict and political oppression. 
 
Research Problem 
Sexual violence is a key component of ethnic violence, and it is widely accepted 
in the academic literature that sexual violence was used as a weapon for ethnic 
cleansing in both the Rwandan genocide (1994) and the Bosnian war (1992-95). It is 
estimated that 250,000 to 500,000 individuals were raped in Rwanda (Hudson, 2010: 
264), with estimates pointing to 20,000 to 60,000 rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) 
(Skjelsbaek and Smith, 2001: 53-4). In the aftermath of genocide and ethnic 
cleansing, processes of ethnic reconciliation are often necessary for peaceful 
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reconstruction and co-habitation. There are, however, some individuals, such as the 
men and women who suffered for wartime rape, whose experiences during the 
conflict put them at risk of distinctive forms of social stigmatisation. Indeed, much 
research has been widely conducted on the stigma of rape and its consequences for 
the survivors of sexual violence (Carey, 2001; Cockburn and Zarkov, 2002; Krug et 
al, 2002; De la Rey and McKay, 2006; Pankhurst, 2008). 
As a result of the stigma associated with rape, post-war social inclusion and 
belonging is generally harder to achieve in comparison with other types of civilian 
victimizations during war. Moreover, because they were targeted for sexual violence 
due to both their sexual and ethnic identities, these survivors need to be reconciled 
not only with the enemy group, but also with their own dual identities (Sideris, 2001: 
59). As Skjelsbaek argues (2012: 44), ‘because rape in war targets both the ethnic 
and gendered identity of its victims, this dual identity violation creates a possibility 
for dual identity construction in the aftermath’. The stigmatisation experienced from 
the community, in addition to their personal journey towards rebuilding their social 
identity, creates barriers for the social reintegration of these individuals in the 
aftermath of the violence. 
This research explores these barriers and how they are experienced, negotiated 
and mediated. I also analyse the work done by key NGOs to facilitate this social 
reintegration. The use of sexual violence as a weapon of war has been theorized and 
documented by previous research, with an important body of research documenting 
wartime rapes during the Bosnian war (and in contrast to other contexts) 
(Mackinnon, 1994; Seifert, 1994; Allen, 1996; Chang, 1997; Littlewood, 1997; 
Ghiglieri, 2000; Mertus, 2000; Rosenman, 2000; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000; 
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Gottschall, 2004; Skjelsbaek, 2012). A growing body of research is also emerging on 
the consequences of wartime rape, focusing especially on the medical, psychological 
and sociological impacts of this practice (Hamilton, H.B., 2000; Carey, 2001, 
UNHCR, 2003; Hagen & Yohani, 2010; Aoláin, Haynes and Cahn, 2011; Medica 
Zenica, 2015). However, the long-term post-conflict experiences of the survivors of 
sexual violence remain under-studied, and studies that provide a comprehensive 
contrast between the two contexts are even less common (one rare example is 
Staveteig, 2011). This research therefore contributes to the academic fields of both 
nationalism, conflict and gender studies by offering an analysis of the contrasting 
post-conflict experiences of women in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
approximately 20 years after the end of the ethnic violence.  
It is worth noting that this thesis limits its scope to some women’s experiences of 
social belonging and social reintegration within their national or ethnic communities. 
I do not attempt to provide a comprehensive portrayal of the post-conflict 
experiences of all men and women survivors of sexual violence. The same is true for 
the analysis of the programmes and services offered by the NGOs I observed. The 
focus of this study is limited to an analysis of the programmes and services offered to 
women who suffered from wartime sexual violence, and does not provide an account 
of the work done with other beneficiaries or the internal politics and structures of the 
NGOs. So while I cannot claim empirical generalizations from these two contexts, I 
aim at theorizing and explaining the post-conflict experiences of some women 
survivors of sexual violence in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the relevant 
programmes and services offered by some NGOs, in relation to their social 
relocation within their ethnic/national communities. This said, however, I also hope 
 18 
that theoretical insights from these empirical findings might usefully contribute to an 
understanding of the same social phenomenon as experienced in other, similar post-
conflict contexts. 
Arguments and Findings 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Two main substantive chapters provide 
ethnographic accounts while the two others situate these experiences within the aid 
sector and within the states’ macro-policies of gender and ethnicity. 
Chapter Two provides the theoretical framework with which I examine the 
experiences of the women I met. It first argues that during the ethnic violence, 
women had imposed upon them the role of embodying the nation and its boundaries. 
Through their bodies, they were the gateway into the nation’s purity and survival, 
and thus made vulnerable to sexual violence in armed conflicts. Once the violence 
had ended, the perceived ‘dirtiness’ of their bodies was transferred to their moral 
value, justifying their moral exclusion. Drawing on Mann’s (2004) and Opotow et 
al’s (2005) frameworks of ethnic violence and moral exclusion, I design my own 
framework to capture the post-conflict experiences of moral exclusion, highlighting 
the process from where the women were relocated from being outside the scope of 
justice of the enemy group to being outside the scope of justice of their kin group. I 
then argue that the NGOs working with them try to address this moral exclusion by 
targeting their increased agency, voice and empowerment, but that their work 
remains constrained by the state policies of post-conflict reconstruction. 
I then explain in Chapter Three how I empirically examined these processes 
through a contrast ethnography of two contexts, since the specificities of one context 
 19 
provide a commentary on those found in the second, deepening our understanding of 
the experiences examined. I also explain that an ethnographic approach, 
complemented by interviews and secondary sources was chosen since it allowed me 
to analyse these processes and their consequences from the viewpoint and 
experiences of the survivors of sexual violence and NGO staff. Of course, 
conducting this type of research involves important ethical concerns, and I engage in 
this chapter on the challenges faced and their impact on the data collected. 
Chapter Four then presents the historical background of both contexts, explaining 
the consequences of sexual violence as a weapon of war, and how these were 
addressed by the NGO sector from the ethnic violence in the 1990s to the present. It 
then examines the ethnic and gender policies implemented by both post-conflict 
states, providing the contexts within which the experiences of the women I met are 
embedded, and the political context that influences the work done by the key NGOs I 
observed. 
The following four chapters then present the substantive findings. Chapter Five 
uses official statistics and government documents to analyse the degree in which 
ethnicity and gender are accommodated in both post-conflict states, connecting these 
specific policies to broader policies of post-conflict reconstruction. I suggest that in 
the Rwandan context, an important process of nation-building is occurring, with 
ethnicity being outlawed in favour of a broader, more inclusive national identity, one 
which includes the implementation of gender-sensitive policies. However, I show 
that these top-down attempts to promote gender equality and remove ethnic identities 
have still not been fully incorporated at the local level. This is contrasted by the 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, where ethnicity has been institutionalized within the 
 20 
state, but where access to services and political opportunities depends on the political 
entity (Republika Srpska and Federation of BiH) and ethnicity. The focus has 
therefore been on strengthening state institutions (state-building) to accommodate 
this ethnic diversity. This has the consequence that, despite both countries suffering 
from ethnic violence, they differ in their process of ethnic reconciliation, which 
influences the social reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence. Moreover, I 
argue that the population experiences these contrasting policies of state/nation-
building through state institutions, which inevitably impacts their day-to-day lives. In 
the cases of the survivors of sexual violence, I argue that these macro-policies 
continue to powerfully shape their experiences of social belonging, since they find 
themselves somewhat excluded from the post-conflict state due to their dual 
identities both as civilian victims of war and as women. 
Chapter Six then draws on ethnographic data to present the post-conflict 
experiences of women who survived sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide, 
and the work done by some organisations that continue to work with them. I argue 
that these women mostly demand to be socially reintegrated as valued human beings 
within their community, and that the NGOs I observed respond to this need by 
providing holistic support to assist these women in reconstructing their social value, 
helping them to accept themselves and to accept living with others in the society. 
Chapter Seven examines the post-conflict experiences of the women I met and the 
work done by some NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, data that provides a commentary 
on the Rwandan experiences. Here I argue that, in contrast with the Rwandan 
context, the women I met in BiH mostly wish to have their rights legally recognized 
by their state, in effect institutionalising their status as survivors of sexual violence. 
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The NGOs I observed seem to be responding to this demand by actively lobbying the 
state for legal recognition of these civilian victims of war. Both ethnographic 
chapters therefore raise questions around to what extent these contrasts are explained 
by the NGOs themselves, who might not only respond to the needs of their 
beneficiaries, but also shape them, and to what extent this is influenced by the 
broader aid sector. 
I therefore move my focus towards aid in Chapter Eight, where I explore these 
questions, analysing the relationships among state, NGOs, and donors. It argues that 
the NGOs I observed in both contexts undertake the role of mediating the women’s 
experiences, navigating the strategic interests of the donors. These mediated 
experiences are therefore not directly the women’s experiences, but rather 
experiences that NGOs reconstruct in order to align with the priorities of the 
international donors. These donors’ priorities are however also embedded within the 
macro-policies of gender and ethnicity implemented by the state, which not only 
influence donors, but also influence the programmes and services prioritized by these 
NGOs. This has the consequence that despite the similar crimes against women that 
occurred in both states, Rwandan NGOs promote women’s empowerment within 
their local communities, while Bosnian-Herzegovinian NGOs promote the inclusion 
of women’s voices in the political arena.  
 Finally, Chapter Nine argues that while the contrasted policies of 
state/nation-building influence the work by NGOs and shape the experiences of 
social reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence, what remains unaddressed 
are the moral violations that these women continue to suffer in the aftermath of the 
violence. In this chapter, I argue that regardless of the specificities found in each 
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context it is the ideology of woman-as-nation which continues to justify their moral 
exclusion. Therefore, I argue that the women moved from ethnic women to moral 
outcasts in the aftermath of the ethnic violence, and that this exclusion is 
contextually shaped since the priorities for social reintegration are different in 





Chapter 2. Theorizing Social and Moral Exclusion 
This chapter first defines key concepts used in this thesis, before theorizing the 
experiences of social exclusion of the survivors of sexual violence. I argue that in the 
aftermath of the ethnic violence, the women face a moral exclusion that is justified 
by their changed social value (or social self), as a result of the rape experienced. 
NGOs working with these women attempt to address this changed moral value by 
increasing their agency, empowerment and voice, but they remain constrained by 
macro post-conflict policies. These do not provide the framework within which the 
personal sense of self of these women can be reconstructed, since they instead 
facilitate the reconstruction of their ethnic or national identities.  
Defining Key Concepts 
When referring to the concept of nation, I refer in this thesis to Anderson’s 
definition as ‘an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign’ (Anderson, 1991: 6). First, a nation is imagined because it is 
impossible for any human being to know every member forming that nation. Second, 
a nation is limited because nations inevitably possess boundaries that distinguish 
them from other states. Third, it is sovereign because nations emerged in the context 
of the Enlightenment, which promoted the idea that sovereignty lies in the hands of 
the people. Finally, it is a community because regardless of the inequalities within 
that nation, each member can equally participate in it (Anderson, 1991: 6-8). 
Anderson’s definition is extremely important when analysing the social inclusion of 
women who experienced wartime sexual violence, because the acts of imagining and 
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of creating boundaries and communities influence whether or not the women are 
integrated in their nation. 
Moreover, approaching this thesis from a constructivist epistemological 
viewpoint, when speaking about ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic groups’ in this thesis I refer to 
Eriksen’s understanding of ethnicity as ‘an aspect of social relationships between 
agents who consider themselves as being culturally distinctive from members of 
other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction’ (Eriksen, 2002: 
12). Ethnic groups then use myths of common origin and kinship to mark these 
boundaries (Eriksen, 2002: 13). I mostly use this term when referring to the 
groupings found in BiH, while I mostly use nation in the Rwandan context, as a 
result of their policy of nation-building, which will be described in more depth in the 
subsequent chapters. 
The concept of community has been widely discussed in the academic literature, 
moving from a more traditional understanding of community as social interactions in 
a specific geographic area (Hillery, 1955; Gusfield, 1975) to more abstract 
conceptions of community (Delanty, 2003). For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt 
Delanty’s (2003: 187) analysis of community, as ‘possibilities for belonging based 
on religion, nationalism, ethnicity, lifestyle and gender’. Complementing this 
definition with Putnam’s (2000) analysis of social networks, I also imply that 
communities entail identification and membership of these different sources of social 
belonging. ‘For most of us, our deepest sense of belonging is to our most intimate 
social networks, especially family and friends. Beyond that perimeter lie work, 
church, neighbourhood, civic life, and [an] assortment of other “weak ties”’ (Putnam 
2000: 274). Based on these definitions, the community I refer to when speaking 
 25 
about the social inclusion of the women I met can vary from their neighbourhood, to 
their village, to their gender, religious, ethnic and national group.  
Furthermore, by social belonging, I refer to the emotional attachment and 
commitment to people, social groups and culture (Calhoun, 2003: 558; Yuval-Davis, 
2011: 10). Belonging can be a choice, or imposed by others (Guibernau, 2013: 26). 
As explained by Guibernau (2013: 28), 
Belonging fosters an emotional attachment; it prompts the expansion of the 
individual’s personality to embrace the attributes of the group, to be loyal 
and obedient to it. In return, the group offers a ‘home’, a familiar space – 
physical, virtual or imagined – where individuals share common interests, 
values and principles, or a project. Belonging provides them with access to 
an environment within which they matter.  
Therefore, when analysing the sense of social belonging of the women I met in 
Rwanda and BiH, I explore their emotional attachment to their nation and 
community, and their social worth within this environment. This is strongly 
intertwined with the concept of social integration. For the purpose of this thesis, 
I refer to social integration as the equal access to benefits, services and scope of 
justice available to members of the in-group, which I discuss in more depth 
below (Opotow, 1990: 2; Tugendhat, 1993: 5-7).  
To achieve social reintegration, a certain degree of social belonging is 
therefore needed, since access to services will be fully granted only if members 
of the group offer these women ‘a familiar space’. Chapters Six and Seven will 
explore these concepts in relation to the experiences of the survivors of sexual 
violence, where for these women, being socially reintegrated would for example 
mean that they would have their voices and rights valued and promoted by their 
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community and national group, enforcing their access to the benefits of the in-
group (participation in the community life, employment opportunities, etc.). 
As this thesis will demonstrate, social integration for the survivors of 
sexual violence is a process strongly dependent on various actors, such as the 
post-conflict state, NGOs and the national group, but these women exert a 
certain agency in creating or not a sense of belonging to these actors. These 
contrasts between these two concepts therefore explain the conceptual focus of 
this research, which is to analyse how women experience social belonging in 
post-conflict Rwanda and BiH (research question 1), and how the NGOs that 
work with them and their state facilitate their social reintegration (research 
question 2). 
Finally, it is worth noting that I am using the term ‘post-conflict’ for purposes of 
simplicity, referring to the period following the ethnic violence and the signing of the 
peace accords. ‘Post-Conflict’ does not suggest in this thesis that the tensions at the 
core of the previous armed conflicts are completely resolved, but it refers to this 
reconstruction period after the violent conflict.  
The Embodied Nation 
Existing theories on gender and nationalism provide the necessary theoretical 
grounding on which to understand the consequences of wartime sexual violence on 
the women and their national group. In this thesis, I argue that the women’s bodies 
were used as the battlefield upon which the nation could be destroyed, giving them 
the role of embodiment of the nation. This role of ‘bodies of the nation’ creates 
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important consequences in the aftermath of the violence, with these women suffering 
from a moral exclusion because of the aggression committed to their bodies. 
Theories of embodiment (Thapan 1997; Witz, 2000; Backett-Milburn and McKie, 
2001; Howson, 2005) suggest that the human body has been appropriated by society 
to construct and embody gender. For instance, Thapan (1997: 1-2) argues that the 
body is crucial to a person’s sense of identity, and that the body possesses symbolic 
and cultural values that differ across societies. In this case, the importance of the 
female body should not be understood only in biological terms, but through the 
social context in which it is being discussed. It is indeed argued that ‘gender is 
embodied and bodies are gendered’ (Howson, 2005: 143). The female body is no 
longer perceived as an individual ‘property’ since it has been appropriated by the 
nation to establish gender relations and cultural values. Based on this assumption, a 
connection between the female body and the nation can be made. As Wenk (2000: 
70) suggests, personification has been used throughout history as a way of 
representing ideas that cannot be illustrated. This is the case of the concept of 
‘nation’, and nationalist discourses have used women’s bodies as the personification 
of the nation in order to foster a sense of belonging to this abstract concept. To do so, 
women’s bodies became the body of the nation through which future generations are 
reproduced.  
Moreover, women’s bodies are also used to embody ideas of national supremacy 
through values of chastity, fecundity and purity (Enloe, 1990: 54, Mertus, 1994: 16; 
Yuval-Davis, 1997: 45; Cockburn, 1998: 162; Mookherjee, 2008: 38). Mosse (1985: 
90) explains that at the beginning of the 19th century, nationalist discourses started to 
use female symbols to represent the nation. Many female figures, such as Marianne 
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(France), Britannia (Great-Britain) and Germania (Germany), were created in order 
to personify the nation, to unite the population under a collective/national sense, and 
to represent national values. By choosing chaste, modest and respectable female 
symbols of the nation, nationalist ideology promoted the superiority of the nation, 
but also imposed on women the role of embodying the nation’s respectability 
(Mookherjee, 2008: 45). Whether Marianne or Mother Russia, these female figures 
impose gender roles within the society (Enloe, 1990: 54; Mertus, 1994: 14; Yuval-
Davis, 1997: 45; Cockburn, 1998: 43). More importantly for this research, this has 
the consequence that wartime rape survivors then pose a threat to the nation’s 
respectability and purity. 
This is especially problematic considering that women not only have imposed 
upon them the role of symbolizing the nation, but also of embodying it, as a result of 
their maternal positioning within the society. This is a crucial role since families are 
perceived as central to the development of the nation (Eley, 2000: 32; Ranchold-
Nilsson and Tétreault, 2000: 5). As Smith (1991: 79) explains:  
The metaphor of family is indispensable to nationalism. The nation is 
depicted as one great family, the members as brothers and sisters of the 
motherland or fatherland, speaking their mother tongue. The family of the 
nation overrides and replaces the individual’s family but evokes similarly 
strong loyalties and vivid attachments. Even where local allegiances are 
tolerated and real families given their due, the language and symbolism of 
the nation asserts its priority and, through the state and citizenship, exerts 
its legal and bureaucratic pressures on the family, using similar kinship 
metaphors to justify itself. 
This suggests that nationalist discourses make a connection between the private 
(having children) and the public (survival of the nation) (Blom, 2000: 17). Due to 
their role as cultural reproducers of the nation, the role of embodying the nation is 
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therefore imposed on women, reducing them to their motherhood (Enloe, 1990: 54; 
Yuval-Davis, 1997: 45; Cockburn, 1998: 43).  
This role as cultural reproducers of the nation becomes increasingly important 
when group identity intensifies or when the nation feels threatened by another group, 
and even more so when a woman is raped (Yuval-Davis, 1994: 413). In these 
contexts, women as mothers and wives become politicized and are instructed to 
participate in the nationalist agenda by producing more members of the nation, and 
by conserving the nation’s purity (Enloe, 1990: 44; Milic, 1993: 120; Moghadam, 
1994: 18; Mostov, 1995: 522; Cockburn, 1998: 43). This means that survivors of 
rape, especially those who had children born out of rape, are perceived first as 
hurting the nation’s respectability, and second its survival and reproduction. As 
Yuval-Davis (1997: 30-33) explains, since the future of the nation depends on its 
continuous growth, reproductive rights become extremely relevant to nationalist 
ideology. When the nation is constructed in ethnic terms, the pressure to bear more 
children is closely entwined with the need to protect the purity of the bloodline, 
legitimizing a greater government control over what is defined as “appropriate” 
sexual behaviour and what becomes “deviant”, such as having sexual intercourse 
with an outsider (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 37; Cockburn, 1998: 43; Mayer, 2000: 13; 
Peterson, 2000: 69).  
In this way, the female body becomes the nation’s body, through which both the 
nation and its boundaries are reproduced (Eisenstein, 2000: 47; Mayer, 2000: 18). 
Moving beyond the metaphor of nation-as-woman, by becoming the body of the 
nation, there is a more problematic ideology of woman-as-nation. Indeed, in the very 
influential book ‘Purity and Danger’, Douglas (1966: 142) mentioned how 
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The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. Its 
boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or 
precarious. The body is a complex structure. The functions of its different 
parts and their relation afford a source of symbols for other complex 
structures. 
This is especially true of the female body, where in patriarchal society it is the entry 
point into the group (Douglas, 1966: 156). In the case of ethnically defined nations, 
their bodies serve the purpose of carrying the distinction between the insiders and 
outsiders of the nation. Woman-as-nation suggests the fusion between women’s 
bodies and the nation’s boundaries, between “Our Women” versus “Enemy/Other 
Women”. As Yuval-Davis (1994: 413) argues:  
Gender divisions often play a central organizing role in specific 
constructions of ethnicity, marking ethnic boundaries and reproducing 
ethnic difference. (…) The “proper” behaviour of women is often used to 
signify the difference between those who belong to the collectivity and 
those who do not.  
More importantly, this also means that raped women and the children born out of 
rape now embody the “Other”. Sexual violence as a weapon of war therefore 
transforms the raped women into dirty and sinful individuals (Mertus, 1994: 18) who 
disturb the social order. Dirt and purity are used to impose social order on lived 
experiences and when something, or someone, is considered dirty or an anomaly, it 
reinforces the boundaries of the category within which it/they are not included 
(Douglas, 1966: 4, 47). Moreover, Douglas (1966: 48) notes that  
There are several ways of treating anomalies. Negatively, we can ignore, 
just not perceive them, or perceiving we can condemn. Positively, we can 
deliberately confront the anomaly and try to create a new pattern of reality 
in which it has a place. It is not impossible for an individual to revise his 
own personal scheme of classifications. But no individual lives in isolation 
and his scheme will have been partly received from others. 
This thesis will demonstrate that in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, 
the population engages in a negative response to the survivors of sexual violence, 
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instead of creating a new pattern that challenges the taboo and stigma associated with 
rape. 
From	  ethnic	  identities	  to	  personal	  sense	  of	  self	  
As the substantive chapters will demonstrate, the women I met who experienced 
wartime sexual violence suffer from stigmatization and social exclusion in the 
aftermath of the violence. Most immediately, the experiences described in this thesis 
demonstrate how some women are still struggling with the construction of their 
ethnic and gender identities, while other women have reached a certain level of 
empowerment by disassociating themselves from the status of victimhood in favour 
of rebuilding their identities as survivors (Green, 2009: 41). However, scholars such 
as Green (2009: 41, 118) and Forsyth (1999: 63) suggest that stigmatization and 
exclusion disrupt the construction of the self, with the result that the survivors’ 
identity as moral and good persons is questioned. Stigmatization may therefore lead 
to a loss of self, with ‘former self-images crumbling away without a simultaneous 
development of equally valued new ones’ (Charmaz, 1983: 168). I therefore argue 
that regardless of the ethnic or civic nation found in the post-conflict state, there is a 
shift from ethnic identities to moral identities in the aftermath of the violence, where 
underlying these difficulties of ethnic and gender identification is a deeper loss of 
moral self that is caused by the consequences of wartime sexual violence. 
Because the day-to-day experiences of these women are framed by their ordeals 
during the war, the process of stigmatization experienced is first understood as a 
continuation of the ethnic violence. The academic literature provides a number of 
theories explaining the character and nature of ethnic violence. Most notable is 
Mann’s ‘Types of Violence and Cleansing in Inter-Group Relations’ (2004: 23-24). 
 32 
Table 1. Types of Violence and Cleansing in Inter-Group Relations. 
 Types of Cleansing 
Types of 
Violence 
None Partial Total 
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Source: Mann, M. (2004). The Dark Side of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. p. 23-24. 
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His framework of ethnic violence undoubtedly explains the character of violence 
in BiH and Rwanda through an escalation of ethnic tensions towards premeditated 
mass killings and total cleansing. The framework also demonstrates how first and 
foremost, it is the ethnic identities of the individuals involved that caused tensions 
during the ethnic violence, and not the personal sense of self. 
However, I argue in this thesis that in the aftermath of the violence, the women I 
interviewed do not experience social exclusion solely because of their ethnic 
impurity (due to their close contact with the enemy ‘Other’), but more importantly 
because the perceived dirtiness of their bodies is now also imposed on their moral 
character. There is therefore the belief that the social self of these women is now 
‘bad’ and ‘immoral’. Tugendhat (1993: 5-7) theorized how individuals are socialized 
into being members of a community, with set rules on what is considered ‘good’ or 
‘bad’. This set of rules, or moral values, both encourages and discourages certain 
behaviours, as a continuum from very bad to very good. Individuals engaging in 
some of these behaviours can therefore be deprecated or highly esteemed, based on 
their conformity with the community’s set of moral rules. Staub (1990: 54; 1993: 
341) suggests that this set of rules is established in order to build the community’s 
sense of self and identity, and, as described above, in times of ethnic conflict the 
purity and morality of the group may be promoted.  
I however nuance this argument, suggesting that in the case of the Bosnian and 
Rwandan ethnic violence, the discourses of ‘othering’ focused on the purity of the 
ethnic group and its identity, and less so on its morality. As presented above, the 
norms towards sexual behaviours had more the purpose of preserving the purity of 
the ethnic bloodline than preserving the morality of its members. However, since 
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moral norms play a role in distinguishing who is included and excluded from the 
benefits of being a member of the community (Deutsch, 1975: 142; Tugendhat, 
1993: 5-7; Opotow, 2004: 105), the elite used a moral discourse to render certain 
groups eligible for violence and human rights violations (Opotow, Gerson and 
Woodside, 2005: 305). Indeed, as argued by Opotow, Gerson and Woodside (2005: 
305), those within the boundaries of fairness ‘are morally included and seen as 
deserving fair treatment. Those outside are morally excluded, beyond our moral 
concerns, and eligible for deprivation, exploitation and other harms that might be 
ignored or condoned as normal, inevitable, and deserved’. However, as Mann’s 
typology demonstrates, it is the politics of ethnic dynamics, and the identity of the 
groups involved that was threatening during the ethnic violence, and not their moral 
self. Therefore, the moral exclusion experienced during the ethnic violence was 
justified by the immorality of the enemy ethnic group as a whole, which is why the 
women describe in Chapters Six and Seven that they were targeted during the ethnic 
violence because of their ethnic identity. 
However, as shown in the following table from Opotow, Gerson and Woodside 
(2005: 306), I argue that a new form of moral exclusion is witnessed in the aftermath 
of the violence, with the survivors of sexual violence suffering from narrow and 
subtle exclusion. This exclusion is different to the wide and blatant one that was at 
play during the ethnic violence, but this time the women are excluded not because of 
their identity, but because of their moral self. Unlike with the moral exclusion 
experienced during the ethic violence, this post-conflict exclusion is now justified by 
their individual impurity, and therefore by their personal sense of self. This moral 
exclusion occurs through various physical, social and economic types of exclusion, 
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but underlying all of these is the social understanding that these women are now 
excluded from the boundary of fairness due to their past experience of sexual 
violence. The experiences related in the substantive chapters indeed highlight how 
some women are actively bullied and intimidated by their community, while others 
experience a milder form of moral exclusion where their needs and rights are being 
ignored and uncared for by their community. This is a result of disintegrated moral 
obligations towards these outcasts and the belief that they are undeserving of the 
fairness and resources available to the in-group, with society accepting the outcomes 
of this exclusion on the lives of these individuals (Opotow, 1990: 2; Opotow, Gerson 
and Woodside, 2005: 303-306). 
Table 2. Manifestations and Extent of Moral Exclusion. 
 Subtle Blatant 
Narrow Rudeness, intimidation and 
derogation (e.g. Bullying and 
sexual harassment) 
Persecution and 
violence directed at 
particular individuals or 
groups (e.g. hate crimes, 
witch hunts) 
Wide Oppression and structural violence 
(e.g. racism, poverty, domestic 
violence) 
Direct violence and 
violations of human 
rights (e.g. ethnic 
cleansing, mass murder, 
inquisitions) 
Source: Opotow, Gerson and Woodside, 2005: 306. 
Based on the theories presented so far, it would not necessarily be surprising that 
the women are perceived as ‘immoral’ by the perpetrators themselves, and that the 
perpetrators blame the women for their suffering, arguing that they brought it upon 
themselves as outsiders to the perpetrators’ scope of justice (Bandura, 2004: 39-45). 
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As expressed by Bandura (2004: 40), ‘people do not usually engage in harmful 
conduct until they have justified, to themselves, the morality of their actions’. 
However, what is paradoxical in the cases of the women I interviewed is that the 
social exclusion currently experienced comes from members of their own ethnic or 
national group (Staub, 1990: 56). This is something not necessarily recognized by the 
state in either country – which will be discussed in the next section. 
Some scholars have attempted to understand why victims of crime might be 
blamed for their situation, as is the case for many of the women I met. The ‘just 
world theory’ (Lerner, 1980; Hafer 2004) argues that individuals believe that the 
world is fair, and that the injustice experienced by innocent victims threatens this 
sense of a fair and rational world. To preserve this sentiment of safety, individuals 
will then blame the victims, maintaining the belief that their suffering was deserved. 
However, Lerner (1980) - the original contributor of the ‘just world theory’ – also 
suggested that a sense of closeness and identification with the victim may increase 
compassion towards that individual.  
If we identify with the inflicter, we are likely to condemn the victim, as a 
way of maintaining the inflicter’s integrity. On the other hand, if we have 
identified with the victim, then obviously we will blame and condemn the 
person who “caused” the harm (Lerner, 1980: 91). 
Based on this theory, rape survivors faced two possibilities: members of the 
ethnic/national group would support their kin women and condemn the perpetrators 
for these crimes, or they would blame these survivors in order to maintain their belief 
of a just world. In the aftermath of wars that caused immense suffering, one would 
expect that the belief of a just world would have already been destroyed by the ethnic 
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violence, and that members of the group would support their kin women. This, 
however, is not happening in practice.  
Instead, many women are blamed for their rape, suggesting that the crime was 
caused by their behaviour or character (Lerner, 1980: 96; Hafer, 2004: 122). The 
impurity of their body reflects on their own moral self, resulting in the character of 
the women concerned being questioned. ‘People “identify” with and try to help 
victims who, on the basis of the best information available, appear to be worthy of 
help by virtue of their innocence, lack of culpability for their fate, and high personal 
worth’ (Lerner, 1980: 107). This can be particularly disturbing for the survivors of 
sexual violence, since they were imposed upon them the embodiment of their nation, 
and are now blamed for this embodiment. This may lead to a feeling of injustice - as 
is clearly observed in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context - where the women 
themselves do not comprehend the rationale behind their social exclusion. 
Victim-blaming is not observed with other victims of the Bosnian war and 
Rwandan genocide, such as widows or individuals who were physically tortured, but 
it is extremely common for both the men and women who experienced wartime 
sexual violence. I therefore suggest that there is something distinct and inherent 
about sexual violence as a crime that encourages victim-blaming instead of 
prosecuting the perpetrators. This may originate from a deep patriarchal set of moral 
values. A shift therefore occurred between the conflict and the post-conflict period, 
in which the women’s sense of social self changed and pushed them to the margins 
of their own group. Drawing on Mann’s and Opotow et al’s models, I then propose a 
specific model for women who experienced wartime sexual violence that captures 
this shift from ethnic purity to immorality. 
 38 









Pre-Conflict Escalation in the type of violence and cleansing  




Conflict Premeditated mass killings and total ethnic 
cleansing 
Blatant and wide moral exclusion justified by the 
ethnic identities 
Sexual Violence in War 
Post-Conflict Move from Ethnic Identities to the Moral Self 
Narrow and subtle moral exclusion justified by 
the spoiled moral character of the survivors of 
sexual violence 




A few points should be made about this framework. First, it incorporates Mann’s 
framework, suggesting that during the pre-war and war periods, the violence and 
moral exclusion that justified this violence were embedded within the ethnic 
identities of the groups involved. The moral exclusion was a group exclusion, where 
it was the ethnic identity of the group that justified the exclusion, and not the 
individual set of individual identities that form one’s sense of self. The ethnic women 
had imposed upon them the role of embodying the nation, and this put them at risk of 
sexual violence. However, once their bodies were used as a battlefield, a shift 
occurred where the impurity of their body was transferred to their moral character. 
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Having their bodies – and therefore the body of the nation – ‘spoiled’ by the enemy 
group, these women now started to be considered ‘sinful’ by their own group in the 
aftermath of the violence. Since their impurity could no longer be justified by their 
ethnic identity – an identity they share(d) with their group - their kin group now 
justified this impurity as a result of their own personal sense of self. This is an 
important shift from group moral exclusion to individual moral exclusion. This shift 
is now included in this proposed framework, clearly showing how the exclusion now 
experienced also comes from the kin group of these women, and not only the enemy 
group. Chapters Six and Seven demonstrate in more depth how this moral exclusion 
takes form, such as through inability to secure employment, unequal access to 
services, etc. In a sense, for these women, the violence has ended, but the moral 
aggression they suffered during the armed conflict is still present in the aftermath, 
though with different manifestations and to a different extent. I argue throughout this 
thesis that this remains the main moral transgression that these women experience in 
the post-conflict period. 
Mediating the Experiences 
Moral exclusion takes considerable time to address, and in this case, it is only by 
transforming social norms, and the moral rules at their core, that women (and men) 
who experienced wartime sexual violence will be reintegrated within their 
community (Opotow, 2004: 105). This process may take considerable time, but is 
still possible. As Opotow (1990: 12) suggests, the process of moral exclusion allows 
individuals and society to modify each other:  
In one direction, individuals internalize the prevailing social order, reshape 
their perceptions of others, reconfigure their moral community, and engage 
in symptoms of moral exclusion such as dehumanization, victim blaming, 
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psychological distancing and condescension. In the other direction, moral 
exclusion emerges from individuals; their attitudes and behaviours reshape 
the social order, redefining group entitlements, narrowing the scope of 
justice, and reinforcing the perceptual distortions that gave rise to them. 
Individuals have the power to transform the social order and to redefine the moral 
values of their community. However, since survivors of sexual violence are excluded 
from this decision-making process, many of them now rely on NGOs to bring about 
this transformative social change.  
To achieve this, women’s NGOs tend to provide programmes that target women’s 
empowerment, voice and agency. Voice refers to women being represented in 
various spheres (political representation is one example) and have their concerns and 
needs heard (World Bank, 2014: 7), while agency refers to ‘the ability to make 
decisions about one’s own life and act on them to achieve a desired outcome, free of 
violence, retribution, or fear’ (World Bank. 2014: 3). Empowerment refers to 
economic, social and political power shifts between gender groups that allow women 
to implement the choices made about their lives (Batliwala, 2007: 560; Munoz-
Boudet, Petesch, Turk and Thumala, 2012: 21). These processes are perceived as 
crucial for improving women’s rights and social status, since it is argued that 
increased agency, voice and empowerment are crucial for an holistic improved 
livelihood (improved health, increased income, etc.), and that limited agency restricts 
access to services and opportunities (World Bank, 2014: 2). 
These processes are inter-connected and are all necessary for the social 
reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence, but may result in different 
programmes within the NGOs. For example, whilst NGOs may agree that 
institutional changes are needed to transform gender power relations, empowerment 
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programmes will often take the form of microcredit, land ownership, etc. (Batliwala, 
2007: 563). In contrast, increasing voice may instead focus on the inclusion of 
women in political institutions (World Bank, 2014: 7). Due to the nature of these 
programmes and the often inability of the post-conflict state to achieve these 
processes, NGOs are often the actors with the ability to promote these processes for 
marginalized groups, such as survivors of sexual violence (Fisher, 1997: 443). 
Indeed, as a result of the ‘New Policy Agenda’ in the 1990s, NGOs have been 
attributed with the role of fostering post-conflict reconstruction and strengthening 
civil society (Tarry, 2000: 109). This has increased both their roles and influence in 
conflict and post-conflict societies, as the following quote suggests.   
A mutual dependence between governments and NGOs has resulted, with 
NGOs increasingly looking to public donors to contribute to their projects, 
and governments relying on NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid and other 
services in complex emergencies and in peacebuilding operations (Bennett, 
1994: xiii). 
However, the academic literature has so far been extremely critical of the role of 
NGOs, suggesting that their autonomy and agency are seriously constrained by two 
actors: states and donors (Bennett, 1994: xiii; Tarry, 2000: 109). Consequently, I 
argue that the NGOs I observed in both contexts undertake the role of mediating the 
experiences of the survivors of sexual violence, providing them with services to 
increase their voice, agency and empowerment, while at the same time operating 
within the parameters imposed by their donors and the state in which they operate. 
The focus of the ‘New Public Agenda’ is on poverty reduction and the 
Millennium Development Goals (now the Sustainable Development Goals) - and 
more recently on international security - meaning that important sources of funding 
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are prioritizing programmes associated with these issues (Hayman, 2006: 16-19). It 
is suggested that states have a strong interest in aligning with these international 
priorities, providing them with increasing opportunities to receive funding and to 
strengthen their civil society (Whitfield, 2009: 1). International priorities therefore 
align with the need to increased women’s voice, agency and empowerment, but here 
the NGOs face the difficult challenge of promoting these processes to a group of 
marginalized women: the survivors of sexual violence. 
Indeed, as argued above, the women who experienced wartime rape are positioned 
outside the scope of justice of their nation, and the NGOs working with them need 
first of all to reintegrate them as members of the nation before being able to support 
them as women. This requires additional programmes that may not be included 
within the SDGs (or previously within the MDGs) and that are specifically designed 
for post-conflict societies. This therefore puts the NGOs I observed in a situation 
whereby the needs of their beneficiaries may require specific programmes, whilst the 
NGOs themselves also need to align with the national strategic interests of their 
donors and of the state in which they operate. This may not always provide the 
necessary institutional changes needed for the reintegration of the survivors of sexual 
violence (Hamilton, K., 2000: 53).  
Relation between Nation/State-Building and Social 
Reintegration 
This situation is complicated in post-conflict states, where I also argue that the 
policies of post-conflict reconstruction strongly shape the social reintegration of the 
survivors of sexual violence. Theorists of post-conflict reconstruction agree that:  
 43 
A mixture of measures aimed to rebuild both the Nation and the State are 
needed. The basis assumption remains that state-building and nation-
building are two different, albeit necessary, elements to guarantee the 
reintegration of a State into the peaceful international community after a 
conflict (Fischer and Quénivet, 2005: 11-12).  
For peacebuilders, state-building refers to the task of reconstructing the 
institutional structures of the state (government structure, elections, rule of law, 
police forces, etc.), and its physical structures, such as schools and roads. In a post-
Cold War context, international actors involved in state-building also assert that this 
reconstruction is only possible through the establishment of a liberal economy based 
on the Western model (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 11; Diamond, 1999: 78-88; Fischer 
and Quénivet, 2005: 14; Hippler, 2008: 552). By contrast, nation-building usually 
refers to a certain degree of identification with a common language, history and 
culture (Tilly, 1975: 608; Smith, 1991: 76), allowing the establishment of a sense of 
national identity and loyalty to the state (Colley, 1992: 6). This can be extremely 
complex in the aftermath of ethnic violence (Hobsbawm, 1997: 360; Hechter, 2000: 
65).  
Whilst often described in the literature as a dichotomy, I argue that both sets of 
policies are needed for broader post-conflict reconstruction, and for the reintegration 
of the survivors of sexual violence. The following section will analyse in further 
detail how each process influences individual experiences of belonging, 
demonstrating how they both remain intertwined and crucial for the processes of 
social reintegration. 
Social Belonging through State-Building 
Theories of post-conflict reconstruction refer to state-building as the 
reconstruction of government institutions and structures, governance, and state 
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capacity-building, alongside economic development. First, in terms of governance, 
the academic literature on post-violence reconstruction tends to privilege the 
establishment of a democratic government and political culture in post-conflict 
societies (Manning, 2006: 725; Oberschall, 2007: 198-199; Hippler, 2008: 552; 
Loizides, Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 2). This democratic governance should involve 
functioning municipal administration and legal courts, and be committed to the 
accommodation of minorities. It should also include free speech and freedom of 
association, a constitution that secures civil and political rights, and an electoral 
system that promotes moderation (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 33; Hechter, 2000: 138; 
Reynolds, 2002: Introduction). The aim is to create conditions where access to state 
services is accessed by all, rejecting a winner-take-all approach that could fuel 
further ethnic resentment. However, no consensus has been reached in the academic 
literature on which constitutional design should be implemented to achieve this 
stable society. 
For instance, proponents (Lijphart, 1977: 54-55; McGarry and O’Leary, 2004: 17; 
Loizides, Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 2) of a system that acknowledges and 
accommodates the ethnic identities at the source of the conflict support the 
establishment of consociationalism, a system in which power-sharing and the federal 
structure are based upon ethnicity. This system would mean that the survivors of 
sexual violence would have their rights secured as members of their ethnic group, 
since consociationalism promotes the maintenance of multi-ethnic politics.  
Individuals would therefore have the incentive to maintain a sense of belonging with 
their own ethnic group.  
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However, other scholars such as Horowitz (1993: 35-36) suggest instead that a 
transition from a multi-ethnic democracy to a political culture based on special-
interest politics is crucial. Horowitz criticizes consociationalism for strengthening 
divisions between ethnic groups, and proposes instead the establishment of a unitary 
state, where competition occurs between cross-ethnic groups with similar political 
interests rather than between ethnic groups. This should be achieved alongside an 
important process of nation-building, creating incentives for individuals of different 
ethnicity to share similar political interests (Horowitz, 1993: 35-36). 
Snyder (2000: 70) argues that political leaders face the challenge of appealing to 
their constituency for political power. However, in the aftermath of ethnic violence, 
this need for mass support can lead to discourses of ethnic supremacy and be an 
obstacle to peacebuilding. Fearon and Laitin (2000: 855) also suggest that political 
competition in divided societies can be a direct cause of ethnic violence, because 
political elites can legitimise their political power by claiming their group faces an 
external threat. Finally, Mann (2004: 231-235) argues that the democratization 
process can be an explosive issue in divided societies, since control over the state 
means control over a high number of resources. Changing identities at the local level 
would therefore facilitate democratic consolidation, but more importantly for this 
thesis, it would mean that the reconstruction of the sense of belonging of the 
survivors of sexual violence is not necessarily constrained by ethnic politics, thus 
creating opportunities for these individuals to reconstruct their sense of self 
independent of their ethnicity.  
The type of constitutional design adopted by the post-conflict state therefore has 
impacts beyond the political or institutional level, since it directly influences whether 
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individuals have the incentive to mobilize based on political interests which are not 
embedded within ethnic identities.  
Social Belonging through Nation-Building 
Nation-building generally refers to a certain degree of assimilation or cohesion 
under an inclusive national identity (Deutsch and Foltz, 1966: 118; Weilenmann, 
1966: 40; Fischer and Quénivet, 2005: 17-18), but in cases of post-conflict societies, 
it also entails the implementation of mechanisms of truth, justice and reconciliation. 
These mechanisms are crucial for group cohesion because they establish individual 
accountability and allow individuals on the margins of society to be included in the 
reconciliation process. This process provides not only the necessary tools upon 
which ethnic reconciliation and group cohesion are possible, but also facilitates the 
social reintegration of certain victims of war. The establishment of truth and the 
prosecution of war criminals are necessary steps in the process of healing, shame 
removal for the victims and social inclusion under an inclusive group identity 
(Sarkin, 1999: 800; Loizides, Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 6).  
This body of the literature provides a direct response to the argument presented 
above, on how women who were raped during the previous ethnic violence find 
themselves outside the scope of justice of their kin group. These mechanisms of 
truth, justice and reconciliation directly attempt to reverse this social pattern, 
allowing the women to be reintegrated within the scope of justice of their in-group, 
transferring their experienced blame, shame and immorality to their perpetrators 
(Sarkin, 1999: 799; Cockburn, 2001: 27-29). To do so, the rule of law should be 
effectively restored, as well as becoming fair and trustworthy enough for the 
population to favour court rulings over private revenge. Mechanisms regarding the 
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reintegration of war offenders should also be implemented (Minow, 1998: 77-78; 
Mobekk, 2005: 277-278). 
The establishment of truth and reconciliation processes in divided societies can, 
however, be extremely challenging, as can be demonstrated by the Rwandan context. 
Aoláin, Haynes and Cahn (2011: 171) and King (2011: 139) argue that despite the 
success of Gacaca courts, it remains difficult for crimes of sexual violence to be 
prosecuted in some cases because of the absence of witnesses. The relative absence 
of crimes of sexual violence in the Gacaca courts demonstrates how the truth about 
the past conflict can be constructed in a way that denies some victims reconciliation 
and justice, and ensures the relative absence of sexual violence in public discourses. 
As King (2011: 139) suggests, women ‘were not allowed to say anything related to 
rape because doing so could lead the rapist génocidaire back to prison and in turn be 
considered as a crime committed by these women. Further, they did not see any 
support from the judges or other community members’. This is something that will 
be discussed in more depth in Chapter Six, and is a direct consequence of the change 
in the women’s moral value, who now find themselves outside the scope of justice of 
their own community. This therefore prevents or complicates their access to 
mechanisms of truth, justice and reconciliation, which are normally allowed to 
members of the in-group. 
Finally, nation-building also includes the strengthening of group cohesion under a 
national identity. It is argued that ‘the greater the love felt by the members of a 
population for their country, language and state, the more these values become a 
common good that brings them to the whole’ (Weilenmann, 1966: 40). Divided 
societies should then foster a certain degree of assimilation to particular values, 
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language, history and culture as a transition from tribal or ethnic affiliation to 
national identification (Smith, 1991: 76; Colley, 1992: 382; Hobsbawm, 1997: 360-
363; Hechter, 2000: 64-65). This ideology of civic nationalism may challenge the 
concept of woman-as-nation, but since I argued above that the post-conflict period is 
characterized by a shift from the ethnic to the moral, where it is not the women’s 
ethnic identities that were questioned, but rather their social moral value, a move 
towards civic nationalism may still not reintegrate the survivors of sexual violence 
into the community’s scope of justice.  
Discussion 
It can therefore be argued from the above theoretical framework that the women 
who suffered from wartime rape face social exclusion in the aftermath of the 
violence, as a result of their socially perceived low moral value. Differently from the 
ethnic war, where the rape was spoiling their ethnic identities, it is now their personal 
self that is being questioned by members of their community, since the perceived 
‘dirtiness’ of their bodies has now been equated with their morality. This is 
something that will be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. However, while the 
NGOs may provide programmes that allow them to reconstruct their personal sense 
of self, through increased agency, voice and empowerment, they operate in a context 
where the post-conflict reconstruction mostly targets a reconstruction of the nation’s 
identity, which will be discussed in further depth in Chapter Eight. Indeed, the 
policies of state or nation-building all share the same consequence of influencing the 
type of social belonging available to the survivors of sexual violence, such as 
mobilizing around ethnic or national identities. Yet, these policies do not challenge 
the moral norms that are at the core of the exclusion experienced by these women. 
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With the women and the states operating at different conceptual levels, the NGOs 
therefore have the role of bridging the gap between these micro and macro 
experiences. These concepts will be brought forward in Chapter Eight. 
This thesis aims to explore how these experiences take form in two specific 
contexts, and addresses two broad main research questions: 
1. How are women who suffered from wartime sexual violence experiencing 
social belonging 15-20 years after the end of ethnic violence? 
2.  How do NGOs and state policies influence these experiences of social 
reintegration? 






Chapter 3. Methods and Data 
This chapter will discuss the methods used to conduct this research. It will first 
discuss the research design, before elaborating on the methods used. It will then 
discuss the ethical concerns related to this research and the actions implemented to 
address these concerns. 
Contrast and Interpretative Research Design 
To address the research questions, I undertook in-depth fieldwork observation and 
interviews in two contrasting contexts, in order to highlight the similarities and 
differences of the women’s post-conflict experiences across these contexts.  
Following Mill’s method of agreement (1843: 454), these two countries were 
chosen because of their shared experience of ethnic violence and of wartime sexual 
violence, and because of important differences in their post-conflict settlements. It is 
argued that both conflicts drastically changed the ways in which war rape has come 
to be understood, with the International Court of Justice for the former Yugoslavia 
being the first international tribunal to prosecute individuals solely on the basis of 
crimes of sexual violence (Peterson and Runyan, 2010: 161). However, the countries 
differ in their views on ethnic accommodation, and despite gender-sensitive policies, 
both still face the challenge of promoting gender equality in the post-conflict setting 
(as described in Chapter Five).  Furthermore, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian and 
Rwandan contexts present an interesting contrast in relation to the work conducted 
by NGOs to address the needs of this population, and the international aid made 
available for these civilian victims of war. It is worth specifying that NGOs were 
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chosen instead of state-run programmes in order to analyse whether their 
programmes and services align with the post-conflict reconstruction methods 
implemented by the state, or whether non-governmental organisations negotiate 
different practices of post-conflict reconciliation. 
Following Geertz’s approach in Islam Observed (1968), this research bases itself 
on the rationale that an ethnography of the women’s and NGOs’ post-conflict 
experiences allows me to draw out the particularities of each context, which when 
contrasted highlight the similarities and differences across these contexts. They then 
form a commentary on each other, which is why the particular experiences in 
Rwanda can be fully understood only in contrast to the experiences in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and vice-versa. 
Two Targeted Ethnographies 
I conducted targeted ethnographic fieldwork in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
because it allowed me to observe the work done by the NGOs and to engage with the 
women and NGO staff. As Streeck (1983: 9) mentions of micro-ethnographies, 
‘[they] seek to combine the exhibition of organizational processes in face-to-face 
interaction with the pursuit of applied issues’. A targeted ethnography was therefore 
appropriate in this case, since this research is not an observation of the NGOs as 
wholes, and instead focuses tightly on the programmes and services offered to their 
beneficiaries, and on their mediation role between their beneficiaries and the state. 
This approach was favoured over others because of the interpretative nature of this 
research. In order to gain the understandings and perceptions of my research 
participants, it was important to engage personally with them through a variety of 
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research methods, and a targeted ethnography allowed me to do so through 
participant observation, focus groups, and semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews (Davies, 1999: 4; Fielding, 2008: 267).  
My fieldwork took place over a total period of seven months in 2013, in which 
four months were spent intensively with the NGOs and the women. It is worth noting 
that my time in the field in Rwanda was considerably longer than in Bosnia-
Herzegovina for a variety of reasons. First, Bosnia-Herzegovina was my second 
ethnographic site, which meant that I arrived in BiH with a clearer research focus 
than in Rwanda; I needed more time to develop my research angle in Rwanda, which 
was not the case in BiH. Second, the experiences of the women and of the NGOs are 
different in each context, as will be described in Chapters Six and Seven, which 
meant that the fieldwork conducted was also different. For example, the 
organisations I observed in BiH did not provide the same variety of programmes as 
in Rwanda, so I spent less time observing each organisation in the former. Moreover, 
as the experiences on the ground are different in both countries, so is the experience 
of the researcher. I found Bosnia-Herzegovina a difficult field site, which I will 
explain in more detail below. For the purpose of this thesis, the data collected in this 
latter field site is sufficient, but more research in that context should be conducted 
for future projects.  
The purpose of this thesis is not to determine what is true or false, but rather to 
analyse the perceptions and interpretations of my research participants on their post-
conflict experiences. Moreover, the analysis conducted is a result of my own 
interpretations of these individual perceptions. As noted by Dewalt and Dewalt 
(2002: 30), ‘our personal characteristics as individuals - our ethnic identity, class, 
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sex, religion and family status - will determine how we interact with and report on 
the people we are studying’. There is therefore the possibility that the data collected 
was influenced by my identity and presence in the field, which may have influenced 
the behaviours and discourses of some individuals (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 
111; Davies, 1999: 3; Carpenter, 2012: 364). For example, it may have been possible 
that some staff members exaggerated the difficulties they face in order to encourage 
more support for their organisation. I however do not believe that this happened in 
practice, since the staff members were aware that my research would not necessarily 
be used to promote their aid sector, and they were aware that the names of the 
organisations would be anonymised, therefore the thesis would not promote their 
specific organisation. Dickson-Gomez (2004: 153) also warns about the potential 
dilemma of an outsider explaining participants’ suffering without misinterpreting 
their memories of trauma and violence. This has been an important challenge, and 
throughout the research process I constantly questioned my interpretations of the 
data, ensuring that I did not form assumptions and make claims that were not 
substantiated by my data.  
Some steps were implemented whilst conducting this research to limit potential 
bias, as explained above. The data was collected through participant observation, 
semi-structured and unstructured interviews, as well as focus groups, which allowed 
me to contrast the data and to ensure that I was not misinterpreting some statements 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 24; Davies, 1999: 85). Despite these steps 
undertaken, I acknowledge the possibility of bias in the respondents’ behaviours and 
narratives as a result of my presence in the field, and acknowledge my identity as a 
researcher who is also an atheist, a Western woman and an outsider from these 
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countries and experiences. Since as researchers we are not excluded from the social 
world we research, my identity and personal experiences have therefore probably 
influenced the way I approached this study (Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002: 30-31). One 
such example can be found in Rwanda, when I was attending an educational session 
for HIV-infected individuals at Organisation D. The session focused on safe sexual 
behaviours and practices, and the sexual norms discussed aligned with more 
traditional Christian values. Participants however started to ask me questions about 
sexual norms in the Western World, showing disbelief of certain behaviours. This is 
a banal example, but demonstrates how my social values and norms may differ from 
those of my research participants, and that these embedded values may have 
influenced my understanding of the consequences of sexual violence, and the 
resulting stigmatisation. 
Finally, it is worth specifying that whilst this research focuses on women who 
experienced wartime sexual violence, this type of abuse can also be practiced on men 
and children. My focus was chosen for theoretical and practical reasons, but also 
because women represent the vast majority of the victims of sexual violence during 
armed conflicts. One should, however, be careful not to naturalise women as victims. 
It can be quite straightforward to understand wartime sexual violence as a dichotomy 
between male aggressors and female victims. Doing so, however, would be harmful, 
since it renders gender roles static (women as passive and men as aggressive) and 
marginalizes the male victims of sexual violence, making it even harder for them to 
receive assistance and resources.  It is worth noting that women also participated in 
encouraging sexual violence, as demonstrated by the case of Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko, the former minister of Family and Women’s Affairs in Rwanda, 
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who became the first female génocidaire prosecuted for her role in encouraging rape 
as a weapon of war (Peterson and Runyan, 2010: 161).  
Participant Observation in Two Fields 
My fieldwork first involved participant observation of grassroots and international 
organisations working with women who had experienced wartime sexual violence. In 
Rwanda, this included five grassroots and international non-governmental 
organisations in Kigali and in the Eastern province. Most services for survivors of 
sexual violence are currently being provided in Kigali, which is why I wanted to 
observe NGOs in this capital: some organisations were chosen because of their 
reputation in the field (Organisation E), others because they represent international 
organisations (Organisations A and B), and some others because they are grassroots 
organisations (Organisations C and D). I also observed the Eastern branch of 
Organisation E to draw out the particularities of this organisation in a rural setting. 
Due to the limited scope of this research where it was impossible to observe the work 
of all organisations working with survivors of the genocide, I chose these five 
organisations as I believe they represent well the NGO sector in Rwanda. From 
international to grassroots, from large to small NGOs, these five NGOs each 
represent the variety of the NGO sector in the Rwandan context. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, I observed the work done by five grassroots organisations 
that work with mothers, widows and survivors of sexual violence. These 
organisations were located in Sarajevo and in another municipality in the centre of 
the country, which I anonymise for purposes of this research. Prior to conducting 
fieldwork, I had decided that my research would focus on Bosnian Muslim women 
for ease of access in the field (most women who seek NGOs support identify as 
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Bosnian Muslim) and because they represented the majority of the women raped 
during the war. I am aware that this focus contributes to the lack of research on 
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croat women. However, for the purpose of this research, 
this focus and the fact that the majority of Bosnian Muslim women who were victims 
of sexual violence during the war currently live in the Federation of BiH, meant that 
I chose NGOs that were established in that entity. Moreover, as with the Rwandan 
context, most organisations operate in Sarajevo, the capital. However, I also engaged 
with an organisation located in another canton in the Federation of BiH 
(Organisation J). These organisations were specifically chosen because of their 
reputation in the country (Organisations G, I and J), one because it is a grassroots 
organisation (Organisation F) and another because it was recommended to me by one 
of the women I interviewed (Organisation H). Similarly to Rwanda, I chose these 
organisations because I believe they well represent the variety of the aid sector in 
BiH. Of course, an exact representation of the aid sector in both contexts is 
impossible to achieve for this research, and this was not the intended purpose. Whilst 
my rationale for including organisations in my fieldwork was based on the need to 
include contrasting NGOs (international to grassroots, large to small), the 
ethnographic nature of the research prevents any generalisations to the wider aid 
sector across both contexts.  
Observation was conducted with the purpose of developing a clearer 
understanding of the work done by these NGOs, of the relationship between the 
organisations and their beneficiaries, and finally of the mediation role they undertake 
(Walsh, 1998 in Seale, 1998: Chapter 17; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 14). Participant 
observation as a method normally involves a long-term observation of research 
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subjects but as discussed above, a targeted ethnography was conducted in each 
organisation. This focused research agenda meant I spent less time doing participant 
observation with each organisation than a normal ethnography would entail 
(Lambert, Glacken and McCarron, 2011: 20). 
My participant observation of the NGOs’ activities provided me with an initial 
understanding of the range of services offered to their beneficiaries, of the 
participants’ behaviour when participating in the activities, and of the relationship 
between the women themselves and the staff members. I was able to conduct this 
direct observation in their natural setting on a day-to-day basis without strongly 
impacting the research participants, and as a result I developed a better 
understanding of their ordinary behaviour and experiences (Davies, 1999: 71; Dewalt 
and Dewalt, 2002: 1-2; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 14; Gomm, 2008: 269). The data 
gathered through this participant observation was mostly useful to address my 
second research question, i.e. How do NGOs influence the women’s experiences of 
social reintegration? 
In addition, using participant observation as a first method of data collection 
offered me the opportunity to build close relationships with the research participants, 
mostly with the women (Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002: 40-45; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 
14). Building relationships of trust, respect and friendship was crucial to conducting 
my fieldwork. Participant observation allowed the women to get to know me during 
the activities, and helped create relationships of trust in which they felt comfortable 
speaking about their post-conflict experiences, which paved the way to answer my 
first research question (How are women who suffered from wartime sexual violence 
experiencing social belonging 15-20 years after the end of ethnic violence?). This 
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was also important to achieve early on in my fieldwork because of my position as an 
outside researcher, and the possibility that the women might have been 
uncomfortable in speaking to me about their past (Walsh, 1998: 226). 
There are, however, a few weaknesses associated with using participant 
observation as a research method of which I was aware. First, the researcher being 
the primary research instrument in participant observation, I had to ensure that my 
observation was not too narrow and excluded important facts or events, or that my 
interpretation of certain behaviour was not inadequate (Walsh, 1998: 221; Dewalt 
and Dewalt, 2002: Chapter 4; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 14; Gomm, 2008: 292). This 
was controlled in the field by keeping extensive field notes and by discussing with 
my interpreters some situations or behaviours that I found puzzling. There was also 
the possibility that the organisations observed might have had an incentive to keep 
things secret in order to be perceived in a favourable light. There is a chance that 
what was considered ‘ordinary’ during my observation was in fact a cover made by 
these organisations (Walsh, 1998: 231; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 14). However, I do 
not believe it to be the case for this research, as in most cases I was able to support 
the claims made by the staff members through other sources of data, such as official 
documents or the interviews and focus groups conducted. 
 Finally, while some scholars (Davies, 1999: 70-71; Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002: 18; 
Silverman, 2006: 82-85) have also warned against the risk of ‘going native’ - which 
refers to becoming so involved in participant observation that one’s status as a 
researcher is lost and events or behaviour are instead interpreted from the worldview 
of the research participants - this was not as much an issue in this case because of the 
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nature of the ethnographic research which was narrow and targeted, and over a 
limited period of time. 
Focus Groups 
Focus groups were organised in both places with women who survived sexual 
violence and with groups of beneficiaries. In Rwanda, I conducted four focus groups: 
two focus groups with HIV-infected individuals and two focus groups with women 
who were raped during the genocide (there was no overlap between the experiences 
in these focus groups). The two focus groups organised with the rape survivors 
contributed data that directly addressed my first research question, and the focus 
groups with HIV-infected individuals were conducted in order to understand the 
similarities and differences in stigmatization that these different groups of 
individuals may face. The focus groups with HIV-infected individuals were very 
helpful in providing a nuanced analysis of the post-conflict experiences of the rape 
survivors. These focus groups were held in the offices of the organisations I observed 
during educational training and group counselling sessions. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, I 
conducted one focus group during a knitting session with 20 women who 
experienced wartime sexual violence. These women were chosen since they had 
already formed a group as members of the same organisation, a clear advantage. 
Indeed, the focus groups in both field sites were conducted in group activities already 
planned by the organisations, which meant that all participants knew each other. The 
groups were therefore organic groups, since they were either groups of income-
generating activities, HIV-infected individuals, or women who experienced wartime 
rape. I chose to conduct the focus groups in this manner thinking that the women 
may be more comfortable expressing themselves in a group setting, where the other 
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women involved all share the same trauma. In practice, the group setting created an 
atmosphere of emotional support where it became easier for the participants to 
overcome feelings of shame or embarrassment (Morgan and Kruger, 1993: 12-17; 
Kitzinger, 1994: 112; Cronin, 2008: 233). Focus groups were however not conducted 
with NGO staff members because of the complexity of their work schedules. 
Focus groups were included in this ethnographic research because they are ideal 
ways to explore opinions in the context of a group dynamic, especially in my case 
when they already form constituted groups. This was especially interesting in order 
to contrast the group dynamic and social belonging within the groups in Rwanda to 
the group in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, since I am not part of the same 
culture as the research participants and have not suffered from the same trauma, 
focus groups were helpful in allowing the respondents to raise issues that I had not 
planned for and to discuss issues without imposing my prior knowledge or biases, or 
lack of knowledge. Indeed, the group dynamic inherent to focus groups allows ideas 
and opinions to be shared, nuanced and clarified without constant intervention from 
the researcher. Other participants might also challenge statements made by others, 
which can prevent participants from embellishing their accounts and misleading the 
researcher (Fern, 1982: 1-2; Morgan and Kruger, 1993: 17-18; Kitzinger, 1994: 105-
112; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 16; Cronin, 2008: 228).  
Moreover, focus groups were ideal for this research because of the sensitivity of 
the topic. Focus groups can be used when researching sensitive topics, as research on 
HIV has demonstrated, because of the concept of ‘strength in numbers’ (Kitzinger, 
1994: 111). As will be explained below, face-to-face interviews on sensitive topics 
might be difficult to organise, especially when the researcher is perceived as an 
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outsider. However, there are some limitations associated with using focus groups that 
I had to address. 
First, there was a chance the information discussed might not be directly 
associated with the research, since focus groups do not give the researcher strong 
control over the research process (Bryman, 2004: Chapter 16). However, this was 
mitigated through the use of probes following interesting remarks and by conducting 
unstructured interviews as the last stage of my research, and in practice the focus 
groups generated interesting data to answer both of my research questions. 
Moreover, Cronin (2008: 240-241) warns of the possibility of creating a group effect, 
where a consensus is made despite individuals disagreeing with each other. This 
could happen if some individuals are more talkative and dominant than others. In 
these cases, the data collected may only be representative of a few individuals, and 
may understate disagreements and opposition within the group. This issue occurred 
in both contexts, where some women were more dominant than others, and seemed 
to be wishing to promote their message in contrast to others. Whilst Cronin would 
suggest trying to include the more reticent speakers into the group discussion, I 
decided not to target any individual and probe them to engage in the conversation in 
case they did not want to share private information on this specific topic. However, 
since this research does not attempt to provide a representative account of the post-
conflict experiences of all women, the data gathered through the focus groups was 
analysed as individual perceptions and understandings, and not as a group consensus. 
Unstructured and Semi-Structured Interviews 
In addition to participant observation and focus groups, I mostly conducted 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews with women who had experienced 
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sexual violence and the NGO staff members working with them. In Rwanda, I 
conducted in-depth interviews with ten women survivors of sexual violence during 
the genocide and 16 staff members. The survivor narratives all come from Tutsi 
women aged between 35 and 60 years old, who are members of a survivors’ 
organisation and mostly live in the Kigali Province (see Annex 1). Additionally, I 
engaged in non-formal interviews with around 30 survivors through attending 
counselling sessions, income-generating activities sessions, and follow-up health 
meetings. I also conducted an interview with a representative of the Ministry of 
Gender and Family Promotion. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, I engaged in in-depth 
interviews with six women survivors of sexual violence, and seven NGO staff 
members. The survivors of sexual violence include women of 35 to 60 years old, 
who are all members of a women’s organisation, all identify as Bosnian Muslims, 
and live in the Sarajevo Canton in the Federation of BiH (see Annex 1). Throughout 
my fieldwork in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I also engaged in non-formal interviews with 
around 20 survivors of sexual violence through attending income-generating 
activities sessions.  
The interviews were conducted with the women in order to generate data to 
answer both my research questions, but more specifically on their experiences with 
the NGOs and their experiences of belonging and stigmatisation within their 
families, communities and more broadly, their state (see Annex 2 and 3 for the list of 
questions). With the NGO staff, the interviews were mostly targeted on the second 
research question, which is to understand the work done by NGOs to reintegrate the 
women. The interviews were also aimed at understanding the process in which the 
programmes and services are created, and whether the perceptions that the staff 
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members have of the post-conflict needs of the women influence the type of services 
available. 
All women interviewed in both places were chosen based on their past experience 
of sexual violence and because of their affiliation to an NGO in order to limit the 
ethical risks. Interviewing women active in the NGOs ensured that they had access to 
psychological support in case of psychological distress during the interviews, and 
provided me with access to these women without having to directly contact them, 
perhaps putting them at risk of having the truth about their past becoming known in 
their community. This, however, has some implications for the analysis of the data. 
First, it meant that the majority of the women I interviewed came from either the 
Kigali Province or Sarajevo Canton, which is why the data cannot be generalized to 
all women who suffered from wartime sexual violence. There is indeed an urban 
bias, which means that this targeted ethnography mostly include the experiences of 
women having access to services in cities in contrast to survivors living in rural 
areas. Second, engaging with women active in NGOs also means that the experiences 
of those women who did not join an association are absent from this thesis. As I 
explained above, this decision was made for ethical reasons, but it is worth keeping 
in mind that this group of women may share specific socio-economic conditions that 
foster their involvement in NGOs, in contrast perhaps to those women who did not 
join an association.  
Furthermore, the age range of the women interviewed also means that the 
experiences told are only those of women who were teenagers and older during the 
war. I did not have the opportunity to discuss with women who were perhaps raped 
when young girls. Of all the women with whom I conducted formal interviews, only 
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one respondent in Rwanda did stay in proximity of where she was living during the 
genocide, with all the other women attempting to rebuild their lives outside their 
community. This woman is also the only survivor who openly discussed her child 
born out of rape. 
Once back from fieldwork, I also conducted two semi-structured interviews 
through Skype with an international organisation operating in Rwanda, and with an 
international organisation operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I also conducted a semi-
structured interview with two staff members of UN Women and the UN Trust Fund 
in New York, for a total of 42 interviews for this research. These last interviews were 
conducted in order to fill in some gaps from my fieldwork on the work done by 
NGOs in both contexts, and in the case of UN Women and the UN Trust Fund, to 
understand how donors may influence NGOs. This research angle opened up while I 
was in the field, with many NGO staff mentioning the impact that donors and 
donors’ priorities have on the work conducted on the ground. I therefore wanted to 
get a glimpse into the perspectives of international donors, which was not an easy 
task for this research. For instance, I contacted the UNFPA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the Red Cross, International Alert, UNDP Rwanda, UNDP Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Office of the Special Representative for Sexual Violence, the UN Action Plan, 
Bloomberg Institute, Medica Mondiale and DFID, who all either did not respond to 
interview requests or declined a research interview.  
As mentioned above, the interviews conducted in Rwanda and Bosnia-
Herzegovina allowed me to ask specific questions on my research and probe on 
specifically relevant data, allowing me a deeper exploration of the perceptions, 
interpretations and understandings of my research participants of their experiences of 
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social belonging and of the work done by NGOs (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 32-34; 
Mason, 2002: 63-65). This was ideal for enabling a direct contrast of the specificities 
of my two contexts (Bryman, 2004: Chapter 15). While the NGO staff member 
interviews were mostly semi-structured, the interviews with the women who suffered 
from sexual violence were unstructured. Indeed, I started and ended these interviews 
with open questions, first asking if there was anything in particular they wanted to 
speak about. The responses from this first question then directed the rest of the 
interview, which generated interesting data that will be analysed in Chapters Six and 
Seven. I still prepared an interview guide ahead of the interviews which included 
general open questions aimed at eliciting data on the friendship and social relations 
maintained in their communities, as well as the support they receive from the NGOs, 
but these questions only served as resources to guide the discussion, and each 
interview differed in the topic emphasised (Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 246-7). This 
flexibility that I had in probing, creating new questions or adapting my interview 
guide depending on the answers provided produced a variety and richness to the data 
collected (Seale, 1998: Chapter 16; Mason, 2002: 64-65; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 15; 
Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 250-251). It also meant that no one interview was the 
same. For example, most of the women interviewed in BiH either still had their 
husband or their children, while all women in Rwanda were single/widowed with 
many of them having lost a child during the genocide. Family relationships were 
therefore more discussed in BiH than in Rwanda, and this enables a direct contrast of 
my two contexts.  
Furthermore, in most cases, my interviews resembled more of a dialogue between 
my respondents and myself, which allowed me to nuance and clarify certain answers. 
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This dialogue strongly differed from the one in the focus groups, where the 
participants mostly discussed between themselves through a somewhat more 
superficial conversation. Instead, the interviews produced a space where the women 
were comfortable to engage more deeply into their personal lives, often leading to 
highly emotional discussions. This however strongly increased my understanding of 
their war and post-conflict experiences and perceptions (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 
32-34; Mason, 2002: 63-65; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 15; Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 
129-147; Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 248).  
However, there is a consensus in the academic literature that face-to-face 
interviews might be uncomfortable for some individuals, especially when the topic 
discussed is personal or sensitive as is the case with this research (Arksey and 
Knight, 1999: 34). This is the main obstacle that I faced in my research, since only a 
minority of women I met in both countries agreed to be interviewed. We were able to 
hold informal talks, but the idea of sharing their personal experiences formally, for 
research purpose was an uncomfortable thought for many of them. Furthermore, 
Seale (1998: Chapter 16) warns about the importance of establishing a relationship of 
trust with the interviewees since this will impact their willingness to disclose 
personal information and to tell the truth; participants may adapt their responses in 
order to please or mislead the interviewer. There is then a risk associated with 
interviews that the answers given are different to the actual behaviour of the 
respondents, and the researcher has no real way of knowing this only through 
research interviews (Bryman, 2004: Chapter 15; Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 249). 
The fact that I was not able to observe the women interact in their local community 
for ethical concerns, as explained below, meant that I could not personally observe 
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whether the claims made in the interviews are consistent with the social 
stigmatisation they described. However, I am fairly confident that the information 
provided in the interviews does not strongly differ from the real perceptions of the 
women, since the sincerity of the emotions felt during our encounters could not have 
been put on show to mislead me. 
Fielding and Thomas (2008: 255) also warn about the impact of differences in 
social position between the researcher and the participants on the validity of the 
interview. As mentioned above, as a Western white woman, I probably represented a 
certain power and privilege that was not available to some research participants. The 
perception interviewees have of the researcher can therefore influence their 
willingness to disclose some information, and this can be aggravated when the 
researcher is perceived as exploitative or representing geopolitical power relations 
(Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 255). This was especially a concern in Rwanda, where 
power relations between Rwanda and the Western world might have been reflected 
in our personal relationships. In these cases, interview responses might be distorted 
and unrepresentative of the participants’ true perceptions. This was controlled when 
conducting the interviews by ensuring that I reflected on the impression I gave the 
research participants by trying as much as possible to challenge the assumed power 
relations (Thomson, 2010: 20). This was a challenge in Rwanda since my ethnicity 
alone comes with certain assumptions and distinguished me from my participants. I 
however dressed modestly and took the public transport instead of taxis or private 
cars to travel to the organisations, which helped me to decrease to a certain extent the 
power imbalance between myself and the Rwandan women I met.  However, due to 
the fact that I was younger than all the women I met, the possibilities of echoing 
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power relationships were greatly limited. Instead, the women took on a more 
authoritative role of educating me about their experiences. This is supported by some 
findings that suggest interviews about sensitive topics are often more open when the 
researcher is ‘different’, i.e. an outsider. This is based upon the hypothesis that the 
outside researcher is perceived as less threatening, and as a stranger that needs to be 
educated on this topic (Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 256; Paluck, 2009: 47). This 
happened in both contexts, but more so in Rwanda, where the women opened up and 
discussed personal matters to an extent that I had not anticipated. I believe this 
happened more so in Rwanda due to the few opportunities that these women had of 
telling their stories to outsiders, in contrast to the women in BiH who had often 
spoken to other researchers before meeting me. Regardless, my identity as an 
outsider was a clear advantage for this research, since I did not represent a potential 
source of stigmatisation. 
Fieldwork in both countries also entailed the use of a translator, which the 
academic literature considers an acceptable solution to the language issue 
(Williamson et al, 2011: 382). However, conducting research in a language other 
than the study language is inherently challenging because of linguistic and cultural 
differences. It is argued that some words might not have an equivalent in the study or 
original language, and that some concepts might not be understood similarly between 
cultures (Davies, 1999: 77; Kapborg & Bertero, 2002: 55). This situation is further 
complicated when working with instant interpretation, where the risk of 
misinterpretation is greater. For instance, Kapborg and Bertero (2002: 54-55) detect 
three occasions where misinterpretation may arise: when the researcher addresses a 
question to the interpreter, when the interpreter translates this question to the 
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participant, and when the interpreter translates the participant’s response to the 
researcher. In all these situations, there is a risk that the questions might have been 
misinterpreted, misunderstood or modified. The key issue in cross-language research 
is therefore the challenge of attaining a translation that maintains both the intended 
meaning and its relevance in the study language and culture (Davies, 1999: 77; 
Kapborg & Bertero, 2002: 55). Since interpreters are influential agents in the 
generation of data, I put in place a few mechanisms suggested by the academic 
literature to limit misunderstandings in the research interviews and focus groups. 
First, it is argued that inadequate translations and understandings of the 
participants’ responses are reduced when the interpreter and the research participants 
are members of the same culture (Freed, 1988: 316; Kapborg & Bertero, 2002: 53; 
Temple and Edwards, 2002: 7). Temple and Edwards (2002: 7) also suggest that 
collaborating with an interpreter who comes from the same culture as the research 
participants might increase the participants’ comfort and desire to speak up, since the 
interpreter is often perceived as trustworthy. This can, however, be a challenge in 
divided societies, where the interpreter’s identity might create tensions with the 
research participants. Taking this into account, I decided to work in both places in 
collaboration with local women who were recommended to me by other academics 
who previously worked on similar topics, reducing the risks of misinterpretation 
since the interpreters were already aware of the context (Williamson et al, 2011: 
383). In Rwanda, my translator was trained as a social worker and worked for a few 
years with HIV-infected orphans. In BiH, my translator worked as a journalist and 
did some translation work for the Red Cross in the aftermath of the war. They both 
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have mixed identities from their parents and both fiercely condemn ethnic politics 
and divisions within their country. 
Moreover, as is suggested by some scholars (Freed, 1988: 316; Williamson et al, 
2011: 383), I met and discussed with both interpreters before collecting data in order 
to clarify the type of information/data that I specifically sought. This was also a good 
opportunity for them to go over the interviews/focus groups’ questions guide and to 
raise any issues. For instance, my translator in Bosnia-Herzegovina suggested 
printing some translated copies of the interview questions that the women could read 
before deciding to be interviewed or not. Finally, the position of the interpreter and 
their commitment to confidentiality were also discussed in those meetings (Freed, 
1988: 316). 
In practice, my translators were incredible women who played an important part 
in forging meaningful relationships with the women who experienced wartime rape. 
They became active in the research process and asked questions during the focus 
groups or unstructured/semi-structured interviews. Their local knowledge allowed 
them to probe on some answers by referring to local events, which highlighted even 
more the specificities of each context. They provided instant translation and also 
transcribed the recorded interviews into English, while I transcribed the interviews 
already in French or English. But more importantly, they also undertook the role of 
cultural mediator, bridging the cultural or social distance between the women 
interviewed and myself. 
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Documents 
Finally, I drew on some documents, such as official state statistics and annual 
NGO reports, to complement my data. I first drew on official statistics of state 
employment and state services, in order to go beyond my respondents’ perceptions 
and illustrate the gender and ethnic composition of the public sphere, aimed at 
explaining the social location of these survivors as ethnic women. These statistics 
can sometimes be misleading, as the criteria for including or excluding some cases 
are not always explicit. This can be ambiguous when working with ethnic or gender 
identification (Seale, 1998: Chapter 15; Davies, 1999: 160-167; Bryman, 2004: 
Chapter 10; Macdonald, 2008: 288). I then analysed the last annual report available 
for each NGO in order to access their financial data and establish relationships 
between themselves and their funders, since as Chapters Six and Seven will suggest, 
donors’ priorities have a strong impact on the NGOs’ services, and inevitably on the 
women themselves. In some cases, the last report publicly available was published in 
2011-2012, and for some organisations no annual reports were made public. I made 
the decision to only analyse reports that have been made public, instead of asking for 
insider access to the non-published reports, since I wanted to analyse the information 
the NGOs choose to disclose to the public and to financial donors. By doing so, I was 
able to get a glimpse of the way the NGOs present themselves to the public and their 
potential donors, the intended audience. This provided interesting data that highlights 
which programmes are prioritized by the NGOs and their donors.  
Analytical Strategy 
 This thesis follows an inductive approach, meaning that the language, 
categories, and themes discussed in this thesis directly emerged from the data 
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collected in the field. This required an extensive reading of my interview transcripts 
to identify certain themes and key words that were discussed by my research 
participants, and these categories were subsequently used to code my interviews, 
observation notes and informal conversations (Thomas, 2006: 238-239). I recorded 
my informal conversations and observations in my notebook, and analysed these 
sources of data using the same conceptual categories that emerged from my 
interviews.  
Therefore, the concepts discussed in this thesis - trauma, alternative families, 
holistic support, etc. – are those that were discussed directly by the women and the 
NGO staff I interviewed. For example, the women in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Rwanda used the word ‘trauma’ in its English form to describe their mental state in 
many occasions. These research interviews have therefore informed my use of these 
categories, since ‘in inductive coding, categories are commonly created from actual 
phrases or meanings in specific text segments’ (Thomas, 2006: 241). It is however 
worth noting that this language aligns with the wording used in the NGOs 
documents, which demonstrates that the women have internalized some of the NGO 
language to describe their own experiences. This may raises questions on how 
women who are not members of NGOs describe their post-conflict experiences, but 
for the purpose of this thesis, I have decided to keep this language since these are the 
concepts and terms that the women use to describe and understand their own 
experiences. Therefore, using these concepts throughout my analysis first limits any 
risks of misinterpreting these individual experiences, but more importantly it 
contributes to the reader’s understanding of interconnectivity between the women’s 
experiences and the NGOs work. 
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Ethical Concerns 
Due to the sensitivity of the topic researched, a few ethical concerns had to be 
addressed during the completion of this thesis. It is worth noting that this research 
abided by the University of Edinburgh’s Level 2 ethics guidelines 
(http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/research/ethics/postgraduate_research_ethical_procedures), 
and by the British Sociological Association’s ethics guidelines 
(http://www.britsoc.co.uk/media/27107/StatementofEthicalPractice.pdf).  
The purpose of this research is to investigate the post-conflict experiences of the 
women who experienced wartime sexual violence. Discussions about social stigma, 
family loss, or illness, for example, can create psychological stress for the women. 
Whilst the purpose of this research is to focus on the post-conflict period, the women 
still discussed their experiences of sexual violence during the ethnic violence, which 
could also lead to psychological distress. A few mechanisms were therefore put in 
place to limit the potential psychological risks. Participants were first informed in 
their consent form that they could leave the focus group or interview at any moment 
and without providing any reason. I followed Thomson’s (2010: 20) advice and 
agreed to meet with participants in the circumstances in which they feel most 
comfortable to do so (at home, early in the morning, in the presence of others, etc.). 
In the end, only one interview was conducted outside of the organisations, which will 
be discussed in Chapter Seven.  Instead, all focus groups and interviews were 
organised in the organisations’ buildings (unless asked otherwise), a place the 
participants knew and in which they were comfortable. This meant that staff 
members were in proximity in case the women became distressed. The use of 
qualitative methods when working with trauma survivors can also be challenging 
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since no one can predict how they will react during the interview process 
(Rosenblatt, 1995: 148). My interpreters and I created an atmosphere where empathy 
and sensitivity were central to the interviews conducted (Thomson, 2010: 27). 
However, both my interpreters and I ensured that we did not take on the role of 
untrained therapists (De Marrais and Tisdale, 2002: 121).  
Moreover, some studies (Rosenblatt, 1995: 144; Cromer and Newman, 2011: 
1542) also suggest qualitative research on trauma survivors may benefit the 
participants by providing them the opportunity to tell their stories to someone who is 
listening, showing empathy and taking their pain seriously. I believe this process 
happened in Rwanda, where despite some emotional interviews, the women were 
extremely happy to share their past to individuals who were listening to them, free of 
judgement. However, I do not think that this same process happened in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which is an important reason why my fieldwork period in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was shorter than in Rwanda. 
Indeed, I spent less time conducting research in BiH than in Rwanda for the 
reasons mentioned above, but mostly because of the emotional distress experienced 
by the women, my interpreter and myself. First, I developed a strong impression 
when conducting research with the women who experienced wartime rape in Bosnia-
Herzegovina that whilst the interviews did not create psychological distress, it 
contributed to their anger towards the government and international community. The 
women were angry towards their lack of recognition in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
towards the lack of change. Most women had already spoken about their past in the 
judicial system, to other researchers, and one woman (Dalija) even met Angelina 
Jolie as part of her visit to BiH. None of this has changed their situation, and at the 
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end of my stay in BiH, I developed the impression that I was contributing to their 
disappointment since I was not be able to grant them the changes they wanted – 
which primarily focused on legal recognition. For instance, the women were told that 
my research would not directly benefit them, but they still asked if I would be able to 
present my findings to their government. As Chapter Seven will argue, the women 
are looking for mediators who will promote the inclusion of their voices within the 
state policies, and I had the strong impression that they were hoping that my research 
would act as a mediation tool. The interview process itself was therefore not 
distressing, but it contributed to their anger and disappointment, and after a few 
interviews I realised that I could not conduct the same fieldwork in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as I had in Rwanda. I found that there was something distinct about the 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian context that made it emotionally difficult to conduct research 
without being able to provide changes to the women’s lack of legal recognition. This 
led me to develop a strong sense of guilt, which has been difficult to shake off since 
my return from fieldwork.  
In addition, scholars who have done research on sexual violence warn of the 
existence of psychological risks to the researcher because of the sensitivity of the 
topic. For instance, Rebecca Campbell mentions that ‘studying sexual violence, as a 
woman is, almost by definition, an emotional experience’ (Campbell, 2002: 35). She 
also mentions that working with victims of sexual violence challenges the 
researcher’s beliefs in justice and security, and strengthens our perception that 
women are never truly safe. Finally, she mentions how hearing in repetition about 
the suffering of others is a painful experience (Campbell, 2002: 70). Despite putting 
in place some mechanisms to limit the psychological risks to myself, such as setting 
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a clear schedule between work and social activities, and maintaining a support 
system, I started to be affected with this research during my stay in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It might have resulted from the fact that BiH was my second field site 
and that after my intense fieldwork in Rwanda, I was perhaps more vulnerable to 
these stories. But the fact remained that hearing various stories of rape and sufferings 
was a difficult experience that I was able to cope with at first, but one interview in 
particular in BiH was quite challenging. This story is partly described in Chapter 
Seven but without the exact details, because of the cruelty and violence of the crime. 
Since I first heard that story, I have told its details to only one other person, and this 
is a story that I will keep with me forever. That moment therefore represents for me 
the shift in which I realised the impact that this research had on myself, but also at 
this point on my translator. 
Indeed, for research like this, it is also important to protect the emotional safety of 
the interpreter. As Turner (2010: 213) mentions, research assistants can also suffer 
from anxiety and psychological distress when conducting fieldwork. Being from the 
same culture as the research participants does not guarantee that they have been 
confronted with these issues before, or that it is easier for them to discuss traumatic 
experiences. This is an issue that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where my 
translator also started to show signs of being emotionally affected by the stories 
heard. We held debriefs following our meetings with the women, we did a few social 
activities together and with her husband, but this could still not prevent both of us 
from being emotionally affected by the research. At a certain point during my 
fieldwork, she admitted she had trouble sleeping because she could not forget the 
stories of the women we met. After speaking about it, I asked her if she wanted to 
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continue the project, or if she preferred taking a step back. She decided to keep 
working together, but from that moment on, we both felt challenged by the research.  
After my first trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was therefore decided that I needed 
time to recover from my fieldwork. At this point I was still hoping to return into the 
field, but after taking into consideration the impact that my presence had on the 
women themselves, and the emotional challenges to both my translator and myself, it 
was decided that a return trip would not be conducted for this research. These ethical 
concerns therefore provide one explanation why the data in Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
limited in contrast to the Rwandan context, and demonstrate the difficulty of 
conducting intensive fieldwork research on a sensitive topic like this one. 
This also meant that I had to be aware of my emotions when analysing the data 
collected, since it is argued that the emotions felt when researching difficult topics 
can influence the process of data analysis (De Marrais and Tisdale, 2002: 121). For 
example, I was always composed in my interviews and controlled my emotions, but I 
can still associate some interviews with the intense emotions I suppressed. I did not 
want this to tarnish my data analysis, which is why I did not undertake any data 
analysis while on fieldwork, and allowed around three months after my return from 
fieldwork before starting to analyse the data collected. 
In addition to the psychological risks associated with this research, another ethical 
concern was the issue of confidentiality and anonymity. A consent form was 
provided to all individuals interviewed specifying their right to confidentiality and 
anonymity. The consent forms were translated into the primary languages of the 
participants. The participants (both staff members and survivors) accepted being 
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named by a pseudonym, protecting their identity, and it was agreed that all 
identifying factors would be removed from the research in order to present the 
findings in a way that cannot identify the participants (Davies, 1999: 51-53; Crow et 
al, 2006: 418; Wiles et al, 2008: 418). This explains why the names of the 
organisations are removed, as well as any descriptive factors such as place of 
residence or in-depth family history. Instead, a chart with general socio-demographic 
information of the women interviewed is included in Annex 1, but specific details 
about the women’s lives have been intentionally removed in order to prevent them 
from being identifiable. This also means that a chart with the dates spent in each 
organisation is not provided, in order to prevent the association between the women 
interviewed and the organisation of which they are a member. Finally, the 
participants were told that their words would probably be quoted in my thesis, and 
that this thesis is to be published. Moreover, only my translators and I had access to 
the raw data, and anonymity was and will be ensured every time the data is shared 
with other scholars or published.  
Furthermore, ethical issues also arose as a result of the political climate in 
Rwanda. For instance, it is illegal in Rwanda to ask participants about their ethnicity 
or to self-identify. I therefore did not ask about ethnicity, and instead used words 
such as community and genocide survivors. A few women however used the terms 
‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ in their responses, but mostly when speaking about themselves. 
As will be described in Chapter Six, the term ‘Hutu’ was consistently avoided, and 
these women used the term ‘Interahamwe’ instead. It was also important when 
working with the organisations to ensure that my research did not jeopardize their 
relationship with the government, which again explains why the organisations were 
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protected by removing their names in this thesis. Furthermore, the protection of the 
participants’ confidentiality and anonymity could have been a challenge in a political 
climate where the government might want access to raw data. This could have been 
quite problematic as the case of Thomson (2013: 140) demonstrated, where her 
research visa was revoked because she refused to identify her participants or to give 
government representatives access to her raw data. Precautions were therefore 
undertaken, such as keeping my observation notes and transcripts anonymized 
through the use of a codebook. The names of the individuals were kept in a different 
notebook than the interview notes, and my tape recorder and signed consent forms 
were safely locked away. Electronic files were emailed to my email address, 
removing any saved files from my computer (Thomson, 2010: 31; Begley, 2013: 82; 
Thomson, 2013: 152). However, once my research visa was accepted, the 
government did not contact me again or ask for any information regarding my 
research. 
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Chapter 4. Contrasted Post-Conflict Responses 
 This chapter provides a brief overview of the use of sexual violence in 
Rwanda and BiH and its consequences in the aftermath of the ethnic violence, before 
explaining the response of women’s NGOs and the resulting post-conflict policies of 
ethnicity and gender. It will suggest that in both places women’s bodies became the 
battlefield upon which the nation was attacked (Yuval-Davis, 1994: 413), but 
structural differences created contrasted NGO and state responses. 
Similar Crimes, Similar Consequences 
It is widely accepted that during the Rwandan genocide, sexual violence was used 
by both combatant forces as a weapon of war  (U.S. Department of State, 1995: 
section 1c). According to the United Nations (1998: section 3.10), it is estimated that 
many thousands of women and men were victims of sexual violence during the few 
months of the genocide, with other sources claiming the number of rapes reached 
between 250,000 and 500,000 (Hudson, 2010: 264). Moreover, 15,700 cases of raped 
women and hundreds of forced pregnancies were recorded by the Ministry for the 
Family & the Promotion of Women. These numbers, however, clearly underestimate 
the reality of sexual violence during the genocide since they do not take into 
consideration the reluctance of both women and men to admit they were sexually 
abused because of fear of social rejection (United Nations, 1996: section 16). 
However, because the number of rapes may become an extremely powerful tool for 
political propaganda, the exact figures might never be known. And yet, according to 
international organisations such as Human Rights Watch, almost every Tutsi woman 
who survived the genocide suffered from sexual violence (Skjelsbaek and Smith, 
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2001: 5). As René Degni-Ségui, the former UN Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, 
noted in 1996, ‘rape was the rule and its absence was the exception’ (quoted in 
United Nations, 1998: section 3.10).  
The use of sexual violence during the genocide was extreme due to the pre-war 
propaganda. Prior to the genocide, political propaganda sexualized Tutsi women, 
which led to an understanding that sexual violence was an appropriate tool for 
vengeance and hatred (West, 2005: 7; Wood, 2006: 327). For instance, the ‘Hutu Ten 
Commandments’ portrayed Tutsi women as less noble and chaste than Hutu women1 
(‘Hutu Ten Commandments’, 1990). Tutsi and Hutu women were perceived as 
representing the whole ethnic group, and consequentially the gateway through which 
the group could be destroyed (West, 2005: 17). ‘In this sense, rape served as a 
marker of ethnicity - a deliberate strategy to target women in their role as child 
bearers to destroy the purity of the ethnic group, by forcing them to give birth to 
“impure” babies’ (Hudson, 2010: 265). This was especially dreadful in Rwanda, 
where ethnic ties were still extremely relevant. Both men and women were so 
integrated within their community to the point Westerners had declared that the 
individual did not exist in Africa; such as was the case in Rwanda. The use of sexual 
violence during the genocide was therefore clearly intended as a crime against the 
whole ethnic group through this immoral conceptualization of nation-as-woman 
(Bop, 2001: 25). 
 When the genocide started, there was a race to rape, mutilate and force into 
sexual labour Tutsi women. Reports also suggest that many women (both Hutu and 
                                                
1 To quote, ‘Every Hutu must know that our Hutu daughters are more worthy and more 
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Tutsi) were forced to marry their captors or sold to the Interahamwe, the Hutu 
paramilitary organisation (United Nations, 1998: section 3.10). Women of all ages 
were targeted, including girls as young as ten and elderly women. Women who were 
also normally perceived as ‘chaste’, for instance nuns, were also targeted by the 
policy of mass rape (United Nations, 1996: section A.2.a.ii). 
Sexual violence during the genocide took two distinct forms, witnessed in 
different areas of the country, and demonstrative of the systematic nature of these 
acts: gang rape and forced incest. These rapes suggest forced impregnation was less 
at the core of the policy of mass rape (in contrast to Bosnia-Herzegovina), with the 
subjugation, humiliation and destruction of the ethnic group instead the prime 
motivation. This can also explain why the HIV virus was used as a weapon in order 
to cause the delayed death of the women who survived their sexual abuse (United 
Nations, 1996: section A.2.a.ii).  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bassiouni Report (1994), commissioned by the UN 
regarding the use of rape in Yugoslavia, reported that sexual violence was widely 
used by all sides, against both men and women, but that the largest numbers of rapes 
were committed by Bosnian Serbs against Muslims (Bassiouni Report, 1994: 60). 
Most of the literature on the subject tends to agree that the majority of perpetrators 
were part of the Serbian army, but it is also accepted that it would be misleading to 
ignore the atrocities committed by the other sides, including UN peacekeeping forces 
(Stiglmayer, 1994: 147; Benderly, 1997: 66).  Moreover, whilst it is agreed that some 
perpetrators acted on their own initiative, there were similarities in the overall pattern 
of sexual violence that suggest a systematic rape policy was implemented in some 
areas (Bassiouni Report, 1994: 60). The evidence recorded not only suggests sexual 
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violence was used as a weapon for ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian war (with an 
estimation of 20,000 to 60,000 rapes), but also that this practice was highly organised 
(Skjelsbaek and Smith, 2001: 53-4). 
Sexual violence during the Bosnian war involved an ethnic component that was 
necessary for the strategy of ethnic cleansing. Victims were targeted based on their 
gender, but mostly because they were Muslims, Croats or Serbs (Stiglmayer, 1994: 
84-85). During the armed conflict, sexual violence took three main forms. First, 
sexual violence was used as a tool to create forced exile (Korac, 1996: 137). The 
general pattern was the following: Serbian soldiers entered a Muslim town and 
sexually assaulted women from different ages out in the public view. Days later, the 
soldiers came back to the same town, and offered safe passage to the residents on the 
condition that they never return. Still terrified by the violation of the women, most 
residents accepted, easing the process of ethnic cleansing through forced exile 
(Allen, 1996: 62; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 202). Second, both men and women held 
in concentration camps were randomly chosen to be raped. In the cases where men 
were violated, soldiers often did not engage directly in the sexual assault, but instead 
forced men of the same ethnicity to abuse each other. And third, camps emerged 
during the war in which women were raped systematically over a long period of time 
in order to impregnate them (Stiglmayer, 1994: 135). These camps are clear evidence 
of the use of sexual violence as a weapon for ethnic cleansing, since the main 
purpose of these camps were to impregnate Muslim women with Serbian children 
(Allen, 1996: 63-65; Skjelsbaek, 2001; 54).  For instance, the slogan of the Serbian 
policy of mass rape was ‘You will give birth to a chetnik2 soldier’ (Meznaric, 1994: 
                                                
2 Chetnik here refers to Serbs. 
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77). Most women/girls survived these camps, but many were released only when 
their pregnancy achieved a stage where a safe abortion was impossible (Allen, 1996: 
63).  
In addition to these three main forms, sexual violence was also witnessed outside 
militarized areas in ethnically-mixed localities. For instance, sexual assaults occurred 
during interrogation procedures or against refugees seeking assistance. Furthermore, 
women involved in mixed marriages were also vulnerable to acts of sexual violence 
as punishment for marrying outside the ethnic group and threatening the survival of 
the group, or as a punishment for the behaviour of their national group. Women were 
still targeted based on their ethnicity in areas free of combat as a punishment and as a 
way of distinguishing between ethnic groups (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 197; 
Carpenter, 2010: 66).  
Moreover, forced pregnancies were extremely successful for the purpose of ethnic 
cleansing since ethnic purity was at the core of nationalist discourses in the former 
Yugoslavia (Korac, 1996: 137; Cockburn, 1998: 162). As explained by Morokvasic 
(1998: 76), the post-communist nationalist governments of the former Yugoslavia 
expected women to bear more children in order to secure the existence of the 
national group. In essence, in a time when the nation became described in organic 
terms, ethnic purity became at the core of nationalist discourses and it became the 
responsibility of the women to preserve this purity (Morokvasic, 1998: 75-76).  For 
instance, the Draft Law on Serbia’s Population Policy (1990) rewarded families with 
three children but punished childless couples through increased taxes.  The intention 
was to stimulate the growth of the Serbian population, and it was believed that every 
Serb should contribute either biologically or economically to the survival of the 
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nation. In addition, administrative procedures surrounding abortions became 
increasingly complicated (Milic, 1993: 113). The same reproduction race occurred in 
Croatia, where posters announced that ‘each unborn baby is an unborn Croat’ 
(Morokvasic, 1998: 76). Moreover, in cases where parents possessed mixed 
identities, it was the father’s identity that was transmitted to the children, prevailing 
over the mother’s nationality (Skjelsbaek and Smith, 2001: 55; Carpenter, 2010: 18). 
With the protection of ethnic purity at the core of the conflict, wartime rape was used 
as a tool to destroy and humiliate the other group by producing children that would 
be perceived as belonging to the aggressors’ ethnicity (Korac, 1996: 137; Nikolic-
Ristanovic, 1996: 202).   
In both contexts, sexual violence affected the lives of its survivors on multiple 
levels and on a long-term basis. As Hagen and Yohani (2010: 15) explain:  
Although rape is traumatic regardless of when it occurs, during war, rape 
tends to be of a greater magnitude, frequency, and intention. Given our 
current understanding of the long-term effects of this type of trauma, it is 
perhaps one of the most violent and effective tools of war.  
The first consequence of sexual violence remains its impact on the physical health 
of its survivors. Whilst rape is always physically harmful, in times of war it takes 
elements of sadism and extreme brutality that is rarely witnessed in “ordinary” rape. 
This is the case since the women targeted are not perceived anymore as purely 
individual women, but instead as embodiments of their ethnic group. The aggressors 
might be motivated in their actions to inflict as much pain and hatred as they can in 
order to humiliate and destroy the enemy, which is why wartime sexual violence 
often occurs alongside other types of physical injuries, including torture and 
mutilation (Hagen and Yohani, 2010: 16). Furthermore, survivors of sexual violence 
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are extremely vulnerable to sexually transmitted disease, such as HIV. For instance, 
in Rwanda, 1% of the population was affected by HIV before 1994, but this number 
reached 11% in 1997 (Hudson, 2010: 264). All of the physical consequences of 
wartime sexual violence have a long-lasting impact, and the women who survived 
rape may not survive its resulting injuries (Hagen and Yohani, 2010: 19). 
Another main consequence of sexual violence is the psychological trauma 
associated with rape. The traumatic experience of wartime rape is not necessarily 
different from “regular” rape, and may involve post-traumatic stress disorder, 
depression or anxiety, and can lead to harmful behaviour such as self-harm or suicide 
(Hagen and Yohani, 2010: 19). What is different from “regular” rape is that in a 
context of post-conflict reconciliation, women not only need to face the reality of 
rape, but then need to do so in a context of national grieving. These women may in 
addition have to face the grief of having lost family members and friends, and for 
some, their homes. Women who have been impregnated as a result of rape, and those 
who committed abortion, infanticide or abandoned their child after birth can also 
suffer from strong psychological trauma. Finally, some women may also feel guilty 
for having been raped, or for having survived when so many did not (Hamilton, 
H.B., 2000: 5). Accepting the past for these women is extremely challenging, 
especially when they are rejected by their community and when the aggressors are 
not prosecuted. 
Indeed, the psychological distress associated with war rape is often aggravated 
when the survivors of sexual violence are blamed by their communities, and when 
the perpetrators are not prosecuted. As a Rwandan testifying at the Fourth 
International Conference of Women at Beijing explained:  
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Raped women are doubly punished by society. First, judicial practice does 
not grant them redress for rape as long as graphic evidence is not brought 
out into the open. Second, from society’s point of view there is little 
sympathy, for at the moment that men and children died without defence, 
these women used the sex card, “selling their bodies to save their lives.” 
Thus, they are judged from all sides, and even among their families they are 
not easily pardoned. Even worse, people reproach them for having 
preferred survival through rape (quoted in Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 5). 
Klaric et al (2007: 173) demonstrated that the women victims of war in BiH (sexual 
violence, torture, etc.) still suffered serious psychological trauma more than a decade 
after the end of the conflict, possibly due to the role that social and/or ethnic 
marginalization play as an obstacle to post-conflict reconciliation. The offspring of 
the survivors of sexual violence are also affected by this exclusion, which makes it 
extremely hard to address (UNHCR, 2003: 24). Social exclusion from the 
ethnic/national group as a result of the rape is therefore one of the most devastating 
long-term consequences of wartime sexual violence, since it remains a challenge that 
needs to be addressed by the women and their offspring many decades after the 
ethnic violence. This social stigmatization impacts many decisions in the aftermath 
of the conflict, such as continuing or not one’s pregnancy, seeking justice or publicly 
seeking outside assistance, which will in turn influence the ways in which the 
survivors of sexual violence experience this period of post-conflict reconciliation 
(UNHCR, 2003: 24). This marginalization from society also means that it becomes 
difficult for these women to access housing, job opportunities or land ownership 
(Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 6-9). Survivors of sexual violence are therefore 
increasingly vulnerable to poverty and further exploitation (Hagen and Yohani, 
2010: 20).  
Finally, studies demonstrate that women’s needs are often far from the 
government or NGOs’ priorities in times of social reconstruction. Survivors of sexual 
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violence are provided insufficient resources and inadequate services, and when 
services are available, they might not be financially accessible (Handrahan, 2004: 
431; Pankhurst, 2008: 31).  
From Emergency Relief to Empowerment 
Before 1994, Rwanda had developed a strong civil society, and the existence of 
many non-governmental organisations meant that when the genocide occurred, they 
quickly responded to the needs of its victims. This is especially true for women’s 
groups, who took a leading role in reconstructing the country. Indeed, with the 
government unable to fully address the growing needs of its population, new and old 
women’s organisations took a vibrant and creative role in providing essential 
services to the women and child victims of war (Newbury and Baldwin, 2001: 98-
100). 
Most organisations targeted the socio-economic needs of women before 1994, but 
the genocide drastically changed the NGOs response towards crisis relief with many 
NGOs emerging after 1994 focusing specifically on war trauma. Health and 
counselling services to victims of war (sexual violence, torture, etc.) were therefore 
developed, and are still widely provided by women’s organisations (Newbury and 
Baldwin, 2001: 100-102, 109-111). 
The scope of the programmes offered by women’s organisations has however 
widened over the past decade, including poverty relief, educational training and 
microcredit, to name a few. Women’s NGOs have also been extremely successful in 
bringing more attention to gender issues within their local authorities, with a growing 
number of organisations involved in lobbying and awareness campaigns for women’s 
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political and economic empowerment (Hamilton, H.B., 2000: 8-11). Their role has 
brought more attention to gender issues, helped by the Ministry of Gender and 
Family Promotion, which nominated officials in each prefecture who ensure the 
consideration of gender issues by local authorities (Newbury and Baldwin, 2001: 
116-117).  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, unlike with the Rwandan context, there were no NGOs 
providing services to the population before the war started. Instead, all services were 
provided by the communist government, and there was limited political space for the 
development of a strong civil society. However, with the consequences of the war 
being far too numerous for the state to respond, organisations emerged to address the 
needs of the population (Walsh, 2000: 2). The first women’s organisations to emerge 
during the conflict did so in Sarajevo and Tuzla and were funded by the international 
community. They reacted to the crisis by providing a variety of services, such as 
food distribution, shelter for refugees, medical care (especially for rape victims) and 
psychological counselling (Mulalic, 2011: 43-44).  
Once the war ended, more women’s organisations emerged and continued to 
provide humanitarian assistance to a deeply affected population through prioritized 
psychological support. However, by 1997 the international funding towards 
humanitarian assistance, in particular psychosocial support and medical care, began 
to decrease in favour of income-generating activities. New programmes such as 
educational training and microcredit started to emerge, in order to revitalize an 
economy largely dependent on international aid (Walsh, 2000: 5-7). Over the past 
decades, women’s organisations have therefore widened their scope to include 
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economic, political and legal assistance, promoting women’s rights in the post-
conflict setting (Mulalic, 2011: 42).  
In both contexts, the shift from emergency assistance to broader support of 
women’s rights and empowerment contributed to gender mainstreaming within the 
post-conflict setting, which provided certain opportunities for women victims of war 
to have their specific needs recognized. This will be analysed in further depth 
Chapters Six and Seven. However, the development of women’s organisations in 
both contexts remains constrained by the macro-state policies of gender, but also of 
ethnicity. With the women’s bodies becoming the body of the nation during the 
ethnic violence, macro-state policies of gender and ethnicity inevitably forge local 
attitudes towards the post-conflict reintegration of survivors of sexual violence. 
Contrasting Post-Conflict State Policies 
In Rwanda, the extreme violence ended in July 1994 with the victory of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was mostly comprised of Tutsis living in 
exile since the country’s ethnic violence of 1959, led by Paul Kagamé. A transitional 
government was soon implemented based on the criteria set by the Arusha Accords 
signed in 1993; this framework lasted until 2003 (Reyntjens, 2004: 178-186). These 
criteria included power-sharing, rule of law, return of refugees and the merging of 
the government and rebel armies (Arusha Accords, 1993). The first transitional 
government included both Hutu and Tutsi members, but it is believed that Pasteur 
Bizimungu acted as President of Rwanda in order to make peace with the Hutu 
majority while securing RPF control over the government (Reyntjens, 2004: 178-
181).  
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In 2003, the transitional period officially ended, and national elections took place 
for the first time since 1994 (local elections first took place in 2001). The 
Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), the political party of the previous 
Prime Minister - and the main opposition party - was banned from these elections for 
accounts of divisionism. In this case, divisionism refers to open opposition or 
disagreement with government policies, and the RPF’s crackdown on the MDR had 
the result of neutralizing civil society (Christian Aid, 2004: 7; Reyntjens, 2004: 184; 
Yachat Ankut, 2005: 21; Beswick, 2010: 241). Paul Kagamé was again elected 
President of Rwanda and consolidated a one-party system that is still present today 
(Burnet, 2011: 310).  
The Tutsi-led government implemented a policy of national unity that makes 
ethnic identification illegal.  This policy is part of the country’s Constitution, where 
Article 9.2 specifies that the government should work towards eradicating any 
divisions within society (mostly ethnic) in order to promote national unity 
(Constitution of Rwanda, 2003: 4). Moreover, ethnic discrimination is now 
punishable by law (Law No. 47/2001), where under Article 3 individuals, groups and 
organisations that commit any form of discrimination - including ethnic - through 
writing, speech, or any other act or medium may face prison sentences. However, 
despite its policy of national unity, it is still believed that in practice the RPF is 
reserving positions of power for members of the Tutsi elite, and that its practice of 
nation-building acts as a cover for domination by the Tutsi elite (Reyntjens, 2016: 
66). 
The current political situation in Rwanda is categorized by a lack of free speech 
and free political competition, and open disagreement with government policies is 
 93 
subject to punishment (Hintjens, 2008: 12; Beswick, 2010: 236; Human Rights 
Watch, 2014, Accessed 24 June 2014). This was clearly observed through my 
fieldwork period in Rwanda, where some participants interviewed for this research 
emphasised their desire to keep their identity protected, especially NGO staff, since 
they did not want to put themselves in a precarious position with the government 
because of their comments. This has often put researchers in difficult positions in 
Rwanda, where some had their research permits revoked because they refused to 
provide raw data or information about their participants to the government 
(Thomson, 2013: 140). There was also a rumour spreading around when I was in 
Kigali that the phone communications of certain individuals, including researchers, 
might be recorded by the government (in order to purchase a SIM card in Rwanda, 
the number has to be attributed to a passport), which could explain why Begley 
(2013: 82) suggested code words to provide information to individuals outside the 
field. Whilst this was only a rumour, the fact that the population believed the 
government could be involved in this type of surveillance is revealing of local 
perceptions of the regime (Beswick, 2010: 242).  
Most importantly for the purpose of this study, the post-conflict period has 
included gender-sensitive policies as a result of the RPF’s willingness to promote 
women’s rights, but also as a result of the advocacy work conducted by women’s 
organisations as suggested above (Burnet, 2008: 372; Ansoms, 2013: 1115). Some 
examples of these laws promoting gender equality are the Inheritance Law of 1999, 
the Land Policy of 2004 and the Organic Law of 2005, which all promote gender 
equality in terms of land rights, ownership and inheritance (Ansoms, 2013: 1115-
1117). Moreover, the current Constitution implemented gender quotas in Parliament 
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and in the Senate, with Article 76 specifying that out of the 80 members of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 24 have to be women, and with Article 82 specifying that 
women should comprise at minimum 30% of the Senate (Constitution of Rwanda, 
2003: 18, 20). Gender equality is included as one of the fundamental principles in the 
Constitution (Article 9.4), which states that ‘building a state governed by the rule of 
law, a pluralistic democratic government, equality of all Rwandans and between 
women and men reflected by ensuring that women are granted at least thirty per cent 
of posts in decision-making organs’ (Constitution of Rwanda, 2003: 4). Finally, 
another example of the gender-sensitive policies implemented by the government is 
Law 59/2008 regarding the prevention and punishment of gender-based violence 
(GBV). This law is important for gender equality because it includes a clear 
definition of GBV and conjugal rape, as well as establishes serious penalties for the 
aggressors (Law No. 59/2008, 2008: 89).  
Furthermore, the government created government bodies that deal directly with 
gender rights issues, such as the Ministry of Family and Gender Promotion, which 
coordinates all government action regarding gender equality, and the Gender 
Monitoring Office, which ensures public institutions promote gender rights and 
equality (MIGEPROF, 15 July 2013). The political sphere was therefore transformed 
since the genocide, with gender-sensitive policies at the core of the current 
government’s political platform. 
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended in 1995 with the Dayton Accords, which 
implemented a fragmented political system that ensure the political representation of 
the three main ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. This triple power-sharing 
system was adopted at the state, entity and cantonal levels. For instance, at the state 
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level, the three groups have to be proportionally represented within the Parliamentary 
Assembly; in the cabinet, 2/3 of the ministers should come from the Federation and 
1/3 from the Republika Srpska; and the Presidency is comprised of three individuals, 
one from each constituent people (Bieber, 2006: 68-70). As mentioned in Article V 
of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina (accessed 2014), ‘the Presidency of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: one Bosniak and one Croat, 
each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly 
elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska.’ This triple power-sharing is also 
found at the entity or cantonal level, and whilst the exact settlement might differ, the 
aim remains a proportional representation of the three main constituent peoples 
(Bieber, 2006: 68-70). 
Moreover, the Federation of BiH was divided into ten cantons, with Bosniaks or 
Croats forming the majority group in each canton. The legitimization of these ethnic 
divisions was intended as a temporary measure, since it was believed the return of 
the displaced population would change the demography of the entities and cantons. 
However, to date, the trend has been for returnees to move to regions where they 
represent the majority group, which maintains and consolidates the ethnic identities 
that were at stake during the ethnic violence, greatly limiting any efforts towards 






Figure 1: Ethnic Map of Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1998. 
 
Source: Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies, ‘Mape’. Retrieved from  
http://img197.imageshack.us/img197/8226/ethniccompositionofbihi.gif. (Accessed 9 
June 2015). 
In terms of gender policies, the national government implemented the ‘Law on 
Gender Equality’, which prohibits discrimination based on gender or sexual 
orientation, and defines gender-based violence (‘Law on Gender Equality in BiH’, 
2003). Furthermore, Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently a potential candidate for 
European Union membership. In order to join the EU, Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to 
align some of its policies - including gender policies - with the priorities and values 
of the European Union. The ‘Gender Action Plan’ therefore specifies the equal rights 
of men and women, including equal remuneration and equal treatment in front of the 
law and in accessing social services. Bosnia-Herzegovina has further aligned its 
gender policies with policies implemented by the EU, such as the Millennium Goals 
(‘Gender Action Plan of Bosnia-Herzegovina’, 2007). The Agency for Gender 
Equality of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also created, whose main role is to report 
on the status of gender equality in the country, and to facilitate coordination and the 
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implementation of the ‘Gender Action Plan’. Two centres were also established at 
the entity level: Gender Centre of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Gender Equality Gender of the Government of Republika Srpska (‘Agency for 
Gender Equality’, Accessed 20 July 2015). At first sight, these gender-sensitive 
policies seem modest when contrasted to those implemented in Rwanda, but it is 
worth keeping in mind that women’s roles in the public sphere in Rwanda were 
strongly limited, while women under the communist government in the former 
Yugoslavia enjoyed greater gender equality (Tomsic, 1980). 
Discussion 
To conclude, this chapter demonstrated how women’s bodies were used as a 
battlefield in which the nation could be destroyed both during the Rwandan genocide 
and Bosnian war as a result of the ideology of nation-as-woman (Yuval-Davis, 1994: 
413). Similar crimes were committed in both contexts, which resulted in women’s 
organisations undertaking important emergency relief in the immediate aftermath of 
both conflicts. Over the past decades, women’s organisations have however widened 
their scope, promoting women’s empowerment and rights in each context. Both 
states were committed to gender equality in the aftermath of the violence, but their 
contrasting policies of ethnic reconciliation raise important questions for the social 
reintegration of survivors of sexual violence. The following chapter will analyse 
these state policies of gender and ethnicity, arguing that these macro-policies 
continue to powerfully shape the post-conflict experiences of social belonging of the 
women I met, who find themselves somewhat excluded from the post-conflict state 
due to their identity as civilian victims of war, and as women. 
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Chapter 5. Experiencing the Post-Conflict State 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: firstly, it will examine the character of the 
post-conflict state through the state policies of ethnicity and gender, arguing that 
while both states commit to a process of gender equality, they strongly differ in their 
process of ethnic reconciliation. Indeed, I argue that the state of Rwanda mostly 
favours the redefinition of the Rwandan nation through nation-building, while the 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian state mostly favours strong state institutions through state-
building, maintaining the rigid and fixed ethnic lines from the war. More 
importantly, I argue that these policies have a strong impact on the type of social 
belonging available to the survivors of sexual violence, since the institutionalisation 
of ethnicity in BiH fosters social belonging with one’s ethnic group (Lijphart, 1977: 
54-55; McGarry and O’Leary, 2004: 17; Loizides, Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 2), while 
a unifying national identity in Rwanda promotes a social inclusion that erases 
ethnicity (Deutsch and Foltz, 1966: 118; Weilenmann, 1966: 40; Fischer and 
Quénivet, 2005: 17-18). It is worth noting that a focus on state-building does not 
preclude nation-building and vice-versa, but that these are instead implemented at 
different degrees. For example, Rwanda is still strongly involved in processes of 
state-building, while the Bosnian state is not strongly involved in either, but even 
less so in the processes of multi-ethnic nation-building. Moreover, the Rwandan 
state’s focus on redefining the nation does not necessarily result in a change in ethnic 
identification at the local level, as will be argued in Chapter Six. By arguing here that 
the Rwandan state prioritizes nation-building while the Bosnian state prioritizes 
state-building, I am not arguing that these states are not involved in the other process, 
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but instead that the local population mostly experience the post-conflict state through 
nation-building in Rwanda and through state-building in BiH. 
 Second, this chapter will also examine how these policies of nation/state-building 
shape the experiences of the population, through their experiences with the post-
conflict state. Indeed, Lange and Schlichte (2015: 772) argue that ethnic diversity 
may impact states by communalizing state power, where the interests of certain 
ethnic groups are favoured over others. As they argue, ‘highly communalized states 
also treat the civilian population differently depending on their ethnicity, with certain 
groups having superior access to public goods and services’ (Lange and Schlichte, 
2005: 772). This chapter analyses whether the civilian population – more specifically 
the survivors of sexual violence – experience equal access to state services by 
focusing on specific state institutions, such as welfare assistance, state employment, 
and the political environment. These state institutions were chosen based on the 
premise that processes and decisions of state/nation-building are often undertaken at 
a political and elite level that tends to exclude the involvement of ordinary citizens. 
However, political decisions regarding the type of post-conflict reconstruction 
approach implemented inevitably impacts the peoples’ day-to-day lives. One 
important way in which the people are confronted and impacted by the ideology of 
state/nation-building is through the provision of state services, such as health care, 
education and welfare assistance. Whilst the provision of state services may 
contribute to conditions leading to ethnic violence (one of such example is through 
the education system, see Lange, 2012), they may also contribute to post-conflict 
reconciliation. Indeed, top-down post-conflict reconstruction practices are 
reproduced within these state institutions; but people – specifically for this study, 
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women - experience these practices of post-conflict reconstruction through its 
relationship with the abstract ‘state’. By looking at these institutions, I argue that 
these macro-policies continue to powerfully shape the post-conflict experiences of 
social belonging of the women I met, who find themselves somewhat excluded from 
the post-conflict state due to their identity as civilian victims of war, and as women. 
This demonstrates that even if nation/state-building involves policies that facilitate 
the social reintegration of civilian victims of war (Sarkin, 1999: 800; Loizides, 
Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 6), there is something distinct about sexual violence as a 
weapon of war that fosters this shift from ethnic women to moral outcasts in the 
aftermath of ethnic violence.  
From Ethnic Erasure to Multi-Ethnic State 
Ethnic identification is currently prohibited by the Rwandan government in favour 
of a broader Rwandan national identity. A clear change in the government’s 
understanding of the nation can therefore be observed in the population censuses of 
1991 and 2002. In Imagined Communities (1991: Chapter 10), Benedict Anderson 
uses examples from Southeast Asia to show how the choice to incorporate certain 
categories or labels in a census reflected the perceptions of the colonial state. 
Through time, the categories were changed or reordered as a result of these changing 
perceptions. The same process is observed in Rwanda, where in the 1991 population 
census, ethnicity was not only included as a category, but was used as the main 
category to analyse data. However, following the 1994 genocide, any mention of 
ethnicity was completely removed from the 2002 population census. Religion is still 
included in the census, but unlike Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is not associated with 
ethnic affiliation. The population censuses of 2002 and 2012 therefore reflect the 
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Rwandan state’s constructed nation as one that is inclusive and erases ethnic 
identities. 
However, a certain sense of separation among returnees (Tutsis in exile during the 
genocide), those granted the title of survivors by the government (Tutsis), and those 
who identified as Hutu or Twa still exists in Rwanda today, as will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter Six (Hintjens, 2008: 6). Moreover, despite its policy of 
national unity, it is still believed that, in practice, the RPF reserves positions of 
power for members of the Tutsi elite, and that this practice of homogeneous nation-
building acts as a cover for domination by Tutsi elite (Reyntjens, 2004: 187). 
These nation-building efforts, however, have not been accompanied by a process 
of state-building since the political environment is characterized by a one-party rule 
where freedom of association, opposition and expression remain limited (Beswick, 
2010: 227-242; Human Rights Watch, 2014, Accessed 24 June 2014). In a sense, 
Rwanda adopted a system of post-conflict reconstruction that aims at addressing 
social and ethnic divisions before promoting free political competition (Uvin, 2001: 
92; Paris, 2004: 190-96). The Rwandan state is an example of a state that is first 
committed to group cohesion and national unity (whether it has been successful or 
not so far) through an important process of nation-building before undertaking 
democratisation and a state-building process that could potentially lead to conflict if 
these divisions are not first addressed (Hippler, 2008: 562; Bardos, 2012: 95; Darden 
and Mylonas, 2012: 85).  
As for the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, twenty years after the end of the war, 
Dayton’s political settlement among Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks is still at the core of 
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the political environment of the country. Whilst changes to this political settlement 
have been demanded by certain groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Observation, 12 
November 2013), the state’s inaction is very revealing of the process - or lack thereof 
- of multi-ethnic nation-building. Indeed, the ethnic segregation observed during the 
war is not challenged by the new state, but is instead institutionally consolidated. For 
example, the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina (accessed 2014) explicitly divides 
the population between members of the three constituent peoples and other national 
members. The following sentence, found in the preamble of the Constitution, is 
revealing of the different class of citizens: ‘Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as 
constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows…’	  
(Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, accessed 2014).  
This not only puts an emphasis on group belonging, but specifically on the three 
main groups, meaning that Roma, Jews or members of other national minorities hold 
an inferior status within society. For example, until 2002, no seats were reserved for 
representatives of the national minorities at the entity level, and up to now members 
of a national minority cannot hold the position of state president and cannot be 
candidates for the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly (Guzina, 2007: 
227-228; European Commission, 2013: 7; Kennedy and Riga, 2013: 174). This is 
especially relevant for the Bosniak women who suffered from wartime sexual 
violence, since they are entitled to a superior group status purely based on their 
ethnic identity. However, the reality of their post-conflict experiences reflects how 
this does not happen in practice, as a result of their stigmatisation as rape survivors.  
Second, as Guzina (2007: 226) mentions:  
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One can be a Serb, Croat, Bosniak, Roma or a member of any other 
national group, but one cannot be identified only as a Bosnian citizen. 
Rather, one is first a member of the constituent peoples or “others”, then a 
citizen of the entity in which he or she lives (which, at this point, just 
reinforces ethnic identification) and, finally, a citizen of the Bosnian state 
as a whole. 
This quote is consistent with other research conducted on national identity in Bosnia-
Herzegovina that suggests the population is reluctant to accept and endorse an 
overarching state identity (Kostic, 2008: 385). Instead, individuals who identify as 
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats are more likely to identify with the symbols of 
Serbia and Croatia than with those of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For instance, political 
parties in the Republika Srpska have expressed the view that state symbols have been 
imposed by the international community, namely through the Office of the High 
Representative, and are not representative of the three constituent people (Kostic, 
2008: 391). This lack of unity in terms of national identity remains institutionalized, 
as the example of the 2013 Bosnian census demonstrates. 
The 2013 census was perceived as a very important moment for the country, since 
no census had been conducted since the end of the ethnic war, with the last census in 
1991. The questions of the 2013 census clearly reflect the Bosnian nation as one 
divided along three main ethnic groups. For instance, Question 24 asks for the 
ethnic/national affiliation of the individual. What is especially interesting is that even 
if this question is optional, it is still asked in addition to questions on citizenship 
(Question 19 on state citizenship and 19.1 on entity citizenship). This demonstrates 
that citizenship and national affiliation are perceived as separate identities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Furthermore, by having the set categories of Bosniak, Croat and Serb, 
it maintains the institutionalization of the ethnic divisions and makes these categories 
more important than other ethnic identities (Roma, Jews, etc.). There are therefore 
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two categories of citizens: those who belong to the main ethnic groups, and the 
others.  
Furthermore, Question 26 asks about the mother tongue of the individual. Again, 
there are three set answers: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. What is extremely 
interesting in that case is that there is only a 5% difference between the three 
languages. They are even more similar than British English and American English 
(Fischer, A., 2006: 313). However, despite being almost the same language, the 
census institutionalizes the differences, again suggesting a very divided and rigid 
conception of the nation and its ethnic groups found within BiH.  
The contrasts between the political settlements and environment in each context 
are clearly visible, and the local population experience these ethnic policies through 
their contact with the post-conflict state. 
State	  Employment	  
In Rwanda, the state’s efforts to challenge ethnic divisions at the local level 
certainly led to changing norms in the country, where state employment and services 
are not provided based on ethnicity anymore. A contrast can instead be found 
between the returnees, survivors of the genocide and others. For example, there is no 
data on employment per ethnicity for obvious reasons, but data is available on 
employment of genocide survivors, which provides an insight into the opportunities 
and barriers faced by survivors of sexual violence.  
According to the National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda (2008: 34), at the time 
when the census was taken, only 23% of male and 21% of female genocide survivors 
were employed. Women were generally more involved in agricultural and self-
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employed work (private sphere), while the majority of employed men received a 
permanent income from formal employment (public sphere). It is also interesting to 
compare regional employment, since proportionally more women who declared 
themselves as involved in the labour force lived in the Southern province - a region 
described as poor in comparison to the rest of the country - with the less 
economically involved living in Kigali, an urban setting. This may not necessarily be 
a representation of work opportunities in the South versus in Kigali, but instead 
represents the living conditions of the survivors of the genocide. For example, the 
women I interviewed in Rwanda suggested that survivors of the genocide living in 
the Southern province tend to be poor compared to those living in Kigali. The 
number of active women in the South may therefore be a result of the important 
financial needs of these women, who, despite psychological or physical injuries that 
may render employment difficult, absolutely need to secure work to survive. This is 
perhaps not the same situation some women faced in Kigali, where they might have 
more opportunities to receive credit and financial support from survivors’ 
organisations.  
Moreover, being economically active does not necessarily mean adequate living 
conditions. In terms of salaries received by survivors of the genocide, 67.4% of 
active men and 81.5% of active women received less than 5,000 Rwandan francs per 
month, maintaining them below the poverty line (National Institute for Statistics for 
Rwanda, 2008: 39). This would suggest the lasting consequences the genocide has on 
its survivors maintains them in marginalized positions within the workforce, again 
reinforcing this division among the survivors, those who were not targeted in 1994, 
and returnees. 
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In terms of employment in the public sector, the government’s policy of national 
unity and removal of ethnic discrimination is also observed. According to Law N°86 
of 2013 for public service, an individual may be recruited as a civil servant as long as 
he/she holds Rwandan nationality, is aged 18 or over and was not prosecuted for 
crimes of genocide. This policy was also included in the country’s Constitution, 
where under Article 126, ‘public servants are recruited, posted and promoted in 
conformity with the principle of equality of citizens, through an objective, impartial 
and transparent system on the basis of the competence, merit and integrity of 
applicants of both sexes’ (Constitution of Rwanda, accessed 2012: 32). This is a 
change from the pre-genocide period, where public administration was traditionally 
dominated by one ethnic group. In practice, however, the ethnic composition of the 
public sector remains Tutsi-dominated to a certain extent. This of course cannot be 
officially proven by statistics, but certain scholars such as Hintjens (2008: 13) have 
argued that the public administration sector is dominated by returnees from Uganda, 
and individuals I have met in Rwanda corroborated this statement. 
For example, I engaged with individuals who were recent university graduates or 
graduated less than a decade ago. They told me that ethnic discrimination was still 
happening in the country, but not in terms of Hutus-Tutsis; rather, the more 
pervasive discrimination is between returnees and those who stayed in Rwanda 
during the genocide. The young professionals I spoke to mentioned that returnees 
were favoured for public administration positions and were often offered the highest 
positions. This is also demonstrated by the change from French to English as the 
official language of the state, which again was perceived by the population as an 
indirect way to favour the domination of Tutsi returnees in the public administration 
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sector3 (Hintjens, 2008: 13). This language dynamic was extremely interesting to 
observe when engaging with public administration employees in Rwanda. For 
example, when I was in Rwanda, private meetings with government workers were 
often done in French, but I was asked that all official communications – letters, 
emails – be written in English. The use of the English language in Rwanda will 
eventually become more widespread, transcending the divisions between returnees 
and those who stayed, but it cannot be denied that at the time of change, returnees 
had a better chance of securing public administration positions due to their prior 
knowledge of English. This again puts many survivors of sexual violence in a 
disadvantaged position, since all the women I met could only speak Kinyarwanda. 
As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, fixed ethnic identities lead to inequalities and 
discrimination at the individual level. For example, one of the main challenges faced 
by Bosnia-Herzegovina (regardless of its entity) in its post-conflict transition is 
employment opportunities for its population. BiH has one of the highest 
unemployment rates - 28.4% in 2013 - in Europe and in the Balkans (Bajramovic, 
2010: section 2.4; World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bosnia-and-
herzegovina). More importantly, this high level of unemployment is considered long-
term unemployment, with 50% of the unemployed being out of work for over five 
years. This partly explained why many Bosnians left the country to find employment 
abroad, sending remittances to family members left behind (Ministry of Civil Affairs 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2010: 13). There are also inequalities within the population 
in terms of access to the job market, with certain groups feeling discriminated against 
in the workplace.  
                                                
3 It is worth clarifying that a large number of Tutsi returnees are English speakers from 
Uganda. 
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For example, as described by the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (2010: 29),  
ECRI notes with regret that public sector employment remains far from 
respecting the ethnic breakdown of Bosnian society as registered in the last 
(1991) census. Where available, figures show that the composition of local 
administrations is often heavily weighted in favour of whichever 
constituent people is in the majority in that area, at the expense of all other 
groups. Minority returnees experience difficulty in accessing both public 
and private sector employment.  
These inequalities based on ethnicity however still favour the three main constituent 
groups. Whilst individuals who identify with these three groups might suffer from 
discrimination in the regions where they represent a minority group, their 
employment opportunities and rates remain higher than those who identify with a 
national minority group, such as Jews and Roma. According to the International 
Labour Organization (2009:14),  
the Roma population is far more likely to be poor than members of the 
majority, as indeed is the case in other countries in the region. A recent 
report on the Roma and Internally Displaced Persons in South-East Europe 
found that the unemployment rates of the Roma population were over 70% 
higher than those of the non-Roma population living in the vicinity. 
Furthermore, when looking specifically at employment in the Public Civil Sector, 
a similar pattern of ethnic discrimination can still be observed. There was an attempt 
to address this discrimination in 2002, when the Office of the High Representative 
imposed the ‘Civil Service Law’, aimed at regulating the ethnic employment in the 
state administration. In the first few years following the end of the war, state 
institutions lacked the support of Republika Srpska, and thus included few Serbs, 
which led to this need for reforms. The ‘Civil Service Law’ now requires 
proportional ethnic representation for the three constituent groups within the civil 
servant force and prohibits discrimination based on ethnic identity or religion. As for 
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the RS, a system of proportionality was not adopted, but instead the Law ensures the 
protection and promotion of national equality within the civil service. However, 
despite the efforts undertaken and the progress made in changing a fragmented 
public administration sector into a more professional one, there is still a struggle in 
maintaining the requirements of ethnic representation and professionalization 
(Bieber, 2006: 44-45). The public administration sector remains a domain where 
ethnic ties and fragmentation is still observed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is a 
concern for the European Commission, which in their 2013 progress report (p. 11) 
suggests the following: 
The issue of financial sustainability of public administration at all levels 
needs to be addressed. Continued fragmentation and politicisation of the 
civil service system remain an issue of concern. The development of a 
professional, accountable, transparent and efficient civil service based on 
merit and competence requires further attention at all levels of government. 
The supreme audit institutions should resume cooperation.  
The understanding that Bosnian citizens are first members of a group, before 
being sole individuals is therefore reproduced in the public administration sector, and 
is not challenged by the Bosnian state by fostering a sense of national unity 
(Richmond and Franks, 2009: 64). Reforms undertaken over the last few years to 
render the civil service sector more professional have focused on building and 
developing state institutions that will be efficient (state-building), but did not target 
the ethnic fragmentation that was at the core of the ethnic violence (nation-building).  
In theory, this should advantage the survivors of sexual violence I spoke to 
because of their inclusion within the three main constituent groups. However, if we 
do not take into account certain issues such as the trauma and physical injuries 
experienced, the women I met may struggle to find employment because of their 
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situation as internally displaced individuals. Indeed, according to an Amnesty 
International report (2006: 14), discrimination based on ethnicity has been endemic 
in the post-war period, remaining an important obstacle to the successful 
reintegration of returnees and displaced people. For example, Kondylis’ research 
(2010) has clearly demonstrated an association between displacement and 
unemployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the data analysed, Bosnian 
individuals who were displaced as a result of the war are 16-19% more likely to be 
unemployed than those who stayed. A few factors might explain this situation, such 
as weakened or missing social networks and employment interruptions associated 
with displacement. Since the economic context in BiH involves high numbers of 
informal employment, jobseekers may rely on their social networks as an entry point 
into the informal labour force. Displaced individuals find themselves disadvantaged 
in this economic reality, where they have to rebuild their social networks in their new 
places of residence. This, compounded with their work interruption, makes it harder 
for displaced individuals to secure employment compared to those who stayed in the 
country (Kondylis, 2010: 246-247). This therefore adds another layer that prevents 
survivors of sexual violence from successfully reintegrating into the labour market.  
Welfare Assistance to Civilian Victims of War 
Social welfare and the state’s allocation of resources present another medium 
through which daily life is affected by the government’s ideology towards 
nation/state-building. This is especially relevant in a context of post-conflict 
reconstruction, where consequences resulting from the war continue and where war 
survivors often need government support to improve their living conditions. 
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Analysing the allocation of resources is a good way to understand the position that 
civilian victims of war are granted in the post-conflict state. 
First, according to the Constitution of Rwanda, the government is entitled to 
provide limited financial assistance to survivors of the genocide, under the Fonds 
d’Assistance pour les Rescapés du Génocide (FARG). This financial assistance was 
established by the government in order to support the survivors of the genocide, 
specifically the Tutsi survivors. As confirmed by Thérèse and Laura, staff members 
of Organisations A and B (13 May 2013), in order to be covered by this fund, one 
has to be an individual who identified as a Tutsi and lived in Rwanda during the 
genocide. Indeed, Law N°69 of 2008 specifies that the fund is aimed at supporting 
individuals who were targeted in the genocide against Tutsis, with no mention of 
Hutu moderates. FARG thus prioritizes assistance to Tutsi survivors who are 
included in the following categories: widows or orphans, elderly without families, 
individuals whose homes were destroyed, and finally handicapped and HIV-infected 
individuals. Children are covered under this fund if they were born before December 
31, 1994, to parents who are considered survivors of the genocide (Law N°69/2008, 
2008). Based on these criteria, children born out of rape are excluded from this 
financial assistance and from recognition as survivors, since they were born in 1995. 
Women and survivors’ organisations, however, are lobbying the government to 
modify these criteria in order to recognise the rights and needs of children born out 
of rape. 
Moreover, based on a report prepared by the National Institute for Statistics of 
Rwanda (2008: 23), in 2008, 56% of female survivors received assistance from 
FARG, whilst 53% of men did so. Some regional variations can be observed, such as 
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in the Southern province, where 58% of women receive financial assistance 
compared to 42% in the Northern province. As for health insurance, 66% of women 
received FARG assistance (63% of men), with only 15% of both men and women 
being insured through the state system of mutuelle de santé, and 13% of women 
(12% of men) being without any medical insurance (National Institute for Statistics 
of Rwanda, 2008: 23, 29).  
These numbers reflect the financial dependency that many survivors of the 
genocide - mostly women - have towards the state. The situation, however, varies 
between regions, where women survivors living in the Southern province and in 
Kigali are more likely to be supported by FARG than women living in the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces, a result of various factors such as land fertility, consequences 
of the genocide, and social networks. What is important here to analyse is the 
specific recognition that survivors of the genocide receive from the state, which 
results in financial compensation. In order to be granted the title of a genocide 
survivor and so access its associated rights, one must have identified as a Tutsi 
during the genocide, which not only challenges the state’s policy of national unity, 
but also creates a certain division between those Tutsi rape survivors whose rights 
are recognized, and the Hutu/Twa rape survivors. For the women I met who all 
identified as Tutsis, the state policies of welfare assistance privilege the recognition 
of their rights, and yet they all still struggle economically.  
What this policy, but also the practices of state employment demonstrate is that 
there are certain limitations to the Rwandan state’s policy of ethnic erasure. Whilst in 
theory these policies tend to favour unity, their implementation has the result that 
some individuals may still feel disadvantaged in comparison to Tutsis, especially to 
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Tutsi returnees. This is something that will be discussed in Chapter Six, but the data 
presented in this section illustrates the extent to which the official state policies of 
ethnic erasure impact these women on a daily basis: while they are not ethnically 
discriminated, their identity as genocide survivors results into a more subtle state 
exclusion.  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, when looking at the distribution of state benefits divided 
by category, the 2012 data (see Annex 4) of the Federation shows that the highest 
number of beneficiaries received compensation due to their low income, followed by 
those receiving different social welfare, including those claiming survivors benefits 
(Institute for Statistics for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2013: 30-33). 
These numbers are supported by the UNDP, which also mentioned that ‘the second 
most prevalent type of social beneficiary in BiH are the disabled and those people 
who are surviving dependents of the policy’s direct beneficiary, namely disability 
and survivor benefits’ (UNDP, 2007: 27). When comparing the beneficiaries within 
that category, it does seem that more individuals are receiving benefits under the title 
of ‘survivor’, than that of ‘military’ or ‘disability’. As with Rwanda, civilian victims 









Graphic 1: Percentage of the population receiving disability, survivor or 
military benefits. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from UNDP, (2007), ‘Pension Reform and Social Protection 
Systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 27. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the level of assistance is the same 
between the categories. For instance, according to the UNDP (2007:42): 
The social protection system in both entities provides war veterans, war 
invalids and their families with a broad range of benefits and in amounts 
significantly higher than similar benefits provided to other categories of 
population in social need. It is not an isolated case for the total monthly 
benefits of the above mentioned categories of the population to be two or 
three times the average net salary in BiH. 
The following graphics clearly show this difference in terms of monetary aid. At 
both the entity and national level, pensions represent the highest state expenditure 
(8.2% of the BiH GDP, 8.3% of the Federation GDP and 10% of the RS GDP in 
2005). When comparing the other transfers to individuals, it is clear that at all levels, 
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Graphic 2: Transfers to individuals as a percentage of BiH GDP. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from UNDP, (2007), ‘Pension Reform and Social Protection 
Systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 54. 
 
Graphic 3: Transfers to individuals as a percentage of the Federation of 
BiH GDP. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from UNDP, (2007), ‘Pension Reform and Social Protection 


























Graphic 4: Transfers to Individuals as a percentage of RS GDP. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from UNDP, (2007), ‘Pension Reform and Social Protection 
Systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 55. 
The comparison reveals the importance that war veterans have in terms of social 
benefits, and the numbers presented above demonstrate an inequality between those 
who fought during the war and the civilian victims (including survivors of sexual 
violence). This could imply that war veterans are favoured within the social welfare 
system in contrast to civilian victims of war. This contextualises the injustice that the 
women I interviewed mention in Chapter Seven, where their aggressors are seen to 
receive state compensation. Unequal welfare assistance therefore has the impact, 
even if not necessarily intentional, of creating a citizen v. sub-citizen dichotomy 
between the military aggressors and the women I interviewed. 
Furthermore, since the allocation of resources is divided between the state and 
entities, the actual financial aid received by the beneficiaries varies according to 
geographical location. These differences are also observed at the cantonal level in the 
Federation of BiH, depending on factors such as the size and wealth of the canton 











great inequalities in terms of social assistance. Moreover, the UNDP (2007: 42) also 
argues that financial assistance remains low, and that the different levels of 
government are often unable to respond to the needs of the population due to their 
financial limitations. This is of particular importance for the survivors of sexual 
violence since the assistance provided is often insufficient to cover their needs, and 
information regarding the type of assistance available to civilian victims of war is 
often absent. 
Finally, in terms of aid to refugees and displaced people, the process is again split 
between the entities. Whilst the exact criteria differ in each entity, in general war 
refugees are entitled to accommodation, health services, food, clothing, and more. 
However, in practice, only a few services are guaranteed by the entities, which tend 
to focus on housing and infrastructure, and even then it is quite common for the 
entities to provide assistance only to refugees from their own national group (UNDP, 
2007: 86). As a survivor of sexual violence displaced from the war, a woman may 
then feel discriminated first as a civilian victim of war, and second as an internally 










Graphic 5: Expenditures of the Ministry of Refugees and Displaced 
Persons of FBiH (%), 2004. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from UNDP, (2007), ‘Pension Reform and Social Protection 
Systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 89. 
Graphic 6: Expenditures of the Ministry of Refugees and Displaced Persons 
of RS (%), 2005. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from UNDP, (2007), ‘Pension Reform and Social Protection 
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A few observations can be made from these expenditures, but the most important 
remains the difference between the funding given to housing and psychosocial 
programmes. In the Federation of BiH, there is a clear focus on reconstruction of 
housing units, and the amount spent for that purpose remains considerable compared 
to the funding spent on psychosocial programmes. Of course, costs associated with 
rebuilding a house might be far greater than the annual wage of a psychologist. 
However, when considering that all NGOs I engaged with as part of my fieldwork 
mentioned the challenges they faced in providing counselling services to their 
beneficiaries, it still suggests that a choice was made not to spend more money on 
counselling services. This perhaps reveals a certain type of post-conflict ideology 
regarding the needs of survivors, in which basic needs, such as accommodation, have 
priority over psychological well-being. Certainly housing is truly a priority, but, as 
will be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, the long-lasting psychological 
consequences of sexual violence still affect the survivors’ lives. It is thus worth 
keeping in mind the considerable difference in the state’s expenses on infrastructure 
and psychological assistance. The financial limitations of the state are also an 
obstacle to the provision of state welfare, and the European Commission (2013:37) 
outlined the situation as the following: ‘on social inclusion and protection, 
vulnerable groups (children, Roma and returnees) are not adequately protected, 
whether at State or Entity level, or in the Brcko District’.  
Unlike in Rwanda, where being a survivor of the genocide entails a certain 
recognition and financial assistance, it seems that in BiH, civilian victims of war are 
not adequately supported by the state, who might prioritize financial support to ex-
combatants. This is revealing of the nature of the post-conflict state in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina, where a lack of nation-building policies maintains the ethnic divisions 
of the state, reinforcing group rights over individual rights. This has the consequence 
that certain groups, such as the women who suffered from sexual violence, may have 
their rights as ethnic group members recognized, but are underprivileged in both 
state employment and welfare assistance as civilian victims of war. 
Challenges to the Structural Integration of Women 
Both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda have implemented gender-sensitive 
policies in the aftermath of their ethnic violence. These policies are aimed at 
promoting gender equality and preventing gender discrimination in the private and 
public spheres. Through an analysis of state employment and welfare assistance, I 
argue that despite the progress observed in both contexts, women remain structurally 
excluded and marginalized from the public sphere. The marginalization experienced 
by most women, compounded with the complex layers of social exclusion 
experienced by women who suffered from sexual violence during the Bosnian war 
and Rwandan genocide provides the structural context for the limited integration 
opportunities these women face in the post-conflict state. 
Rwanda 
The genocide of 1994 profoundly changed Rwandan society on many levels, 
including the gender paradigm. Due to the disappearance of large numbers of 
Rwandan men, women’s roles and involvement in the reconstruction of the country 
have greatly increased, ascribing them roles that were never allowed before the 
genocide. Economic realities for many female heads of household led them to 
undertake paid employment or commercial activities that were strictly reserved for 
men prior to 1994. Women have therefore increased their participation in the 
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economic, social and political domains, which was supported by government laws 
and policies. For example, the RPF-led government implemented policies regarding 
gender-based violence, maternal rights and gender quotas. Overall, it can be argued 
that the social position of women in Rwandan society has improved following the 
end of the genocide (Burnet, 2011: 303).  
However, despite the progress observed, numbers show that women are still 
under-represented in the public sphere. For example, labour force participation rate 
numbers for 2012 suggest that 71.7% of women and 75.6% of men are economically 
active. There is, however, a rural-urban divide, where in rural Rwanda, 75.8% of 
men and 73.9% of women are active, and in urban areas 75.2% of men and 60.9% of 
women are active (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2015: 18). According 
to World Bank indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda), 87% of 
women were involved in the labour force in 2012 (86% of men). In terms of 
unemployment, 0.4% of women were registered as unemployed (0.8% of men). 
These numbers suggest that women are more integrated into the workforce than their 
male counterparts, which do not support the official statistics of the Rwandan 
government.  
Moreover, according to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2002: 
107), women are mostly included in the labour force in rural areas, where they 
remain self-employed and work on their own land. In addition, ‘women are scarce in 
such professional categories as employers and salaried workers, which require a 
reasonable level of education and some material and financial capital base, as a 
prerequisite. Such professions are more common in the secondary and tertiary sectors 
that are located mainly in the urban areas’ (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
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Planning, 2002: 107). For instance, the Rwandan government implemented a 
national action plan - Vision 2020 - to improve the economic situation of the country 
and reduce poverty over the next few years. The full participation of women in the 
workforce has been mentioned as a key element of economic growth, since ‘women 
represent 52% of the population, yet despite progress, they do not participate fully in 
socio-economic and political spheres of life’ (Republic of Rwanda, 2013: 86). There 
is therefore a gender divide in the Rwandan labour force: whilst a high portion of 
women are working, they are mostly self-employed and cultivate their own land, and 
remain excluded from professional work, which in turn restricts them to the private 
sphere. 
In addition to the urban-rural divide, there is also a regional variation that is 
witnessed in Rwanda.  
Graphic 7: Women’s Labour Force Participation Rate, Rwanda, 2012. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda. (2014). ‘Fourth 
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The rate of active women in urban areas is lower than the national average (60.9%) 
in only two places: Kigali City (59.5%) and the Western Province (56.0%). In terms 
of the rate of active women in rural areas, the rate is again lower than the national 
average (73.9%) only in two places: Kigali City (61.0%) and the Southern Province 
(70.6%). It is therefore interesting to notice that for both indicators, Kigali City fares 
worse than the national average for employed women, which may be surprising 
considering the work opportunities the Rwandan capital offers. However, this 
confirms reports by the Rwandan government that women tend to be employed in 
agricultural work instead of professional work. Kigali City provides opportunities for 
professionalised work; however, when taking into consideration that many women 
who suffered from sexual violence in the genocide later moved to Kigali, this helps 
contextualise why women face challenges in securing employment, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Six. 
 Moreover, when looking at specific state employment, a gender gap can also 
be found in the education sector. For instance, at the primary school level, schools 
have an almost equal number of male and female teachers. In 2010, 13,337 women 
were primary school teachers, compared to 13,417 men (Republic of Rwanda, 2010: 
12). This pattern, however, is completely transformed at the secondary and higher 
education levels, where it is estimated that men represent 70% of the workforce 
(National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2011: 11). This gender divide increases 
when looking at positions of authority in both primary, secondary schools or in 




Graphic 8: Employment in the Education sector by gender, 2010. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from République du Rwanda. (2010). ‘Recensement des Agents de 
l’État’, p. 12 and National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda. (2013). ‘Statistical Yearbook 
2012’, p. 30-31 
In the public administration sector, the National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda 
and the Gender Monitoring Office recorded that in 2011, 54.5% of civil servants 
were men, with 45.5% women (National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda, 2011: 
10). High numbers of women employed in some sectors - judges, districts’ councils - 
is observable, but some sectors remain heavily male dominated, as summarized in 






































Table 4: Public Administration staff by gender, 2011. 
Institutions Women (%) Men (%) 
Administrative Districts  - - 
Provinces (2010) 24.3 75.7 
Districts (2010) 36.5 63.5 
Sectors (2010) 35.6 64.4 
Justice - - 
Supreme Court 50 50 
Judges 39.8 60.2 
Courts and Tribunals - - 
Judges/higher courts 30.8 69.2 
Judges/primary courts 44.2 55.8 
General Prosecutor - - 
General prosecutors 0 100 
Source: National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda. (2013). ‘Statistical Yearbook 2012’, 
p.30-31 and République du Rwanda. (2010). ‘Recensement des Agents de l’État’, p. 12. 
In the public health sector, data for employment is quite limited, but does provide 








Graphic 9: Public Health workers by gender, 2010. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda. (2013).‘Statistical 
Yearbook 2012’, p.30-31 and République du Rwanda. (2010). ‘Recensement des Agents de 
l’État’, p. 12. 
The graphic shows that women seem reasonably integrated within the health sector 
workforce, but a visible shift occurs when looking at positions as general and 
specialist doctors. As with the cases of employment in the education and public 
administration sectors, these official statistics illustrate how policies of gender 
equality may allow opportunities for women to be employed in the public sphere, but 
these policies have still not lead to transformative changes in terms of gender 
equality in decision-making positions.  
Finally, in terms of politics, Rwanda implemented a system of gender quotas to 
ensure representation of women in government. This gender quota is included in the 
Constitution, specifying that women should comprise at least 30% of government 
representatives (Constitution of Rwanda, accessed 2012). The following graphic 
shows gender representation in the Rwandan government in 2011, but it is worth 



















making Rwanda the country with the highest number of women in government in the 
world (World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda). 
Graphic 10: Gender representation in the Rwandan government, 2011. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda. (2013). ‘Statistical 
Yearbook 2012’, p.30-31. 
The inclusion of women in politics remains a progressive step towards a change in 
gender roles and stereotypes, and has influenced the participation of women in other 
spheres of life. However, the role of women in the government has not necessarily 
been associated with a rise in women’s legislative rights, with some decisions – such 
as the increase of weekly working hours from 40 to 45 hours, and the increase of 
working days from five to six days a week - which clearly limit the economic 
activities of women, who are often also responsible for household chores (Burnet, 
2011: 314). Moreover, while state policies favour the inclusion of women at the 














Graphic 11: Local Government Positions by Gender, 2011. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda. (2013). 
‘Statistical Yearbook 2012’, p.30-31 
These numbers therefore demonstrate that whilst the policies of gender equality 
open up possibilities for women to be included in the public sphere, and in this case 
in politics, it seems that these policies may benefit only those women who already 
possess a higher status in society, and possess the language skills and education to be 
considered as a representative in the National Parliament. The statistics presented 
above clearly demonstrate that women are still under-represented in the public 
sphere, but what is not necessarily shown, but is implied by these statistics, is that if 
only a limited number of women successfully integrate into public state employment, 
these women need to speak the official state language (English) and have certain 
educational training that allow them to undertake professional positions. The women 
I met in Rwanda are therefore constrained in attaining these positions, due to the 
















The inclusion of women in politics has been traditionally quite low in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, with the latest numbers suggesting that women comprised only 21% of 
the Parliament in 2013 (World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bosnia-and-
herzegovina), and no woman is currently included in the Council of Ministers 
(Council of Ministers, 2014) or is a member of the Presidency (Presidency of BiH, 
2014). This weak participation of women in politics can be traced over an extended 
period of time and through diverse state institutions. For instance, since the end of 
the war in 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been ruled through a system of power-
sharing that institutionalizes ethnicity, but ignores gender proportionality. No 
mechanisms have been put in place to ensure the inclusion of women in politics 
(such as quotas), meaning that whilst the country’s presidency is equally shared 
between Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs, no women have been elected to this level yet. 
Moreover, a clear gender divide is also found at the ministry level, where both in the 
2004 and 2008 elections, inclusion of women in the Council of Ministers was very 
weak. In 2004, 10% of ministers were women, with no women ministers in 2008, 
and 20% of deputy ministers were women in 2004 and 2008 (International Labour 
Office, 2011: 45). 
A low participation rate of women in politics is also observed at the local level. 
For example, in the 2008 local elections, 35.3% of the total candidates were women. 
However, both in terms of elected mayors and councillors, male representation 
remains extremely high. 
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Graphic 12: Elected mayors and councillors by gender, 2008. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from International Labour Office. (2011). ‘Gender and Employment 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina- A Country Study’, Working Paper 4/2011, p. 50. 
All of the data presented above suggests that participation of women in Bosnian 
politics remains quite low, and that women are excluded from the highest positions 
within the government, namely the Presidency and Council of Ministers (European 
Commission, 2013: 17). Moreover, the weak inclusion of women within state politics 
is also observed through diplomatic appointments, yet again demonstrating a certain 
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Graphic 13: Ambassadors and General Consuls in Diplomatic-Consular 
Offices of BiH. 
 
Source: International Labour Office. (2011). ‘Gender and Employment in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina- A Country Study’, Working Paper 4/2011, p. 52. 
Through the institutionalization of ethnicity within state politics as a result of the 
Dayton Accords, and through the absence of mechanisms securing gender equality, 
the government is currently prioritizing ethnic identities over gender equality.  
Furthermore, in terms of employment, Bosnia-Herzegovina is characterized by a 
low level of women’s participation in the workforce (European Commission, 2013: 
17). A few factors could explain this situation, and the European Commission (2013: 
17) suggested that for example discrimination in terms of maternity rights is still 





















Graphic 14: Population characteristics by sex and activity, Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from Agency for Statistics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (2014). ‘Labour 
Force Survey 2014’, p. 31. 
However, when tracing gender employment historically, the current level of 
women’s employment shows a clear increase from the last decades, suggesting an 
improvement in women’s representation within formal employment. This trend 
started in the aftermath of the Second World War, with the rise of socialism in the 
former Yugoslavia. Whilst employment figures varied in former Yugoslav countries, 
the rapid industrialization witnessed in the region fostered social changes that led to 
the abandonment of a more traditional lifestyle and paved the way for women’s 
employment. As Tomsic wrote in 1980 (p. 89), ‘industrialization created 
opportunities for the employment of the young generations of both sexes, and the 
employed included more and more women, as the number of employed married 
women and mothers accordingly increased’. These positive changes, however, did 
not mean that women were undertaking positions of leadership within the workforce; 
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similar to the traditional gender division of labour, and rare were the women who 
undertook leadership positions (Duric and Dragicevic, 1965: 15; Tomsic, 1980: 94).  
Whilst women’s employment has increased over the past decades, important 
challenges are still present, especially for vulnerable groups. According to the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina (2010: 29), vulnerable groups and 
individuals suffering from physical or psychological disabilities experience difficulty 
integrating into the workforce since they face specific challenges that limit their 
employment opportunities. The challenges faced by the women I interviewed will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven, but here it is important to stress that whilst their struggle 
to secure employment can be contextualized and understood as part of a larger trend 
of unemployment amongst Bosnian women, rape survivors still share specific 
circumstances (trauma, illness) that is not necessarily shared by other women, and 
put them on the margins of women’s employment. 
Furthermore, a certain contrast between the employment figures in the Federation 
of BiH and the Republika Srpska can be observed. When compared, the employment 
and unemployment rates for both men and women are worse in the Federation of 
BiH than in the RS. When looking specifically at women, employment rates increase 






Graphic 15: Population characteristics by sex and activity, Federation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, 2014. 
 
Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (2014). ‘Labour Force Survey 2014’, 
p. 31-32. 
Furthermore, whilst a certain variation in employment figures can be observed 
between the two entities, data from the Rural Household Survey (2012: 8) recorded 
figures for rural areas similar to the national average in 2012, suggesting that no 
strong variations between employment opportunities in urban-rural areas can be 
found. This thesis is not aimed at analysing the various factors that can explain these 
variations; instead, these figures contextualise the experiences of many civilian 
victims who were displaced from the RS during the war and settled in the Federation 
of BiH in the post-conflict stage. Based on these figures, women living in the RS are 
more likely to secure employment than those living in the Federation of BiH. 
When looking at specific state sectors, it can first be observed that women are 
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Graphic 16: Employees in the education sector at the beginning of the school 
year, 2010/2011. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from Agency for statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
(2011).‘Women and Men in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
http://www.bhas.ba/tematskibilteni/zim_2011_001_01-bh.pdf, p. 29. 
Based on these numbers, women represent the majority of employees in the 
education sector, with the sole exception of the academic staff at institutions of 
higher education, where 60.2% of the workforce are men. Although a few years have 
passed since this survey was conducted, extreme situations would have needed to 
occur to completely change this trend of gender differences in educational sector 
employment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, when analysing this trend in the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the RS excluded) over a multi-year period (2002-





























Graphic 17: Employment in Pre-School and Primary School Institutions by 
gender, FBiH.  
 
Source: Data Retrieved from Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Federal Office of 
Statistics. (2008). ‘Women and Men in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 64-65. 
Graphic 18: Teachers in secondary schools and High Education Institutions 
by gender, FBiH. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Federal Office of 
Statistics. (2008). ‘Women and Men in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 66-67. 
What these graphics demonstrate is a contrasting situation with Rwanda, where 
women in BiH represent the majority of the workforce in the educational sector even 
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Education Institutions. Again, women’s involvement in the education sector fares 
quite well in BiH, but strongly decreases in higher positions, as well illustrated with 
the graphic below. 
Graphic 19: Women’s Employment in the Education Sector, Federation of BiH. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Federal Office of 
Statistics. (2008). ‘Women and Men in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 66-67. 
This high inclusion of women might not be necessarily surprising, since the 
education sector has traditionally been associated with women’s work skills, which 
means that as women’s participation in the labour market remains low, women still 
undertake positions associated with traditional women’s work.  
However, data from 2007 regarding enrolment in the Federation of Bosnia’s 
universities show that of all students enrolled in the Academy of Education, 92% 
were women (Federation of BiH Federal Office for Statistics, 2008: 47). When 
comparing these statistics with the employment figures of 2010-2011, the difference 
between the higher education enrolment of women in the Academy of Education and 
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employees in the education sector in 2010-2011 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, only 61.7% 
were women, and 38.3% were men. These proportions are very different to the ones 
found in the Academy of Education in the Federation of BiH, suggesting that 
women’s enrolment in this department does not necessarily result in employment 
opportunities afterwards. Whilst no data is available on higher education enrolment 
in the Republika Srpska, it would remain extremely surprising that a major 
difference between the two entities could be observed. Instead, it seems that men are 
more likely than women to find employment in the education sector, and further 
research on the factors influencing this situation should be conducted. 
In terms of public administration employment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, another 
gender gap can be observed. Data collected from the Federation of BiH Federal 
Office of Statistics (2008: 81) shows that in 2007, out of the 36,423 public 
administration employees in the Federation of BiH, 41.4% were women and 58.6% 
men. In 2012, the total number of public administration employees increased to 
39,434, but the proportion of women stayed almost the same at 41.9% (Institute for 
Statistics of Federation of BiH, 2012: 28). However, as with the education sector, the 
majority of students enrolled in the Faculty for Public Administration in the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2007 were women, with a percentage of 58% 
female students and 42% male students (Federation of BiH Federal Office of 
Statistics, 2008: 47). Again, the gender proportion found within the Faculty is not 
reproduced in the workplace, raising questions about the structural factors that may 
limit women in undertaking paid employment in their field of specialization after 
their degree. For instance, even if the state policies promote gender equality in state 
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employment, policies of maternity rights or nursery costs may constraint women’s 
opportunities to join the labour market.  
A different pattern is however found in the public health sector, where data from 
2010 shows that of the 27,627 total public health workers in the country, 76.5% were 
women. 
Graphic 20: Public health workers in Bosnia-Herzegovina by gender, 2010. 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from Agency for statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2011). 
‘Women and Men in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
http://www.bhas.ba/tematskibilteni/zim_2011_001_01-bh.pdf, p. 25. 
These numbers seem to have remained constant for a few years now, since in 2007 
75.9% of public health workers in the Federation of BiH were women (Federation of 
BiH Federal Office of Statistics, 2008: 81). The representation of female workers in 
the public health sector is also observed at different levels of responsibilities, with 
60.5% of doctors and 82.3% of nurses and medical technicians being women. Unlike 
with Rwanda where women were under-represented as doctors, Bosnian women 















Furthermore, unlike the public administration and education sectors where the 
gender ratios found in the Federation’s universities were not reproduced in the 
workplace, the public health sector is in fact hiring more women than men. When 
comparing solely 2007 statistics from the Federation of BiH, 37% of medical 
students were men. However, in that same year, the percentage of men hired in the 
public health sector reached only 24.1% (Federation of BiH Federal Office of 
Statistics, 2008: 37, 81). All the data presented so far can therefore illustrate the 
specificities of the Bosnian context: women share opportunities to participate in the 
public sector labour force, but may be more inclined to join professions that are 
traditionally associated with women’s care, such as education and nursing. However, 
the inclusion of women in roles as doctors and in other decision-making positions, 
whilst limited in some sectors, demonstrate a certain women’s empowerment in BiH. 
Of course, this empowerment is limited by the economic conditions of the country, 
which experiences high level of unemployment. Regardless, these opportunities for 
women highlight the specific conditions of the survivors of sexual violence I met, 
who were all unemployed. Their unemployment can therefore not be equated with 
their gender identity, but is instead a result of the consequences of wartime rape, and 
of the stigmatization they experience within their community. 
The difficulty for women in securing employment in Bosnia-Herzegovina may 





Graphic 21: Total adult beneficiaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
Source: Data Retrieved from Agency for statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2011), 
‘Women and Men in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
http://www.bhas.ba/tematskibilteni/zim_2011_001_01-bh.pdf, p. 34. 
The data collected show that, in 2010, around half a million individuals were 
receiving social assistance of all sorts, and that whilst the differences between the 
men and women recipients is minimal, there have consistently been more women 
beneficiaries than men. Moreover, within the ‘survivor’ category of beneficiaries, the 
UNDP (2007: 27) suggests the majority of recipients are elderly women over 65 
years of age. According to their data:  
In 2001, 26% of 65+ female population benefited from survivor pensions 
compared to 3% of elderly male population in RS and for female and male 
elderly population, the beneficiaries are 22% and 2% in FBiH, respectively. 
In 2004, the percentage of female beneficiaries had declined somewhat for 
BiH, from 24 to 19%, but was still much higher than the recipient male 
population (UNDP, 2007: 27). 
The employment figures in Bosnia-Herzegovina thus reveal that while some 
changes in ethnic patronage through reforms occurred, gender equality is far from 
















BiH has focused strongly on accommodating ethnicity within the public sphere, but 
this has not been met with a similar process for gender equality.  
Shared Macro-Level Exclusion for the Survivors of Sexual 
Violence 
Finally, in this chapter I first argued that the Rwandan state promotes a Rwandan 
nation that erases the ethnic divisions at the core of the genocide. This requires a 
reconstruction of the nation, aimed at forging a sense of national identity that will 
unite the divided groups under a larger Rwandan identity, by adopting laws and 
policies that foster this unity. This ideology is strongly articulated through state 
institutions, policies and laws, but underlying divisions are still present in the 
country. Instead of representing straightforward ethnic divisions, they are instead 
based on shared experiences during the genocide. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the state 
has not been involved in processes of nation-building since the nation remains 
divided along rigid ethnic identities, reinforced by the Dayton Accords. By 
maintaining the ethnic divisions at the core of the violence, the nation is not being 
seriously redefined in the post-conflict period. Instead, it is believed that effective 
and democratic institutions can accommodate these rigid divisions.  
These contrasted policies of ethnic accommodation are reproduced in the state 
employment and welfare assistance, where in theory they should not lead to any 
discrimination for the survivors of sexual violence I interviewed, but in practice 
these women share a similar struggle to be integrated and not considered as sub-
citizen in the post-conflict state. Indeed, I argued that in both contexts, women 
remain under-represented in the public space and at various levels are confined to the 
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private sphere. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it can be argued that the state prioritized 
ethnic accommodation over gender equality in state employment, while the Rwandan 
context demonstrates a strong state involvement in the improvement of women’s 
positions within society. However, despite the progress observed in Rwanda, women 
remained in large part excluded from the professionalised workplace. It can therefore 
be argued that at the macro level, the women I interviewed in Rwanda and Bosnia-
Herzegovina share the same structural constraints.  
This therefore raises questions on whether the survivors of sexual violence 
experience similar post-conflict experiences of social integration at the micro-level, 
which will be explored in the next two chapters. Indeed, Chapters Six and Seven will 
explore the post-conflict experiences of some survivors of sexual violence and some 
NGOs working with them, observing certain similarities and contrasts between the 
experiences in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I will demonstrate in these chapters 
that these women moved from ethnic women to moral outcasts in the aftermath of 
the ethnic violence, and that their need for social belonging remains embedded 
within the local context. 
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Chapter 6. The Changing Boundaries of Survivors’ Social 
Belonging in Rwanda 
This chapter provides an account of my encounters with some survivors of sexual 
violence and some NGO staff, and analyses perceptions and interpretations of the 
post-conflict environment. I demonstrate that social reintegration and rebuilding 
social relationships are the main priorities of the women and staff members I 
interviewed based on the rationale that it is only through reconstructing their social 
networks that the various spheres of the women’s lives will be improved. For 
example, NGOs undertake the role of creating alternative families of survivors as 
new forms of social belonging for these women. I argue that this is an attempt for the 
women to redefine their sense of personal self, aided by the NGOs, in a context 
where the impurity of their body was transferred to their moral value, building on the 
work of Mertus (1994) and Yuval-Davis (1994). 
Disintegration of the Communities 
The women I engaged with during my fieldwork in Rwanda generously shared 
their individual stories and experiences from the genocide onwards. These stories 
vary on an individual basis, but certain similarities help to conceptualise the post-
conflict experiences of these civilian victims of war. In order to understand their 
post-conflict experiences, however, it is important to understand the trauma 
experienced during the Rwandan genocide.  
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For ethical reasons, discussions with the survivors about their past and their 
experiences during the genocide were not planned for when preparing for fieldwork, 
meaning that the focus of the interviews was on the post-conflict period. There was, 
however, a space in the interviews, both at the beginning and at the end, where the 
interviewees had the possibility of voicing any points they wanted to share. More 
often than not, stories came up about the genocide, and the atrocities they either 
experienced or witnessed. Their experiences during the genocide still follow them 
every day of their lives, and after meeting a few women, it became obvious that their 
post-conflict experiences could not be analysed separately, without prior knowledge 
of their past.  
Indeed, their need for social reintegration cannot be understood before first 
understanding how the social fabric of their lives disintegrated during the genocide. 
For example, Agathe (29 May 2013) started our interview with her personal story, 
sharing her past for nearly one hour. Her parents were killed when the genocide 
started, and she escaped with her younger siblings, whom she calls ‘the children’.  
My real problems started when I went to Kanombe commune. People 
recognized me as a survivor in my family because they knew my family 
was killed. I had to lie that I was a Hutu so that I wouldn’t be killed.  
Denial of one’s identity, as in the case of Agathe having to pretend to be a Hutu to 
survive, was a widespread and common decision made by Tutsis living in Rwanda in 
1994. For example, Rose (29 May 2013) made the same conscious decision when 
facing the Interahamwe: ‘When I reached the Musambira parish I went to hide in the 
church. Two days later many Tutsis joined me. They came to ask for my papers and I 
said I was from there but I didn’t have papers with me’. This is not a surprising 
choice and was even a necessary lie in order to protect one’s life, but, combined with 
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the pre-genocide propaganda that dehumanized this minority population, it certainly 
complicated the process of self-identification in the aftermath of the violence, as will 
be explained in a subsequent section. Keeping her true identity secret meant that 
Agathe was not killed in Kanombe, but her secret came with the price of becoming 
‘the wife’ of some militiamen.  
In that place they didn’t kill with machetes but by throwing people in the 
river saying that they are sent to make business in Tanzania. Where I was, 
they asked me if I had papers so that they can check if I was telling the 
truth. The time came when some people who were part of the killers groups 
came there and asked me to become their wife so that they could keep my 
secret. (…) They told me that they had guns and if I don’t accept they have 
to force me. Three men came and took the children away. When I stayed 
alone, they raped me one by one all night, telling me that they will throw 
me in the river afterwards (Agathe, 29 May 2013). 
Agathe suffered from gang rape, a type of sexual violence that was widely used 
during the genocide. The violence and dehumanization that occurred alongside the 
rapes can also be witnessed in the case of Valentine (29 May 2013). 
When the war began, they came home and killed my uncles with stones. 
My mother, my sisters and brothers and I, they forced us to sign a debt 
recognition, telling us that we are waiting to follow Habyarimana at his 
funeral. They put me in a hole. (…) I didn’t want to remove my underwear. 
They threw me a rock on my head and I saw a flow of blood on my head. 
Then all three, they raped me one by one in that hole. (…) My father was 
there and implored them not to kill me like that. Then they brought a seven 
years old boy there in the crowd and they made him have sex with me, 
which made me very sad.  
There is something very poignant about this story, not only because of the 
brutality of the rapes, but also because of the location where they were conducted. 
The hole where Valentine was kept was in fact a toilet hole, and in doing so the 
Interahamwe matched Valentine’s personal and social value as being dirty. This 
dehumanization process was not limited to Valentine, but to other Tutsis as well. 
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When I got home we went to hide in the bushes during three days, some 
other days in a cemetery. And the final day, they brought me where they 
killed my uncles in a toilet. They brought petrol and burned us. God saved 
me and my little baby on my back. All the people on me were burned to 
death and I survived. When Inkotanyi4 came they took us from that hole of 
toilet and took us home telling us that we would be safe (Valentine, 29 May 
2013). 
Here, not only were the Tutsis also perceived as ‘dirty’, but the next quote from Rose 
(29 May 2013) also suggest that they were also perceived as ‘sinful’. Rose, after 
being raped by more than eight men, was able to make it to a church, where she was 
hoping to be safe from the killers.  
We sat there from nine am up to four pm. We were like 3,000 people and 
they didn’t know how to kill us without wasting their bullets and we were 
too many for them to kill one by one. They had to find a way. They brought 
a tank and it fired on us. There was a flow of blood on me from the dead 
bodies next to me. I spent the night among the dead bodies. I was hungry 
because all I had to eat was dust. (…) At four am, when I woke up, they 
were searching for survivors among the dead using knives. They hit me 
many times with their knives trying to see if I was dead. I didn’t feel it 
because I was like dead and lost too much blood. 
There is again something very telling about the location of these crimes. In a 
religious country as was Rwanda in 1994, it first sounds astonishing that massacres 
were committed in a church. But perhaps this is very telling of the perceived 
attributes of the Tutsis, as unworthy of the Church or God’s protection.  
The physical injuries that resulted from the rape, and also from other forms of 
violence, were a central feature of the stories of the women I met. Their physical 
injuries were sometimes visible, and sometimes they either wanted to show them to 
me, such as removing their wig to show the burns of their heads, or asked me to 
touch them. These injuries were an important subject of discussion not only because 
they impact their day-to-day lives, as will be discussed below, but also because they 
                                                
4 The RPF. 
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are constant reminders of past trauma. However, in addition to these physical 
injuries, a few women I met were also infected with HIV/AIDS as a result of the 
rape, ensuring the lasting consequences of the rape on their lives.  
I was married and I had a ten months child [when the genocide started]. My 
husband abandoned us during that war. He was a Hutu. I saw everything. I 
was beaten, raped, and cut all over my body. I was tested HIV positive 
(Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013). 
This is also the case of Joséphine (26 June 2013), who became an Interahamwe wife 
during the genocide, meaning that she was forced to engage in sexual relationships 
with these men in exchange for her life. ‘We were asked to become the Interahamwe 
wives or to be killed during the genocide. In front of that choice I preferred to follow 
other women who decided to take that choice too.’ After the genocide, Joséphine 
however discovered that she was HIV positive, which was a great source of shame 
for her because of the widespread belief that this was a disease that only affected 
prostitutes.  
Organisation E took us and we were tested HIV positive. They used to say 
that AIDS came from animals. We didn’t agree to be tested because in the 
beginning they used to say that AIDS affected prostitutes only. It was a 
shame. And in that time they used to take blood in Kigali to be tested. I 
didn’t believe them when they told me that I was infected. I didn’t believe 
them because I knew it could affect prostitutes only (Joséphine, 26 June 
2013). 
Accepting her illness was extremely hard for Joséphine, not only because of the 
stigma associated with HIV/AIDS, but also because of the lasting consequences of 
the infection. 
After the genocide I was sick, my husband and my two children killed. I 
stayed with my three children and my sickness that I couldn’t accept in my 
heart. And when the genocide stopped, the Interahamwe left us and went 
away. Life didn’t spare me because I had to fight for it. (…) I was thinking 
that it was better to die, so I was expecting AIDS to kill me because others 
didn’t do it (Joséphine, 26 June 2013). 
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The women’s bodies were therefore again the battlefield upon which the 
communities could be disintegrated, but this time through HIV infection.  
Moreover, all of the women interviewed experienced migration throughout the 
genocide, since they had to flee their home in order to survive. For most of them, it is 
through this journey that they experienced sexual violence, being allowed to survive 
either by choice or by pure luck. This is the case of Céline (5 June 2013), who 
travelled almost 140 kilometres, crossing through different towns and different 
homes and shelters until she was rescued in the Western province. 
Then we arrived at Mushubati. I followed some women to a school. At two 
am I saw people coming towards us, asking for our papers. I was spared 
that night. At nine am in the morning, a little boy came to tell me that some 
people wanted to see me. I asked who were they? He didn’t want to tell but 
I didn’t have a choice. I followed him but I told my children to come with 
me. When we got there I found out that they were soldiers on a roadblock. 
They asked me to enter in the house alone. When I got inside they raped 
me. When they finished what they were doing to me, they asked me where I 
was from. I told them that I was from Kibuye. They let me go.  
The case of Céline is especially troubling since she strongly believes that the men 
who raped her knew about her identity and consciously decided to spare her life. 
This implies a certain gender dimension to the genocide, where the men were killed 
and the women were raped. The vast majority of the genocide victims were indeed 
men, and it is understood in Rwanda that there are not enough male survivors of the 
genocide for every female Rwandan to find a husband (observation of Organisation 
D, 10 June 2013). Of the more than 30 women survivors of sexual violence I talked 
to during my time in Rwanda, the vast majority were widows from the genocide, 
meaning that there was clearly a gender divide between those who were spared and 
those who were undoubtedly killed. This can perhaps be first explained by the 
patriarchal structures within Rwandan society and the gendered nature of war 
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(women ‘survive’ while men fight), where soldiers needed women to undertake 
certain chores. 
That day they [Interahamwe] started killing many people. We were hiding 
in houses. They came and set free every Hutu by asking identification 
cards. We stayed. In a few days my family was killed. (…) They used to 
take us one by one, like five women a day taking them to celebrate their 
marriage with one of them in one of the houses after they killed the owners. 
Days passed and one day G. came to say that he wanted women for sex. 
They took us every day to his house, picking some of us they liked, 
bringing back others. They also used to give us some kind of drinks that 
was like drugs. It was in a rainy season. They also took us to bury a dog 
and a cat they killed. They took me to a woman where they made me work 
as a house girl, cooking for them all night and bringing them food in the 
morning. I used to cook beans in a barrel. After all that, they used to come 
back at night and beat me with their guns (Oda, 2 July 2013). 
However, I suggest that beyond the gender dynamics, the patriarchal 
understanding of biological reproduction of one’s group being carried only through 
paternity also explains why more women than men were allowed to survive the 
genocide. It was understood that Tutsi women could not continue the reproduction of 
their group without Tutsi men. This patriarchal understanding of group reproduction 
also meant that for a few women I engaged with, they also experienced forced 
impregnation. This is the case of Oda, who mentioned above that she had to cook for 
the Interahamwe during the genocide. 
One day I didn’t cook because I heard that the Inkotanyi were coming for 
us. When the Interahamwe came back and found out that I didn’t cook, one 
of them pierced me with his bayonet under my breast. I fell down and bled 
to death. There’s one Interahamwe who took my little sister. He came and 
carried me at St. Famille. When I got there, people were dying a lot. My 
wounds were infected. A few days later we got rescued by the Inkotanyi 
and they treated our wounds. That is when I found out that I was pregnant 
from the Interahamwe. It was bad for me. My wounds were treated and 
after I regained my strength, Inkotanyi made me have an abortion (Oda, 2 
July 2013). 
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This last sentence is especially powerful, since it implies that the Inkotanyi had a role 
to play in the decision to abort that child. This clearly illustrates the patriarchal 
understanding of group reproduction that influenced the use of sexual violence as a 
weapon of war, since instead of seeing a pregnant Tutsi woman who would give 
birth to child raised as Tutsi, the Inkotanyi instead likely saw a child with the 
attributes of an Interahamwe.  
However, another woman, Jeannette, was also impregnated as a result of rape, 
but gave birth to the child in the aftermath of the genocide, which she found difficult 
to accept. 
Days later, one of them [Interahamwe] took me to his house and raped me. 
I spent a week there. Every time he used to go kill people during the day 
and come back at night bringing others like me. After a week, we were 
rescued by the Inkotanyi. When did you know that you were pregnant? 
After 4 months. And how did you take it? It was hard for me to get 
pregnant of a child you didn’t plan and from someone you don’t know. And 
it was worse when I knew I was infected (Jeannette, 9 July 2013). 
These are only glimpses into the personal stories of the genocide of the women I 
met during my time in Rwanda, but these experiences during that 100-day period still 
affect their post-conflict experiences almost 20 years later. The context and their 
surroundings have changed: as mentioned by Valentine (29 May 2013) when 
speaking about the toilet hole where she was raped, ‘Today there’s a big tree in the 
place where was the hole.’ These changes, however, have not erased the physical and 
psychological injuries of the women I met. Indeed, what remains constant is that 
their moral exclusion started as soon as the genocide started and their body was used 
as a battlefield, and continues in the aftermath of the genocide.  
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Reconstructing Social Relationships 
Rwanda has made significant progress in its post-conflict reconstruction, which 
has drastically transformed its surroundings. In my first few days in Kigali, while I 
was waiting for the Rwanda National Ethics Board to approve my research visa, I 
went to the Gisozi Genocide Memorial. From the outside, the Memorial is 
immaculate, with vegetation and gardens surrounding the mass graves. Outside the 
entrance is the memorial flame, a constant reminder of the atrocities that occurred in 
Rwanda in 1994. 
The memorial includes an indoor exhibition on the history of the genocide, 
starting from the pre-colonial period to the current post-conflict state. The memorial 
is well organised and maintained by the Aegis Trust, and acts as a reminder of the 
genocide and as evidence of mass crimes that cannot be denied. The memorial also 
acknowledges the use of mass rapes as a weapon of war during the genocide, and 
mentions the difficulties of addressing this trauma due to the number of victims and 
the prioritization of resources (Observation, 21 May 2013). 
I visited many parts of the country during my time in Rwanda and was surprised 
to find genocide memorials throughout the country. These memorials of course 
change in size and purpose, with some being used more as ‘museums’, while others 
seem to be acting as reminders of the past, as the photograph below shows.  
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 I arrived in Kigali shortly after the beginning of the 19th year 
commemoration, and banners were present on the streets of the city; songs about the 
genocide and the perils of denying it happened were shown on the TV channel 
operated by the Ministry of Broadcasting and Information. Whilst the city did not 
show any lingering signs of the violence, except for the walls of the Parliament, the 
1994 genocide was constantly in the background. I interpreted the space as a 
metaphor of the Rwandan population, where on the surface one would not 
necessarily notice the trauma and violent past that this country has suffered, yet it 
follows them every step of the recovery process. This is something that was 
confirmed throughout my time in Rwanda, where the experiences of the genocide 
still very much influence the post-conflict experiences of the women who suffered 
from sexual violence. 
Genocide Memorial on the right, outside Nyungwe Forest National Park. Photo by 
Author. 
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Voices from the Inside 
Through my interactions with some women who suffered from sexual violence, it 
became clear that they still suffered from trauma. The level of trauma experienced 
varies from woman to woman and even between days, weeks, and months, but it is 
something that all the women I met have endured in the aftermath of the genocide. It 
is worth noting that the term ‘trauma’ was used by the women I met to describe their 
state, but according to a few Rwandans I spoke to, this term was not present in the 
Kinyarwanda language prior to the genocide, or at least it was not commonly used.  
The women told me that, at first, the trauma of the genocide, and of the sexual 
violence, was extremely strong and contributed to their state of social isolation.  
I don’t really remember the year I met Organisation C. But I remember that 
when I [learned] about it, it was like I lost my mind: I never went to pray, I 
didn’t like to approach people, I was thinking that no one could listen to me 
whatever I would tell (Céline, 5 June 2013). 
All the women I met experienced different levels of trauma as a result of the rape 
itself, but added consequences of the act can increase the suffering experienced. For 
example, as explained above, some women were infected by HIV/AIDS as a result of 
the rape, and this added another layer of trauma. ‘I went to be treated at a crazy 
people hospital at Ndera. I was always naked because I got crazy thinking about the 
way they took off my clothes… also because I was tested HIV positive’ (Valentine, 
29 May 2013).   
Their psychological distress was also hard to address in the aftermath of the 
genocide when they felt that they were surrounded by the génocidaires. ‘I went mad 
again because I was living among killers all around me’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013). 
For others, the trauma was so strong that some of them wished they would have died 
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instead of surviving the genocide. ‘I wanted to die on my way back home’ (Céline, 5 
June 2013). Others even attempted suicide in order to liberate themselves from this 
pain. This is the case of Jeannette (9 July 2013), who, in addition to the loss of her 
family and the sexual violence, also gave birth to a child born out of rape. ‘I could 
even stand in the middle of the road hoping that a car could kill me, crying day and 
night. I tried to kill myself many times’.  
The psychological distress experienced by these women may have led some of 
them to develop suicidal thoughts, but the isolation felt also has an impact on their 
access to services such as access to justice. 
I didn’t like to go there [gacaca court] because every time I tried to go 
there, it drove me crazy. Every time they talked about that time I wasn’t 
good. So I preferred not to go. I was invited to go see people who killed my 
family. I was told that they accepted that they were guilty but I never went 
there (Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013). 
This quote by Marie-Louise illustrates the struggle she faced when attempting to get 
justice and reparation for the crimes committed against her and her family.  
Recollecting the events from the genocide can sometimes re-traumatize civilian 
victims of war, and this is something that Marie-Louise experienced during the 
testimonies. 
However, when I was in Rwanda in 2013, it was evident that the women did not 
experience trauma to the same extent as they did after the genocide. In a group 
therapy session with approximately 30 women held by Organisation D, I asked the 
women what helped them after the genocide. They said the organisation taught them 
the word of God, gave them material and financial support, and, most importantly, 
psychological support (Observation Organisation D, 31 May 2013). 
 157 
The psychological support given by the NGOs operating in Rwanda seems one of 
the most important services provided after the genocide. ‘Organisation C gave me 
the peace of heart. They wiped away my tears. That is the first thing I can say they 
did’ (Olive, 29 May 2013). All survivors interviewed mentioned the importance that 
feeling listened to had on their trauma healing. ‘The director prayed for me and I felt 
like my heart was in peace because finally someone listened to me’ (Rose, 29 May 
2013); ‘after days of talking I was free of that charge in my heart’ (Joséphine, 26 
June 2013). The opportunity to not only speak, but to feel heard, is very important 
for these women, giving them the feeling that they are not alone.  
We could spend two days just talking. That helped us feel that we were not 
alone anymore. (…) What I was saying is that before I was lonely, I was 
thinking that I wasn’t capable of coming out of my house and go 
somewhere, but because of Organisation C and other people who I live with 
and the fact that I joined some associations, it helped me to break the chains 
in my heart, move from that darkness and feel better (Agathe, 29 May 
2013). 
 However, I would take this argument further by arguing that it is not only the 
possibility of being listened to that leads to trauma healing, but also being listened to 
by individuals free of judgement. Going back to the case of Marie-Louise, who tried 
to testify in the gacaca courts, the possibility of being listened to and speaking about 
the crimes committed against her did not provide her with the same sense of relief as 
described by Rose and Josephine - on the contrary. This may imply that the 
conditions in which the women are allowed to speak, as well as the character of the 
individuals who are listening, all have an impact on the possibility for trauma 
healing, and consequently show them that they are worthy individuals. For example, 
after conducting interviews with these women, many of them mentioned the 
importance of this moment, where they were able to speak about their lives in a safe 
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space. ‘I will never forget that you took the time to listen to me’ (Agathe, 29 May 
2013).  
This need to be listened to can also explain why some women found their 
religious faith crucial for their trauma healing process. For them, praying and feeling 
listened to by God are crucial for the process of self-acceptance. ‘I also go pray. That 
is what gives me peace’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013), and  
I was a Catholic. I didn’t change. I go pray because it makes me forget 
what I was before. (…) I pray a lot. When you think about the past and how 
we raised our children after that life, I pray a lot (Célestine, 27 June 2013). 
However, due to the disputed role of churches during the genocide, there are still 
some individuals who might feel alienated by religious teaching. 
Is religion helping you in your day-to-day life? No. I don’t even 
participate anymore. We were practising Adventists, the good ones. But my 
family was chased by our friends at the church and one pastor killed my 
father. I also heard that my mother had been given [away] by the sons of a 
pastor. So I gave up on religion. Sometimes I try to pray but I am not strong 
at that (Oda, 2 July 2013). 
In the case of Oda, she is rejecting her faith because of the role that religious men 
played in killing her family. The role of the Christian Church in the Rwandan 
genocide has been analysed by some researchers, such as Carney (2012), and a few 
women I met (Rose and Jeannette) were attacked by the Interahamwe while they 
were taking cover in a church. It was thus a surprise on my part that Oda was the 
only woman I met who personally struggled with her religious faith. It however 
confirms the idea that not all channels available to increase the women’s voices are 
worthwhile for some women, and that they must develop a relationship of trust with 
those who listen. This is not always an easy thing due to their stigmatisation. 
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Regardless, it seems that religion provides for most women a way to understand 
their suffering. On many occasions, the women seemed to be removing their agency 
and putting it into God’s hands. For example, Agathe (29 May 2013) was speaking 
about the suffering she experienced during the genocide, and concluded: ‘that is what 
God gave me.’ Other women also mentioned that they survived because of God’s 
plan. ‘Because God wanted us to survive and tell what happened in that time, God 
saved me and I was healed’ (Jeannette, 9 July 2013). I interpret this as in order to 
accept what happened to them, the women need to believe that this was all part of 
God’s plan. This may lead them to remove to a certain extent their own agency, as 
well as the agency of other Rwandans. This might be a reaction to witnessing 
atrocities during the genocide, and the resulting difficulty of accepting that this was 
purely caused by human agency. It might be easier for trauma healing to hold onto 
this idea that, despite all this suffering, God had a plan. This belief might also 
explain why religion remains important in the aftermath of the genocide, whereby 
some women might believe that their social reintegration and the improvement of 
their living conditions is again part of God’s plan.  
I will always be grateful for what God gave me through Organisation C. 
(…) We were told that we could come pray and tell our wishes in prayers. 
It made me be in a sharing relationship with God. God heard my prayers 
and I got a job here (Rose, 29 May 2013). 
This is also perhaps why Marie-Louise (27 June 2013) wanted me to share this 
message through my research: ‘tell them to pray for us. Also I don’t have a shelter, 
we pay the rent but it is very hard. So they have to pray for us’.  
Joining an association and nurturing their religious faith were described as 
important steps towards trauma healing for some women. ‘They [the NGO] brought 
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back my hope in life’ (Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013); ‘when I cry I feel free because 
they killed my child and everyone I loved. And when I came here I started feeling 
the change in my heart’ (Olive, 29 May 2013). However, as mentioned above, whilst 
there has been important progress in terms of trauma healing, the trauma experienced 
can sometimes be triggered and increase at some points in the women’s lives. ‘Now I 
have hope and I want to live. Problems come only when I face poorness and I have 
no one I can speak to’ (Oda, 2 July 2013). As the case of Oda illustrates, an increase 
in trauma is often associated with a change in living conditions, such as financial 
challenges or illness. This also explains why when I directly asked the women what 
the most important NGO services for them are, counselling services are always 
mentioned alongside other services.  
For some, especially those infected with HIV/AIDS, it is the medicine provided 
that was crucial. ‘What is the service that Organisation E gave you that most 
helped you? The counselling service and the ARV because they gave us our 
medicines’ (Jeanette, 9 July 2013); ‘they give us medicines and it helps us so much. 
They also organise meetings between us and they counsel us about life’ (Célestine, 
27 June 2013). This combination between counselling services and services targeting 
basic and physical needs was a constant feature of my encounters with these women. 
The most important is the counselling service. They gave me Nadège to 
advise me. She made me take my medicines and now I am fine, I came 
back to life. I accepted my situation. Also they helped me in bad situations 
like paying my rent when I was down. (…) I was helped by Organisation E 
in everything. They gave us hope and treated our wounds. They pay my 
ticket to go take my pills every month (Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013). 
I interpret this quote by Marie-Louise as suggesting that the women I met achieved a 
certain degree of trauma healing because of the wide support provided by the 
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organisations, which not only counsel them, but also address the basic and physical 
needs of these women. By receiving support in every sphere of their lives, the 
women are able to overcome trauma and achieve social reintegration. ‘Step by step I 
finally accepted who I was and I stopped thinking about vengeance. Here they helped 
a lot and gave me everything until now’ (Valentine, 29 May 2013). 
Social reintegration was another point discussed by all women in my formal 
interviews, who all felt, to different extents, stigmatised and marginalised by their 
local community. ‘My life went bad again because I started taking care of another 
one like me [infected with HIV]. People were calling us “crazy”’ (Joséphine, 26 June 
2013). This stigma was at times so strong that for some women, such as Oda (2 July 
2013), it removed their hope in a better future: ‘long ago I felt like I lost my will to 
live, the stigma around me made me want to die, asking God why I survived.’ Whilst 
the women mostly feel stigmatised by those individuals who are not considered 
survivors of the genocide, they may also face stigmatisation from other survivors 
who did not suffer from rape. This stigmatisation is experienced through social 
rejection, where the women I met are verbally abused and excluded from 
participating in social interactions in their community. For example, Joséphine (26 
June 2013) survived the genocide because she became the wife of an Interahamwe, 
and because of this she feels rejected by other survivors. ‘Because we were hiding in 
the bushes and lands, before we got to hide with that Interahamwe, people we left 
behind didn’t like us anymore because they knew we got rescued by the same killers 
who were hunting them.’ According to her, others think that she should have died 
instead of becoming the sexual partner of a génocidaire, which means not only 
engaging in sexual relationships with a killer, but with a man from the enemy group. 
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This is extremely revealing of the moral exclusion experienced by these women, 
showing this association between mind and body, where once their bodies were 
tinted by the rape, their morality became compromised. 
With time and with the support of the NGOs, some women I met have, however, 
learned to overcome this stigmatisation, even those infected with HIV/AIDS. 
I was almost dead because I used to stay in the house thinking that people 
knew and that there was shame on me. (…) They used to fear me because 
of what happened to me, they put me in some kind of quarantine, never 
asked me water or anything else. I also didn’t like to talk or to approach 
people. But now I am changed, things are fine. They visit me. I can give 
them what they ask me if I have it. Also people I pray with visit me (Céline, 
5 June 2013). 
This means that for some women, even if stigma is present, whether because of their 
experience of rape, of bearing a child born out of rape or because of their HIV 
infection, it is possible to ignore the situation and to look ahead. ‘Do you fear that 
those who are not survivors learn about your past and reject you? They keep us in 
that stigma because they think they know about us but we don’t care’ (Célestine, 27 
June 2013). 
However, what is consistent with almost all the women I met is that while some 
feel confident enough to face stigma, they will still try to hide the truth about their 
past if possible: ‘I try to show people that I am fine because I don’t want people to 
know my problems’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013); ‘you can’t go tell your problems to 
someone who doesn’t understand you’ (Célestine, 27 June 2013). This reinforces my 
previous argument that speaking about one’s past is not always conducive to trauma 
healing since it may lead to further stigmatisation. These women need to choose who 
they can disclose their past to, and those to whom they cannot. It is worth mentioning 
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that almost all the women I met do not live in the same neighbourhood or village that 
they lived in during the genocide. A few of them moved to Kigali and others moved 
to other villages, and this migration was described as their decision to stay away 
from a place associated with loss and trauma, as well as from a place where their past 
might be known by others. There are, however, some women who never kept their 
past secret, despite comments made by their neighbours. 
I never kept my problems secret. People used to listen to me, others put me 
in the stigma saying that I was infected. (…)  Some of them are good 
people who have good hearts and help me. Others are bad and tell others to 
not come close to me saying that I am crazy and I have HIV (Marie-Louise, 
27 June 2013). 
This quote is especially powerful, due to the association between being ‘crazy’, and 
being a rape victim who is also HIV-infected. The women may not have explicitly 
mentioned this, but underlying all their stories is this shift from a body that was 
spoiled through rape during the genocide to the depreciation of their value as human 
beings in the post-conflict period. 
This explains why all women share the perception that it would be impossible for 
those who have not suffered from rape during the genocide to understand their 
situation, to care about them and to avoid blaming them. 
Why have you decided to keep the secret in your community? It is not that 
easy and if you are able to talk, they wouldn’t believe me. Why would they 
not believe you? No, it is not that they wouldn’t believe me but they don’t 
care (Jeannette, 9 July 2013). 
At first, they may not feel understood because non-survivors may struggle to 
comprehend the reality and scale of these crimes, and to believe that this could really 
happen to a human being.  
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And no one can understand me when I say that I have problems. Those are 
my first difficulties. (…) It means that it is unimaginable things. Things that 
you can tell someone and he can’t understand that it can be real. That is the 
only thing. They face that problem, the fact that these are sad events. Can 
someone live with these sad events and feel free when that person is with 
others, live with them without problems? They don’t understand it, it 
become a question for them. J: they think that it is the impossible thing. 
Unthinkable things (Agathe, 29 May 2013). 
More serious than that is however the fact that many individuals will not believe that 
these events could have happened to innocent victims, and that these women must 
have done something to be treated this way. 
Also when gacacas started, they didn’t want to listen to me because they 
were saying that I was a fool. Then I decided to keep silent until I came 
here, I met a counsellor and they helped me to talk about my past. Marie-
Louise also helped me to talk. But all my neighbours don’t like me. [In] the 
gacaca [it was] decided that I was going to be paid for my damaged 
properties but when I went to follow-up on my case so that I can be paid, I 
found out that the man who was going to pay me sold everything and ran 
away. His wife insulted me in public saying that I was lying about my 
situation, that I didn’t get AIDS from the Interahamwe but because I had a 
good time with my Tutsi friends and that I made it all up (Oda, 2 July 
2013). 
This is especially true for the women who were infected with HIV, since local beliefs 
at the time were that it was a disease that only affected prostitutes, as explained 
above. Contracting HIV/AIDS as a result of rape, as well as forced impregnation, 
thus added additional layers of stigmatisation for the women who survived sexual 
violence, and contributed to the devalorisation of their social worth. This suggests 
that the stigmatisation experienced varies from individual to individual, based on a 
multitude of factors such as the degree of self-acceptance or self-exclusion, the 
strength of social networks and the nature of the consequences of the rape. 
The social marginalisation experienced by the women I met is also aggravated by 
a certain type of ‘gender crisis’, in which they reject their gender identity and roles 
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within society. As expressed by Oda (2 July 2013), ‘many times I did not like to be 
called a woman.’ This rejection of their gender identity was observed during my time 
in Rwanda as the refusal of their social role as wives or mothers.  
In terms of their role as wives, many women interviewed feel uncomfortable with 
the idea of getting (re)married: ‘I didn’t want to marry because I was afraid of my 
situation’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013), and  
My husband [a Hutu] came back after the war and begged for forgiveness 
explaining me that he didn’t want to kill me because they would have asked 
him to, so he preferred to run away. I forgave him and because I didn’t 
want to marry twice, I let him come back (Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013).  
This is also illustrated by the cases of Céline (5 June 2013), who also rejects to a 
certain extent members of the opposite sex: ‘I hate men but I thank God because 
today never a man has stepped on my door trying to woo me, to fall in love with me’; 
and of Jeannette (9 July 2013): ‘I may never get married because every time I see a 
man I see a devil.’ These comments are especially powerful when taking into 
consideration the Rwandan culture, in which girls are expected to get married in 
order to hold a certain status in society. Their unease towards members of the 
opposite sex is not surprising for women who survived sexual violence, but it 
remains a socially marginal attitude outside of Rwanda’s heterosexual norms. As 
expressed by a man infected with AIDS in a group counselling session (14 June 
2013), ‘a man is the head of the household, he is financially responsible.’ 
Considering the survivors of sexual violence I met lived in difficult conditions, this 
refusal to become involved with another man is extremely powerful since it goes not 
only against gender expectations, but it also prevents them from improving their 
economic conditions. 
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Second, some women suffering from this kind of ‘gender crisis’ are also rejecting 
their roles as mothers. This was mentioned in some interviews when respondents 
explained to me how they had abandoned their children or found it hard to love them. 
This was especially true for the women who were impregnated as a result of rape. 
It was hard for me to get pregnant of a child you didn’t plan and from 
someone you don’t know. And it was worse when I knew I was infected. 
(…) I could even stand in the middle of the road hoping that a car could kill 
me, crying day and night. I tried to kill myself many times. I never loved 
that child because every time I see her, she reminds me of the past. She is 
my wound that will never heal. But slowly it may pass. I never told her 
about her father (Jeannette, 9 July 2013). 
However, whilst this is inevitably a crisis experienced by Jeannette, who was 
impregnated through rape, other mothers who did not have children born out of rape 
also told me how they struggled to take care of their children.  ‘Even the child I had, 
I did not love to see him because he came from my genital organs’ (Céline, 5 June 
2013). These women had to be helped by the organisations and ‘re-educated’ into 
their roles as mothers, but for some, tensions with their children are still present. 
Moreover, for other women I met, survival during the genocide meant that they were 
separated from their children or had to abandon them in order to find safety: ‘I came 
and reached Nyamirambo, leaving my children [behind]. (…) Still I don’t know 
where my children are’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013).  
These personal gender and sexual identities are aggravated by the gender norms 
found in Rwandan culture. There is a certain social status related to being a wife, and 
then a mother, and one’s marital status influences one’s social position. The cultural 
value placed on marriage is something that was often discussed during my time in 
Rwanda. For example, after a few weeks in Kigali, I started to notice that some 
individuals were not called by their name, but were instead called ‘Maman X’ or 
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‘Papa X’. When discussing this with my translator, she informed me that, at the 
community level, it might be perceived as disrespectful to call adults by their own 
names. Instead, one might want to call them ‘Papa X’ or ‘Maman X’, or sometimes 
even ‘Maman (name of the child)’. This could perhaps suggest that being a father or 
mother is one of the most respectable statuses one could gain in Rwandan society. 
Once I became aware of these ethics, I started to notice that the NGO staff members 
often referred to the women survivors of sexual violence as “les mamans” (the 
mothers), again reinforcing this idea that women are referred to by their marital 
status and motherhood as a sign of respect.  
This emphasis on marriage and motherhood can place these women in a 
marginalised position. For example, Agathe (29 May 2013) expressed this when 
saying that ‘the first thing is that I am not a woman and I am not a girl.’ Since being 
a ‘girl’ in Rwanda refers to being a virgin, while being a ‘woman’ refers to being 
married, there is an association between virginity/single life, and sexual relationship/ 
marriage that suggests that sexual relationships are acceptable only when they occur 
between married individuals. Because of her past, Agathe is challenging this 
dichotomy, and finds herself without any social status.  
Furthermore, none of the women I met remarried after the genocide. Whilst some 
explained this was because of their unease with men, this could also perhaps be 
explained by the stigma associated with rape, and by the changed demographic 
where there are currently more women than men in Rwanda. It is also worth noting 
that the social status associated with marriage and motherhood is granted only to 
individuals who are engaged in what is considered an acceptable relationship. For 
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instance, stigma is still placed on Jeannette, despite her being a mother, because of 
the origin of her child.  
They know that I have an illegal child because I was never married. So 
because they don’t know my story, and because after the genocide girls 
used to have sex with soldiers, people think that I had my child the same 
way as these girls (Jeannette, 9 July 2013). 
The stigma experienced and the gender norms found in Rwandan culture thus 
complicate the process of socially reintegrating women who suffered from sexual 
violence, since they justify their moral exclusion. However, this does not mean that 
these women do not forge meaningful relationships with other survivors of sexual 
violence or with other individuals in their communities. 
It became obvious through speaking with the women that a strong sense of 
belonging has been forged between the survivors themselves, creating groupings 
within the society that are not totally removed from ethnicity. During my time in 
Rwanda, I started to understand that whilst the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were not 
explicitly used, the individuals I met who were old enough to be alive during the 
genocide still perceived a certain distinction between these ethnic groups. This 
identification is not necessarily based on hatred, but instead seems based on a sharing 
of experiences. My translator explained this (10 June 2013) at one point, mentioning 
how there are not any tensions between these groups, but people have the tendency 
to regroup with others who share the same experiences from the genocide. She gave 
me the example of Butare University, where the students had nicknames for each 
other depending on where they found refuge during the genocide. She assured me 
that these nicknames were not racist, but she still erased these names on the sheet of 
paper she used in case anyone else would see them. My time spent in Rwanda 
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allowed me to observe interactions within the country, and my observations and 
interviews support this idea that there are four divisions within the country at the 
moment: returnees (Tutsis who lived in exile during the genocide and now found 
themselves holding privilege positions), survivors (Tutsis granted the title of 
survivors by the government, which means Tutsis who were targeted during the 
genocide), those who lived in Rwanda during the genocide but were not targeted 
(this include Hutus, from génocidaires to the individuals who took no part in the 
genocide), and finally the Twas (who remain a marginalised group). This sense of 
belonging amongst individuals who shared the same experiences during the genocide 
necessarily involves a sense of belonging amongst individuals who identified as part 
of the same ethnic group during the genocide, but divisions within those who 
previously identified as Tutsi are also found.  
In my conversations with the women who experienced sexual violence, ethnic 
relations surfaced, with some women explicitly using ethnic terms while others 
referred to these shared experiences of the genocide. It was clear for all the women I 
interviewed that they were targeted during the genocide because of their ethnicity. 
As mentioned by Célestine (27 June 2013) when asked why was she targeted by 
sexual violence in 1994, she answered ‘they wanted to see the beauty of a Tutsi’, and 
Valentine (29 May 2013) stated, ‘they said they wanted to see how a Tutsi vagina 
looked like.’ Both quotes are extremely powerful, since they bring together both the 
ethnic and gender component of the genocide, quite explicitly in the latter and more 
subtlety in the former, referring to feminine qualities normally associated with 
women. This suggests that being Tutsi meant something during the genocide, but 
being a Tutsi woman led to a different set of expectations and sufferings.  
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All women I interviewed, however, made a net distinction between their 
aggressors, who they named the Interahamwe, and Hutus in general.  
[The organisation] helped me and found me a sponsor so that I don’t have 
to beg the Interahamwe for food. (…) They also taught me how to behave 
when I am amongst the Interahamwe who did that to me and who live in 
my neighbourhood (Valentine, 29 May 2013). 
This meant that whilst many women could not perceive themselves as forgiving 
the Interahamwe for their acts, some of them were still saying that they can live and 
interact with all Rwandans, which was part of the healing process: ‘I accept to live 
with different people, what was impossible to me in that time’ (Agathe, 29 May 
2013). For her, but also for all the women I met in Rwanda, engaging with 
individuals who identified as Hutus during the war but were not part of the 
Interahamwe is now possible, but implied a strong process of trauma healing and of 
accepting one’s fate. Once this has been achieved, these women might feel that they 
can freely participate in the social life of their community. 
Are you invited to events in your neighbourhood? Yes, even in wedding 
ceremonies. I was alone before and people didn’t want me to be with them, 
but now I am with everyone in every activity, like I am a mediator in our 
cell (Céline, 5 June 2013). 
However, as the next quote by Jeannette suggests, being able to interact with 
members of the other ethnic group does not necessarily mean the women are totally 
comfortable in their presence. ‘All of them [her neighbours] are my friends. Before I 
never loved to speak to a Hutu but when I finally accepted my fate, I started to talk to 
everyone. But I feel free with survivors only’ (Jeannette, 9 July 2013). 
All the women I encountered explained how they felt free only with other 
survivors, suggesting that not only is there a certain distance between them and those 
previously identified as Hutus, but also between them and the returnees who did not 
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live in Rwanda during the genocide. For example, this was implicitly suggested by 
Agathe when I asked her whether she feels free to be herself with members of her 
community: ‘Do you feel free with others? Not everyone, but some of them’ 
(Agathe, 29 May 2013); and this was clearly expressed by Célestine (27 June 2013) 
when she noted that ‘we live in a village of people from abroad [returnees] and they 
don’t like us. They think that we are Interahamwe. We keep quiet and stick 
together.’ Moreover, I observed this first-hand one morning at Organisation D. I 
arrived at the organisation and the director, counsellor and program manager were 
sitting in a circle with a group of around five men and women. The situation seemed 
serious, and I was later told that a fight started between two women in this income-
generating group. They had a fight regarding the finances of their group, and one 
woman (a Hutu) tore a picture of the other one (a Tutsi). The second woman claimed 
that the first one did that because she wants to kill her, and events leading back to the 
genocide were brought into the fight (“your family did this”). Both women share 
some similarities in the post-conflict period (poverty, illness, etc.), but their identity 
during the genocide can still create tensions today. This event suggests that whilst the 
women I encountered were able to socially interact with members of different ethnic 
backgrounds, divisions and tensions might still be present between them and those 
who have different experiences of the genocide. This is well summarised by Agathe 
(29 May 2013):  
Today I finally feel like I am being healed by prayer, I accept to live with 
different people, what was impossible to me at that time. (…) But today my 
life is not that easy due to many reasons like meeting people when I don’t 
want to approach them and in that case I have to stay away. 
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Moreover, this sense of belonging and solidarity found between those granted the 
title of ‘survivors of the genocide’ can be explained by this shared experience of 
suffering during the genocide.  
That is the important thing [to] live in a society of people who experienced 
the same problems as you. One can say that I am a widow and I don’t have 
any children. Another one can say [about someone else] that she doesn’t 
have a shelter and nothing to eat. All of that and living with [these] people 
gave me peace of heart. I realised that there are many people who 
experienced the same problems as me (Agathe, 29 May 2013). 
This quote clearly illustrates the importance for Agathe of engaging with 
individuals who share similar suffering. These shared experiences help the women I 
met to accept their own past, since they realise they are not the only women who 
suffered during the genocide. Strong ties were built through these experiences, which 
the women could perceive as exclusive to “their own kind”. 
[Organisation E] knew that there were some Hutus who had AIDS but not 
because of reasons like ours. Organisation E came looking for Tutsi 
survivors. We were proud to be chosen, we were thinking that we had some 
kind of secret because of that (Joséphine, 26 June 2013). 
This quote is extremely powerful since it demonstrates the bonds created between 
women who share the same experiences of the genocide, in this case being infected 
with HIV/AIDS, and the separation that is created with other women who also have 
HIV/AIDS but did not got infected in the same way. This even leads some women, 
such as Céline (5 June 2013), to refer to the other Tutsis/survivors as members of her 
family. 
After I was healed, I prayed God asking why was I the only one left in my 
family? Was that because I was the last born in my family? I used to tell 
God everything I had in my heart. And I heard God telling me that he will 
show others like me. And I replied that every time I look around I see no 
Tutsis and I was sure that they all perished. I didn’t know what God wanted 
to tell me. But as days passed, he showed me my family, my people and I 
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realized there were many Tutsis that survived. That made me come back to 
normal life. 
The women I met often mentioned this idea of alternative family. For example, 
Jeannette (9 July 2013) mentioned that ‘when I joined the group, I met women in my 
situation and we talked about our lives. They became like my family because some 
of them are of the age of my mother’. Céline (5 June 2013) also expressed that ‘there 
in Gatenga, I have no other family except other survivors, but not my real family.’ 
These alternative families are comprised of survivors of the genocide, but also the 
staff members working for these NGOs: ‘Organisation E came when we needed it, 
they are our answer because I saw them as my mother and my brothers’ (Oda, 2 July 
2013); ‘I am grateful for what Organisation C did to me because they became my 
family. I am Olive who have no husband, no children because they were killed’ 
(Olive, 29 May 2013). Moreover, during my observation with Organisation D, I 
attended a group therapy with around 30 women survivors of sexual violence. We 
spoke about the impact this organisation had on their recovery, and many women 
mentioned how this organisation, i.e. the staff members and the other women, 
became their family and their parents (Observation, 12 July 2013). 
Again, it is important to stress that this sense of belonging is mostly based on 
shared experiences - not ethnic hatred - and in the case of the staff members, on their 
willingness to listen to the women’s stories. For example, a few women I met told 
me after our interviews that I could see them as my sisters, because I took the time to 
listen to them and to learn about their experiences. All of this might suggest that the 
relationships created reproduce familial networks and support, perhaps as an attempt 
to rebuild one’s family network in the absence of surviving family members.   
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This might explain why this strong sense of belonging that the women I 
encountered felt towards other survivors also leads to expectations of members of 
that group, almost like familial expectations. For instance, because of their common 
experiences, most of my respondents believe that stigma and exclusion should not 
happen between survivors. As Oda (2 July 2013) mentions:  
I live in a village of widows and orphans. So they are my friends. But 
because I always go for my physiotherapy session because I was beaten 
badly, people say that my body is losing control. Even my friends Tutsi say 
that and it makes me very sad because they know and they are not supposed 
to say so. 
Finally, another issue that challenges the social reintegration of women who 
suffered sexual violence is their reintegration into the local economy. During my 
time in Rwanda, I noticed that genocide survivors live in more difficult and 
precarious living conditions than other Rwandans, possibly as a result of diverse 
factors, such as migration during the genocide, loss of the family home, and the 
break-up of familial and social networks, to name a few. As mentioned above when 
speaking about trauma, extended support - including financial assistance - is 
extremely important for trauma healing and social reintegration. The NGOs I 
observed responded to this need by providing income-generating activities, skills 
training, or credit, which allows many women to secure some income. ‘I can get 
some money from there [the NGO] and solve some problems and it helps our lives’ 
(Jeannette, 9 July 2013). 
For example, a lot of women I met were undertaking some income-generating 
activities, whether through the organisations or not, or undertook skills training that 
may lead to employment. ‘Now I finished tailoring courses, also helped by 
Organisation C, which gave us means and a place where we meet and learn. I may 
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get some small jobs’ (Agathe, 29 May 2013); ‘they gave me money to start a small 
business but it was very hard because it was my first time starting my real life in 
Kigali’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013). 
 For some women, the psychological or physical consequences of rape prevent 
them from securing employment, but in these cases the NGOs try to support them 
through financial assistance and credits. ‘I am always home because I am not 
capable. But when I get some money from the [NGO], I use it to cultivate my land’ 
(Valentine, 29 May 2013), and: 
My job was to clean everywhere, cut grasses in the ground [of the 
organisation]. But after when they [Organisation C] realised that I wasn’t 
able to accomplish the job because my back is broken, they lend me some 
money. And here when you borrow money, and you pay it all back, they 
can give you more. Today I use the money they gave me. (…) Then 
Organisation C gave me a house. That is the most important thing that I put 
before God (Rose, 29 May 2013). 
For example, Agathe (29 May 2013) explained how the cow she received from 
Organisation C and other skills training were very important for improving her living 
conditions: 
For example, because they gave me a cow, that cow helped me very much 
in a way that I could get milk and get some money for personal use. And 
some other things that they helped me with is that we planned for a project, 
and they promised us that we could start an association and buy a sewing 
machine. They finally bought those machines for us and gave us the means 
to learn how to use them. They did a lot for us but problems will never be 
resolved. (…) They also told us to create a saving and credit association so 
that we could benefit from that money. I asked to join and they accepted 
me.  
As Agathe specifies, economic empowerment will not necessarily resolve all their 
problems, but it is perhaps a first step towards broader social empowerment. Some 
women were still aware that the NGOs sometimes struggle to secure funding for 
their programmes or to find more sponsors, which directly impacts the services 
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offered. ‘Sometimes I think that one day they will stop helping us. And I don’t have 
the means to build a house or to get some money when it stops’ (Céline, 5 June 
2013), and, 
Organisation E helps us. There are also some of us who are stronger than 
me, they created cooperatives and Organisation E organised some training 
about business. Organisation E also made them get some loans. They pay 
them back every week. But because many days I go for the physiotherapy 
sessions, I can’t afford to start a business when I am supposed to pay back 
every week. Every few months FARG send some money but it is not 
enough. The children that I raised are married and I stay with my children 
and I try to manage what I get. Organisation E doesn’t help us anymore 
because their sponsors stopped sending help. (…) They used to have 
sponsors and when we came here, they used to give us some small money 
we called a ticket. And with that money I could buy sugar and do some 
other things I needed to do. They also used to give us some flour for the 
porridge. Now they stopped. It would be better if it was brought back again 
like before (Oda, 2 July 2013). 
Oda’s case is a clear example of how income-generating activities may be very 
helpful for these women, but other factors – such as physical injuries – still prevent 
them from fully participating in these activities. 
My time spent in Rwanda and my interactions with the women who suffered from 
sexual violence during the genocide thus suggest that whilst some women are able to 
secure a certain income for their livelihood, they still remain on the outside of the 
more formal labour force in Rwanda. Their living conditions are indeed still 
precarious, and some important financial challenges are yet to be addressed, resulting 
from the trauma, illness and exclusion experienced. 
The problems that I face are because of my illness that never heals. Because 
of all those problems, it means that I take all the money I can get to the 
hospital. And there come problems of studies for the children. I have to find 
them food and shelter because I don’t live with them. They study in 
boarding schools. That is how things are. I mean that my capabilities and 
my needs don’t match (Agathe, 29 May 2013). 
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This need to socially and structurally reintegrate their community, as identified by 
the women, is central to the post-conflict experiences of the women interviewed. 
This was also discussed with the staff members of five NGOs working with these 
beneficiaries.  
Staff Interpretations of these Experiences 
According to staff members, trauma healing remains a constant challenge for 
these women. ‘Even now we have some women who are unable to accept themselves 
and who attempt suicide’ (Thérèse, psychologist, Organisation A, 13 May 2013).  
Trauma healing is understood as a long-term process that is difficult to measure 
since, according to Nadège (Counsellor, Organisation E, 26 June 2013), it is 
impossible to know if the women are totally healed. She also believes that sexual 
violence is the strongest trauma associated with the genocide, more so than 
mourning, mutilations, and injuries. Many staff members emphasized that trauma 
healing is a long-term process, agreeing that it varies from individual to individual. 
‘You cannot come for one session and think you are healed. It's a process, some will 
take months, others will take years. Another one might never even heal, because their 
minds have been totally destroyed’ (Janvier, Programme Director, Organisations 
A&B, 23 May 2013).  
Some staff members also explained how trauma healing does not necessarily have 
a linear progression. Women can feel better and then a stimulus will make them 
return to a more traumatized state. ‘Sometimes we face a situation where the person 
we have comforted for example in 2000, comes back for counselling because maybe 
something happened that is releasing some emotions’ (Vestine, sponsorship program, 
Organisation C, 4 June 2013). This is something observed on a larger scale during 
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the annual National Commemoration of the Genocide. ‘The National 
commemoration period brings back flashbacks; they [survivors of sexual violence] 
start behaving funny. Those who can speak reduce a lot their trauma’ (Marie-
Chantal, Counsellor, Organisation C, 13 May 2013). Organisation C specified that 
they remain open during the commemoration period especially for that reason 
(Vestine, 4 June 2013). 
Whilst the staff members all agreed that trauma healing remains a challenge for 
their beneficiaries, they also agreed that there are still some women who have never 
spoken about their past. According to Marie, the social worker of Organisation E (5 
July 2013), there are two types of women: those who speak up and those who prefer 
keeping their past secret. ‘We have accepted that there are some mothers that still 
want to keep it private. They don't want to meet other women, to get to know that 
they have the same past. And then we respect that’ (Janvier, 23 May 2013). Keeping 
this secret, however, has a big impact on, and consequences for, the women and their 
trauma. ‘People who still come [for counselling] are the people who find it hard to 
open up, they get lonely, they keep their loneliness, they want to be by themselves, 
they won't open up, they would not get healed so quickly’ (Brigitte, counsellor, 
Organisation B, 18 June 2013). It was suggested that these women are harder to help 
and to reintegrate into their community. Counselling services that involve creating a 
safe space for these women are thus necessary to help them open up and accept their 
situation.  
Organisation C started in 1995, but we have some women who up to now, 
cannot talk about what happened during the genocide. But we let them 
come here, listen to other testimonies, to see how others are comforted. 
You cannot force [them]. If they are willing [to speak], you cannot miss 
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this opportunity. You have to [help them] straight away (Vestine, 4 June 
2013). 
It was also believed that the women who experienced rape, in comparison to other 
survivors of the genocide, ‘find it hard to talk about it. If they talk about it to the 
counsellor, they will ask her not to tell others’ (Marie-Chantal, 13 May 2013). This is 
especially true for Tutsis, since not only do they have to live with this strong trauma, 
but they have to do so with a broken social network as a result of the mass killings. 
It was almost the same [the trauma experienced by the Hutu and Tutsi 
women], almost but a little bit different because for example, a Hutu who 
was sexually violated and maybe has a family, she would then have that, 
she would feel that maybe… I have an example of one, she had her 
children, all of them, she was sexually violated but she maybe has HIV, 
she's feeling bad because she is infected with HIV, suffering all that. But 
the Tutsis have lost everyone, and also have HIV due to sexual violence. So 
it's a little bit different. The first one gets comfort from her children, the 
second one does not have anyone to comfort her (Brigitte, 18 June 2013). 
This is also true for the women who feel rejected by their family members because of 
their past, and for those who experience a sense of guilt for having survived when so 
many others did not. 
They think they want to stop their lives but when we take care of them, they 
feel like they are loved and cherished. For example one told me that she 
didn’t want to live because she was thinking that her family didn’t love her 
because they died alone and she survived while they were supposed to die 
together. But now she is fine (Marie-Chantal, 11 June 2013). 
These two quotes clearly illustrate the role that family networks play in trauma 
healing and may explain why the women interviewed all mentioned creating an 
alternative family with other survivors in the organisation they visit. Social 
relationships, in this case family networks, were perceived by my respondents as 
crucial for the well-being of the women, but negative family relationships also have a 
detrimental effect on personal healing. 
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Moreover, it was also suggested that trauma healing is harder for those women 
who were impregnated as a result of the rape. 
Those who raped, it was fine to a certain extent, but it was worse for those 
who had children with those Interahamwe. What type of differences were 
there between the women who were raped and those who had a child born 
out of rape? Some differences… those who were raped said “at least I did 
not have these children. At least I did not give birth to the child of someone 
who does not love me” (Françoise, 24 June 2013). 
In order to address this situation, the organisations I met in Rwanda all provide 
individual and group counselling, using different psychological approaches to 
support these women. However, one element included in the therapy session that 
seemed a natural decision for the organisations was the inclusion of religious 
teaching. Religious teaching is used as a tool for counselling by Organisations C, D 
and E, whether it is through prayers or through the teaching of the Bible.  
The way we help them, because our counselling is biblical, is based on the 
Bible, it's Christian. We tell them that God loves them still, they are 
women, God created them in its own image, He wanted that woman to be a 
woman, He loves her. Even with all that happened, God still sees her the 
same. She's still a woman, and God is pleased with her as a woman, not as a 
man. So accepting yourself, you are pleasing God. And secondly, there are 
some people who feel that they can't never get married, they hate men you 
know, that kind of angers them, and you tell them, some of them, it takes a 
long time, a process for them to come to an understanding. So the closer 
they get to God and get to know Jesus, they get to love God, so the easier it 
becomes for them to get healed. But those who don't want to pray, who 
don't want to listen, they remain the same. They take longer to get healed 
(Brigitte, 18 June 2013). 
According to Brigitte, there is a connection between the degree of trauma healing 
and religious faith. Following this way of thinking, it would suggest that Oda, who 
previously mentioned having rejected her religious faith, would take longer to heal 
than the other women who regularly attend church or pray. Whether this is true or 
not is another matter, but Rwanda being a country where the population is mostly 
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religious, it is not necessarily surprising that some NGO staff members see the 
potential for trauma healing in religion. Religion is also used when speaking with the 
women who had children born out of rape, as a way to help them accept the identity 
of their child. 
We used to tell them that this child, even if he was conceived by accident, 
that if God accepted that this child was to be conceived - because there are 
many women who cannot conceive - God accepted to conceive that child, 
you conceived that child, it's because He had a plan for that child. This 
child has no faults. It's the father of this child who is the killer, but this 
child is not the killer. So the counsellor adds her own words with the Bible 
(Vestine, 4 June 2013).  
There are a few arguments for using religious teaching to complement the 
counselling services. One of them is that religious faith will comfort the women at all 
times, ensuring a sustainable healing that does not totally depend on the counselling 
sessions. 
The reason [we use religious teaching] is that trauma can only be healed by 
God. It's only God who knows how to deal with His people, He knows the 
pain they are feeling. Other teachings of other counselling ethics could be 
very helpful but they work continually, people always have sessions with 
the counsellor. But when you teach them about, if you teach them Christian 
counselling, it heals them completely. They get healed and they don't 
always come for counselling. If they get to know that God loves them, that 
God cares for them, that He understands their pain, He is always with them. 
And they accept that, they accept the love of God, and then they will be 
healed wherever they are, they will not need the counsellor again. Like if 
you use the other kind of counselling, they always come back (Brigitte, 18 
June 2013). 
It was also expressed by Vestine (4 June 2013) that by teaching these women the 
words of God, they will not only be comforted, but will also be able to comfort 
others. 
Every Monday and Thursday here, they come for counselling and to pray. 
We tell them that the comfort comes from the words of God. It comes from 
Jesus. Myself I cannot comfort you because I do not have words to comfort 
you. But when you tell them to focus on Jesus, who will comfort them, 
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that's why those who are comforted, they go and they comfort others. But if 
it was just a normal counselling, if I'm comforted and I find someone who 
needs counselling, I will tell her "go to Organisation C, there is someone 
who can comfort you. I cannot do that myself". But when you have been 
comforted through the words of God, you can also comfort others.  
The religious teaching provided by Organisations C, D and E was definitely not 
something unique about Rwanda, since even the Ministry of Gender and Family 
Promotion uses religious teaching and the Bible to promote gender equality (15 July 
2013). However, in the case of these NGOs, the teaching undertakes the role of 
spiritual healing, helping women to feel comforted, loved by God, feeling that they 
are equal to others in the eyes of God, and that God has not abandoned them. 
Furthermore, it was also perceived that religion allows women to share their 
deepest emotions through their individual relationships with God.  
There are things that they cannot tell us, that are very deep. Even if they 
come and they talk, there are things that they cannot tell us. But we tell 
them, "if you think that you can't be open to me for some things, you can go 
and pray and release everything to Jesus". And when they do like this, they 
feel free. You will see that sometimes they will come back and tell you 
other things. They will be telling you "I'm free now. I prayed and God has 
been answering my prayers. I'm free" (Vestine, 4 June 2013).  
Recalling my previous argument regarding the women sharing their experiences with 
only a few individuals, it also seems that some things cannot even be disclosed to the 
chosen confidant. I interpret this as a limitation of healing trauma through 
meaningful social relationships. Trauma cannot be totally healed by feeling accepted 
and listened to by others, and a certain degree of self-acceptance is also needed when 
things cannot be shared with anyone else. 
The problem would be if you don't accept yourself. But if you accept the 
way you are, they [the neighbours] will say [gossips about you] and it will 
be over. There are some who are like that but with time they get to open to 
people, they get counselling, they get healed. So it is really the perception 
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of one self that can really (cut). Yes, the individual acceptance (Brigitte, 
18 June 2013). 
It is argued that self-acceptance allows oneself to heal and move forward 
regardless of the stigma experienced, and religion can be a tool for this self-
acceptance. ‘It is because of the words of God that they accepted themselves, that 
they were able to speak between themselves’ (Françoise, 24 June 2013). To reach a 
degree of self-acceptance, the women first and foremost need to feel as valued 
human beings once again. According to Eric, the director of Organisation C (7 June 
2013), when the women,  
Feel that people are listening to them, the healing process is on. The Tutsis 
still feel subconsciously dehumanized after the genocide, so being listened 
to make them feel like worthy human being, especially when a Muzungu 
[Caucasian person/Westerner] is listening. It makes them realise that they 
have the same needs as others. 
This quote successfully summarizes the importance of trauma counselling, whether 
with or without religious teaching. Beyond addressing the traumatic memories of the 
genocide, counselling provides companionship to women who may feel isolated 
within their community, and whose morality is constantly questioned by their 
neighbours. 
Through counselling they started to feel like now "oh, you mean I'm 
important". (…) When the person was telling me her testimony, I would tell 
her what I felt in my heart. I would say, "no you are important", maybe they 
are telling you "I'm just nothing, nobody loves me". "No, you are very 
important". Like now three people have completed university because of 
just telling them "you know, you are not what you think you are. You are a 
great person. You have to study". They say "Me studying? No, I can't even 
get anything in my head. No". I said: "Go register. You are going to school 
and you are going to make it". She did it and found herself studying, and all 
the trauma started going away and now she completed [university]. Like 
three people so far. In the first place they would feel their lives were just 
messed up, not accepted, feeling like they are just useless, no hope for the 
future, they can't manage anything. They ask "why should I even study?", 
"why should I even work?", "for what, for whom? I am just alone". But 
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now they feel they have to live, they have to survive (Brigitte 18 June 
2013). 
This even suggests that once a process of re-humanization is achieved, opportunities 
arise for these women. Indeed, throughout their lives, the women will find 
themselves at different places on the spectrum of trauma healing. It was suggested 
that this influences their social reintegration in terms of access to services and 
employment. 
And you must know that those people who wish to work, they are the ones 
who are already comforted. Because the ones who are not comforted, they 
don't have a desire to survive, they don't want to work, they say "why 
should I work? I don't have my children, they are all killed. I don't need to 
be beautiful because my husband was killed. Why? I don't need to live" 
(Vestine, 4 June 2013). 
In this case, Vestine makes a direct connection between the level of comfort 
reached and the desire to be an active citizen included in the formal economy. This 
may explain why many organisations require survivors to attend counselling services 
before being registered in the income-generating activities. 
All the people who come here, they can't receive the loan if you never 
received counselling. This is our rule, if I can say like this. You go into that 
office after you have gone to counselling. Because we have realized that at 
the beginning, when we were still searching what to do, the people who 
never received counselling are the ones who are unable to pay back 
(Vestine, 4 June 2013). 
The impact of counselling on the success of the income-generating activities is well 
described by Laura (Clinical Psychologist, Organisations A&B, 23 May 2013): 
So some of the women have felt more able to then start businesses, be more 
confident, I think it is also about hope, hope for the future and something 
with, I did a bit of research on the impact of the groups, and I think that 
positive emotions and hope are being quite important. So I think it's hard to 
measure (laugh), but I think it has an impact on women to start income-
generation, or start businesses, or even to start thinking further ahead.  
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It therefore seems that a sustainable livelihood can only be achieved after 
psychological needs have been addressed, which in a sense reverses Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs (1954). In this case, the need for self-esteem and love and 
belonging (third and fourth layers) need to be provided for the needs of safety and 
security (second layer), such as employment, to be fulfilled. The same is also true in 
terms of health (second layer of needs). For instance, it was mentioned how women 
infected with HIV were reluctant to access their local health clinic for fear of being 
stigmatized:  
When we started providing care treatment, (…) it was because most of the 
women were not going out to get their ARV. So we asked "why?", and the 
women said "how can I go there, in the same queue as the person who 
raped me? How can I go where my neighbour is, and they know that I don't 
have a husband? They will ask how did I got HIV" (Janvier, 23 May 2013). 
The solution by Organisation A was to develop a survivors’ clinic, creating a safe 
space, free of judgment, where men and women infected with HIV can access 
medical services.  
Based on these interpretations of the post-conflict situation of women who 
suffered from sexual violence, I thereby propose that a new pyramid of needs - based 
on Maslow’s work - can be developed. I do not aim to argue that the need of love is 
prioritized over safety, but rather that it is only when the needs of love, belonging 
and self-esteem are addressed that safety and security for these women can be totally 





Figure 2: Revised Hierarchy of Needs. 
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July 2013), only the women who achieved a certain trauma healing went to the 
gacaca court, with those still traumatised finding it hard to become active 
participants in this process. Some in fact rejected the opportunity to seek justice in 
the gacacas because they wanted to keep their past secret.  
You prepare her to testify in the gacacas and at one point she says: “why 
are you uncovering me? Why uncover myself? I’ve lived with it for a long 
time, there is no need to uncover myself. I have to keep the secret to myself 
(Thérèse, 13 May 2013). 
This has important implications, since there is often a consensus with peacebuilders 
of the importance of justice for peaceful post-conflict reconstruction. My interactions 
with the women, and the staff members in Rwanda however nuance this idea, 
demonstrating that justice may not always be beneficial for some participants, and 
that some individuals may prefer reparation through other forms than traditional 
justice. 
Finally, the staff members I met also agreed that the continued trauma 
experienced in 2013 by the women who suffered from sexual violence has improved 
in comparison to the level of trauma experienced in the aftermath of the genocide, 
opening up opportunities. 
The first time they came, and if you compare the first time they came and 
where they are now, it is a total change, a complete change. The first time 
when they came, they would come to cry, not wanting to do anything, not 
thinking about their value, not thinking about anything to do, feeling so 
hopeless and feeling like they are not accepted, [like] they are nothing. So 
it's like they didn't have a future, no hope, nothing like that. If you compare 
now, they have changed completely. (…) Because of teaching the words of 
God, continuously as they would come all the time, they continuously 
changed, developed until they felt [that] they were people. They feel that 
they can put make-up, if they are young ones they feel they can go to 
school, if they are old people they feel they need a house, they need 
somewhere to stay, they need something to do. But in the first place, they 
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didn't feel like that. No, no, no, no. They felt like nothing, nothing, they 
didn't have anything in their heart like that (Brigitte, 18 June 2013). 
These staff members observed a lot of progress, but there was a shared 
understanding that the stigma and social exclusion experienced still have a 
detrimental impact on the prospects for trauma healing.  
All agreed that the stigmatisation and marginalization these women face results 
from the gender norms found within Rwandan society. First, they told me that there 
is a strong stigma associated with rape that is reinforced by certain cultural gender 
norms. For instance, virginity before marriage is still encouraged and women are 
often blamed for their sexual abuse.  
Yes, there is just a massive, massive stigma about rape. Even I know some 
of the women who joined Organisation E but (…) did not feel able to talk 
about the rape with other women who have not been raped. (…) I think it is 
pretty much if you have been raped you have been spoiled (…) I think it is 
still very much in the culture about being a virgin (Laura, 23 May 2013). 
In cases where women were raped while they were still ‘girls’, it is extremely 
hard for them to find a husband, in part because of the context in which they ‘lost’ 
their virginity. ‘If she [the survivor of sexual violence] was a girl when she was 
raped, she will never get married. If she was married, her husband will reject her, it 
kills her inside and she gets traumatized’ (Marie-Chantal, 11 June 2013). This is also 
supported by Thérèse (13 May 2013), who said that:  
The women who feel stigmatized are mostly girls. (…) So for those who 
were girls during the genocide, they feel stigmatized because it isn’t easy to 
find a husband, a man that will accept a girl that everyone knows has been 
raped. And in the Rwandan culture, it is a misfortune for this girl.  
Some staff members also believe that the women remain marginalized in their 
community due to their close ‘contact’ with the militiamen.  
 189 
The girls who were raped, what frustrated them is that their communities 
know that they were raped by the Interahamwe, so they are not sure if they 
will be able to get married, or remarried. (…) A lot of them told us “are 
there really some men who will dare marrying us since we got raped by 
those Interahamwe?” And it is even worse for those who had these children 
(Françoise, 24 June 2013). 
I was told of a few examples of women who were rejected by their husband, family 
and community because they were raped by the Interahamwe. For example, Thérèse 
(13 May 2013) mentioned the example of one woman: ‘when the husband was 
coming home drunk, said “you, you were raped. I was wrong to marry the wife of an 
Interahamwe”. And the children of the husband, who was a widow, were assaulting 
the woman on a daily basis’. This is truly the continued moral aggression that the 
survivors of sexual violence face in the aftermath of the violence: their bodies were 
used as the battlefield upon which the nation could be destroyed, and now its 
consequences justify these women’s social exclusion. However, it is worth 
mentioning that not all women were rejected by their husbands and/or family 
members. The staff members I met all knew some examples of women whose 
husbands stayed with them in the aftermath of the genocide. ‘There are some 
husbands that accepted them. They saw that this violence was used as any other 
weapon during the genocide’ (Thérèse, 13 May 2013). 
The staff members also mentioned that ‘many [women] hide [their past] because 
they are afraid that the husband will not accept that situation’ (Vestine, 4 June 2013). 
However, keeping one’s past a secret is more difficult for women who also suffer 
from HIV/AIDS or who had a child as a result of their rape. As confirmed by Brigitte 
(18 June 2013) when speaking about women infected from HIV/AIDS:  
Being sexually violated, no one would just know if you are not telling him, 
except for the people [who live] in the same neighbourhood. But most 
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people would leave their neighbourhood and find other places where they 
are not known. So that was a very big issue. If I do not open up and tell that 
I was sexually violated, you would not know. But if I am HIV positive, 
with time you will see it. So that was a problem. 
It was therefore suggested that it remains extremely difficult for women suffering 
from AIDS to hide their illness because of its physical visibility, such as body rashes 
or white spots on the tongue and mouth, or because of its resulting infections, such as 
tuberculosis. Moreover, Marie (5 July 2013) told me that certain behaviours are often 
understood to be associated with illness, such as anger or dirtiness. This suggests that 
AIDS-infected survivors of sexual violence are more easily socially identified, and 
therefore stigmatized, at certain points in their battle against the disease because of 
its physical visibility.  
In addition, there is another belief rooted in wider gender norms that fosters the 
social marginalisation of these women: the belief that women infected with HIV 
became infected because of prostitution. This was something brought up by the 
women themselves, and was again confirmed by Marie (5 July 2013), who noted that 
sex workers often use rape as an excuse to explain why they are infected with HIV. 
The community thus often believes that survivors of sexual violence are lying about 
the rape in order to justify their situation, and will easily consider them ‘prostitutes’ 
and blame their situation on sexual promiscuity, as the case of Oda showed.  
Furthermore, it was mentioned by the staff members that the nature of HIV/AIDS 
as a disease fosters the marginalization of infected individuals. Most immediately, 
HIV-infected individuals often find themselves stigmatized and excluded by their 
community due to the fear that they will spread their infection. Brigitte (18 June 
2013) gave the example of a young woman ‘[whose] bosses, after getting to know 
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she is infected, had to chase her. They are like “no, this person is infected. She might 
also cause infections to us.”’  
A similar situation was described for women who were impregnated as a result of 
the rape:  
There is a big stigma associated with having a child outside of marriage. 
And that's in all of society, but then the rape is an added thing and then, a 
massive challenge if the woman gets married, the new husband often 
doesn't want to accept that child, so will treat him very, very differently 
(Laura, 23 May 2013). 
Having a child born out of rape adds another layer of stigmatization, especially when 
the child’s father is described as a killer. 
I know there are some women who have had that problem, like they are 
chased from their family completely because they refused to abort their 
child, or because they had the child of the person who killed their entire 
family. There are women who have been chased from their family like that 
(Janvier, 23 May 2013). 
This potential for stigmatisation also leads some women to abandon their child in 
order not to be associated with him/her. 
In our culture, rape is like a taboo, so the mothers were most of them hiding 
the fact that they have children born from rape. So they did not want to be 
associated with their children and as a result most of them took the children 
to live with some relatives so that people did not ask the mother "whose 
child is this?"(Janvier, 23 May 2013). 
Abandoning one’s child or refusing to be associated with him/her further complicates 
the family relationships for the mother, the child and to a certain extent the extended 
family, who can sometimes have a say in the decision. It is argued that this allows 
women to avoid a certain degree of stigmatization until they feel ready to face 
community gossip, but my time in Rwanda suggests that many women are still 
reluctant to disclose the truth about their child. 
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I think the challenge (…) was the verification of recruiting or finding 
women who did had children born out of rape because of that stigma. I'm 
sure there are many women out there who haven't access the support 
because they don't want to talk about it and admit it (Laura, 23 May 2013). 
It is also worth mentioning that women may isolate themselves from their 
community because of their experience. As mentioned by the women when 
discussing their unease with members of the opposite sex, some staff members also 
believed that some raped women actively reject others. ‘Those ones who were raped 
have something in particular: they hate men, even they can hate their own father, 
their brothers, and own children’ (Marie-Chantal, 11 June 2013). 
 Addressing the stigma associated with rape, HIV and bearing children out of 
marriage is, however, extremely difficult for the NGOs. According to Nadège (26 
June 2013), more work should be done to change social norms, but this remains a 
very challenging task. It was suggested that organisations are limited in helping 
survivors of sexual violence reintegrate into society since they have a limited impact 
on changing cultural values and social beliefs. These beliefs are especially hard to 
change for the NGOs operating in Rwanda, because they face the challenge of 
educating a population about sexuality in a context where sexual relationships 
remain taboo. Sexuality is not openly discussed in Rwandan culture, and religion still 
strongly dictates sexual behaviours.  
I observed this during my fieldwork, where sexuality consistently remained a 
difficult topic to openly discuss in the organisations working with genocide 
survivors. For instance, during a class on development given by Organisation D, 
teenage girls were warned about how certain sexual behaviours might have a 
negative impact on their economic development. The girls agreed that they had to 
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resist temptations, temptations such as cookies and candies. But in that moment, it 
was clear that they were not referring to cookies and candies in the literal sense, and 
these were instead used as metaphors for sexual temptations (Observation, 13 June 
2013). Nadège (26 June 2013) also explained how pregnant women often hide their 
pregnancy since it is proof they had sexual intercourse, which is supposed to remain 
hidden. This kind of everyday or banal reluctance to openly discuss sexual matters 
makes it extremely difficult for the government and the NGOs to raise awareness and 
improve understandings of rape and HIV. My time spent in Rwanda also suggests 
that the country is still very much influenced by Christianity, which continues to 
dictate sexual behaviour. The Christian ideology thereby possibly contributes to the 
stigmatization of individuals undertaking ‘marginal’ sexual behaviours. For example, 
at one point during my observation with Organisation D, I was attending a sexual 
educational session for individuals infected with HIV, and the education provided 
still followed the religious belief and norm of heterosexuality. At a certain point, the 
participants started to ask me questions about sexual norms in ‘the West’, sexual 
norms that were perceived as marginal and deviant from Rwandan culture. 
However, despite some limitations, the staff members also agreed that the 
campaigning and the advocacy work done by both the government and the 
organisations have still helped to diminish the marginalization and stigmatization 
experienced by women who suffered from sexual violence.  
[The stigma] was so high but as people got to know the truth, the reality 
and the teachings through the radio, through the government's teachings, 
they got to a level of accepting them in the society, getting closer to them, 
helping them. (…) Yes, they changed because people got to know… we 
have here less cases where people are stigmatized, where they are telling us 
our neighbours don't even get water from us, they can't get anything from 
us, you can't get anything from them because of the stigma, because they 
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know we are suffering from HIV because we were sexually violated. But 
the cases [decreased] as years went by from the genocide (Brigitte, 18 June 
2013). 
As mentioned above when speaking about trauma, the staff members also believe the 
level of stigmatisation varies from individual to individual based on their 
circumstances, and also because of their level of self-acceptance.  
It depends on the woman… if she considers that being raped is a huge 
burden for her. So the community acceptation also depends on the 
individual acceptation. If she accepts herself, it is easier for her to adapt in 
the community. (…) But if she feels on a daily basis as if she’s 
psychologically feeling the rape, it is difficult for her to be integrated even 
if she changed environment (Thérèse, 13 May 2013).  
This was something widely supported by the staff members I met in Rwanda, and 
complements the previous argument of self-acceptance leading to trauma healing. It 
shows that self-acceptance, trauma healing and social reintegration are all inter-
connected. 
You know, when something is marginalized or stigmatized is when.... the 
way the person has accepted his condition contributes to being 
marginalized. But when the person has accepted that she's HIV positive, 
that she was raped, she opens up about it, people start to accept her 
(Vestine, 4 June 2013). 
There is thus an understanding that trauma healing is a necessary step towards social 
reintegration, since the level of self-acceptance will directly impact the likelihood of 






Figure 3: Process of Trauma Healing and Social Inclusion 
 
This was well summarised by Marie (5 July 2013), who said that the ‘level of 
difficulty to reintegrate society depends on the trauma. For some women it is 
extremely hard, they still have some periods of crisis, while it is easier for others.’ 
One criterion that influences the social integration of these women is their social 
location. For instance, some staff members expressed the idea that social 
reintegration is harder in rural villages than in Kigali. According to some, social 
norms and expectations are stricter in the rural communities than in Kigali, and a 
certain sense of social control is exerted in the villages that is not found in the cities, 
or at least not to the same extent. For example, ‘in the village it is more difficult to 
reintegrate the community because everyone is aware of your situation, and the 
social pressures are stronger. In Kigali, you might not even know your neighbour’ 








that it is harder to hide one’s past in the rural communities because of the close 
community ties. 
In the city, you go in the night, in the morning, you go to your activities, 
and there is no social control. But when you are in a rural community, there 
is a social control. We know what you eat, we know how you live in your 
home. So I would say that the women who live in cities, whilst they are 
also miserable as in the rural regions, those who want to keep their secret 
feel better compared to the women in the rural regions because we saw in 
the gacacas that the truth was known by everyone. So even if they keep the 
secret, people will know? People know she was raped, people know what 
she goes through on a daily basis, people know that she doesn’t have 
anything to eat, people know (laughs) everything, everything. So it is 
harder for a woman in the rural communities? Yes (Thérèse, 13 May 
2013). 
These quotes suggest that for these staff members, the rural communities, where 
social ties are stronger in comparison to urban areas, do not provide a supportive 
space for the women who suffered sexual violence, and instead contribute to 
stigmatization and social exclusion. However, Brigitte (18 June 2013) disagreed that 
a generalisation can be made between rural and urban areas. 
Do you find that there is a difference between women who live in the city 
and those who live in the villages in terms of their speaking up? It 
depends I think on the person. Because we have communities in different 
places in Rwanda, rural areas where people are healed. So I think it 
depends on the person, we cannot generalise that.  
Whilst Brigitte disagreed with this distinction, the majority of the staff members I 
met still believed that some rural communities might be a source of anxiety and 
stigmatisation for the women instead of providing supportive social networks. It is 
believed that the social control exerted in the villages prevents women who suffered 
from sexual violence from successfully reintegrating within their neighbourhood. 
Instead, a more individualistic life in Kigali might allow the women to live their lives 
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in a more anonymous way, giving them the choice to disclose or not the truth about 
their past. 
Furthermore, the staff members from Organisation E, located in the Eastern 
Province, mentioned that there are important differences between the Rwandese 
provinces. According to Jean, the program manager of the Eastern branch of 
Organisation E (9 July 2013), the East provides more opportunities for social 
reintegration due to specific factors. First, the Eastern region’s soil is very fertile, 
allowing women survivors of sexual violence to live on their land. This is, however, 
not always the case in other regions such as the South, which has been traditionally 
poorer than the other regions due to infertile soil. Second, the violence of the 
genocide did not impact every region equally, with the Eastern region being the least 
affected and the South one of the most affected region, if not the most. The RPF 
entered Rwanda through Uganda and first reached the Eastern Province before 
fighting across the country. All of these factors might impact the social reintegration 
of these women: ‘There are a lot of vulnerable survivors in the South. In the East, the 
province is rich, with fertile land. In the south, it isn’t productive as elsewhere so it 
remains a big challenge’ (Jean, 9 July 2013). 
Differences in living conditions led to another point of discussion during my 
interviews: poverty and the challenges currently faced by the women who suffered 
from sexual violence. In addition to the need for trauma healing and social 
reintegration, all staff members interviewed also perceived the financial needs of 
these women as the cause of (and financial assistance the solution to) many of their 
issues.  
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The biggest problem women come to the social services for help is poverty. 
Poverty increases, aggravates their trauma. When Organisation E 
contributes to diminish their poverty, there is also a bigger change. For 
instance, when women have some money to start an income-generating 
project, they can then afford to buy food and take their HIV medicine with 
food, which decreases the side effects. So the decrease of poverty is also 
decreasing the trauma to a certain extent (Marie, 5 July 2013). 
This connection between poverty and trauma/social exclusion was expressed by 
almost all staff members I interviewed, reinforcing this two-way relationship 
between trauma healing and income/employment security. As discussed above, a 
certain degree of trauma healing is first needed before the women can sustainably 
fulfil their economic needs; however, financial struggles can also increase trauma. 
And there is also quite a big link here between material needs and trauma. 
(…) I feel maybe that's quite important in this society, if you have a house, 
if you have the things you need, then you're less likely to go back to some 
of the traumatic experiences. I think poverty and hunger and [these] things 
keep people in trauma somehow. Because that constantly reminds them of 
maybe what they lost during the genocide, how their life has not been 
prosperous. (…) So I think for a lot of people they feel like having these 
material things would mean that their life would be OK, and that it would 
be much easier to move on from trauma  (Laura, 23 May 2013). 
It is believed that poverty might return the women to a traumatized state, despite the 
level of trauma healing and self-acceptance reached.  
Even poverty causes them to be more traumatized. It's another trauma, 
another face of another trauma in this generation. People are healed, they 
feel they are accepted, forgiven, they are feeling strong, they feel they have 
accepted themselves, but because of poverty, they tend to think “If I had a 
family, maybe I would be better”, “If I had my children, now they would be 
grown up and maybe I would be in a better position”. So it brings them 
another trauma (Brigitte, 18 June 2013). 
Going back to the pyramid of needs presented above, these quotes suggest that there 
is a certain impasse: trauma cannot be reduced if financial needs are not first 
addressed, but the financial needs cannot be sustained if trauma is not reduced. 
Moreover, according to the staff members, financial needs still remain one of the 
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most important challenges faced 19 years after the end of the genocide, which makes 
this especially important to address.  
So the [women’s] main wish now is for their children to go and finish 
university. The mothers [also] say: “I have something that earns me some 
money, then I am happy”. So that's their wish: to own a small business. It 
could be having a small thing in the market, maybe selling vegetables you 
know. But if she has a source of income, a main one… So there's two 
[wishes]: education and having a stable source of income. And some of 
them have been talking about a shelter. They say: “this house, it was 
constructed 15 years ago. It is collapsing”. If you have heard about this 
problem of houses, they are not done very well, they are collapsing. The 
mothers say: “I want to have a house where even when I die I know that my 
child can live there”. “I know when I get old, I have a place I will not be 
kicked out for not paying rent by having my own house”. So for me I can 
say these three are the main wishes that I have heard from the mothers 
(Janvier, 23 May 2013). 
Some of the financial needs of the women include securing a stable source of 
income, housing and education for their children, and financial assistance for their 
medical needs. Poverty and unemployment are obstacles to their social and structural 
reintegration, and the staff members interviewed all agreed that income-generating 
activities are needed in order to also address other issues, such as trauma and social 
marginalisation. 
I was telling you about the wishes of 30 women. I noticed that the majority 
wishes to have an income-generating activity. You asked me if the women 
were working and their living conditions. Most of them are miserable. They 
cannot eat as everyone else, and they are vulnerable compared to others. 
They wish to have an income-generating activity in order to change their 
living conditions (Thérèse, 13 May 2013). 
The financial struggle experienced by some survivors of the genocide, including 
women who suffered from sexual violence, was also described as an obstacle to post-
conflict reconciliation in Rwanda. As a previous example illustrated, in a 
disagreement between two women who were part of the same income-generating 
group in Organisation D, events that occurred during the genocide were quickly 
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brought into the argument. The organisation had to step in and the staff’s solution 
was to have the women reconcile if they wanted to remain part of this income-
generating group. When discussing this with Fabrice, the program manager (20 June 
2013), he mentioned that fights like these are rare, but do happen. It may start 
because of money, but then tensions from the genocide may arise, whether explicitly 
or not. The NGOs I observed thus focus on the importance of reconciliation, 
promoting inclusive identities of Rwandaness. 
For instance, some organisations I encountered focus solely on providing services 
to survivors of the genocide, but the use of ethnic labels have been removed within 
the organisations. As for those organisations that include individuals who identified 
as ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ during the genocide, they do not create divisions between the 
two groups. ‘I never take them as a Tutsi or a Hutu. I take them as they came to me 
and when they are all here in a group, I can’t know they are Hutu or Tutsi’ (Marie-
Chantal, 11 June 2013). The focus is instead on reconciliation, and on fostering a 
sense of unity between all beneficiaries that erases ethnicity, which of course aligns 
with the government’s ideology. For example, the staff members of Organisation D 
also said that they do not speak about the genocide and the reasons that caused it, 
because this is something from the past and the focus should be on reconciliation and 
reintegration instead. In a sense, the beneficiaries are encouraged to speak about the 
past for trauma healing, but certain things about the genocide - such as the ethnic 
dimension of the violence - remain taboo (Observation, 18 June 2013).  
I know a lot of reconciliation groups who are bringing perpetrators and 
survivors together and doing activities together. I think there is so much 
reconciliation work going on here. Some of it work, some of it doesn't. I 
think it's also a buzzword in the government, because it's very much their 
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agenda, so NGOs are kind of fitting in with what the government agenda 
is... (Laura, 23 May 2013, emphasis by Laura). 
This is consistent with the post-conflict state processes of nation-building and ethnic 
reconciliation, which will be discussed in more depth in the subsequent chapters. 
However, even if the organisations remove ethnic identity from their official 
language, some staff members were aware that most individuals, and even the 
younger generations, still know which group they belong to (Observation, 10 June 
2013). Furthermore, survivors’ organisations often only include members who are 
granted the title of survivors, i.e. those who identified as Tutsis and lived in Rwanda 
during the genocide, and their staff members might also be survivors themselves. 
Despite their strong focus on reconciliation, some survivors’ organisations 
nonetheless keep a certain distance between the different groups in order to address 
the specific needs of the survivors. My time in Rwanda suggested that whilst most 
staff members did not explicitly acknowledge this divide, there was an underlying 
understanding that total reconciliation had still not been reached.  
I think people can [grasp] what people are really feeling, but I think there is 
a certain taboo. There is very much a sense that everyone is Rwandan and 
we are working towards development and reconciliation and I think that's 
helpful certainly, but on the flip side it can... it can put a surface, face over 
what people are truly feeling and I worry that some reconciliation projects 
are painting over the surface and not really addressing people's deep 
feelings and concerns. So you know, I'm sure if you did some nice 
questionnaire about reconciliation, people would tick the box saying "yes, 
yes, yes", but I still worry about what's really deep inside (Laura, 23 May 
2013). 
A lack of total post-conflict reconciliation does not necessarily mean that the 
women I met have not developed meaningful relationships with both survivors and 
non-survivors, as was explained above. These relationships are perceived by the staff 
members interviewed as necessary for trauma healing, and as crucial for the well-
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being of these women: ‘Especially with survivors, they really want to have a family 
of their own and recreate a network that they lost’ (Laura, 23 May 2013). The staff 
members perceive these meaningful social relationships as crucial for their 
beneficiaries since it is through social belonging and relationships of love and 
friendship that the women will be able to look ahead and think about their future. ‘If 
they are free to talk, it's because they feel they are accepted’ (Vestine, 4 June 2013). 
It was suggested that one of the most important needs of the women who suffered 
from sexual violence is to feel loved and accepted. 
Most people when they are traumatized, they don't come asking for things, 
no. Not really. They, most of them, except for those who have really gotten 
some level of healing, but those who are not, they feel they just need love, 
they need someone to talk to, someone that listens to them, and maybe if 
they have a problem, they would tell you later as you go on with them 
(Brigitte, 18 June 2013). 
This was also supported by Marie-Chantal (11 June 2013), when suggesting that 
family relationships are especially important for healing: 
If you have no brother, no father, no mother, there’s no interest in having 
all that money and you start wasting it. But when you have a family, they 
care for you, when you are in trouble they come to rescue you. Identity is a 
great thing.  
However, in a context where many women lost their family networks because of 
the genocide, the staff members often described their organisations as providing an 
alternative family for these women: ‘God is by their side, they have relatives here. 
All Organisation C’s members are their relatives’ (Brigitte, 18 June 2013). This was 
often a result of the relationships created within the organisations, but some NGOs 
such as Organisation C explicitly set out to provide an alternative family to the 
survivors of the genocide: ‘[Organisation C] provides an alternative family for 
people who do not have a family anymore. The organisation sets out to create a 
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family. They have a feeling of belonging at [Organisation C], when they are 
together’ (Eric, 7 June 2013). This alternative family is also reproduced at the local 
level, such as when the women live with other individuals who share the same 
experiences from the genocide. 
They have their fellowship, they have days where they can meet, they 
contribute money between themselves so that they can support each other. 
It's like an alternative family for the widows and orphans. Because the 
people who end up in these communities, there are many widows and 
orphans, widows without children, so when they are together it's like a 
family. A widow who lost her children will see those orphans there like her 
own children. It's a way of comforting each other when they are together. 
Because these people are used to live in loneliness, but when they visit each 
other, when they meet for fellowship like the women you met, they have a 
common point (Vestine, 4 June 2013). 
According to the staff members, these senses of belonging and having built 
alternative families are based on shared experiences and understanding of the 
genocide. They have found that sharing stories with those who also suffered helps 
the women feel accepted and understood, something that cannot necessarily be 
reproduced with everyone. 
It has helped the mothers to know that they are not alone. When we go out 
to give the money, the women are together. Actually, one group has asked 
where they can meet regularly, not necessarily when we go to give them 
money. They have come together to share experiences. When they meet for 
school visits [it] gives them a chance to speak. Because they trust each 
other, they know they have the same past and they talk. And after one of 
them speak, the others say: "I thought I was the only one who had these 
problems but now you are worse than me". So it's like helping them to take 
themselves out of this kind of [cycle] that I was raped, killed or attacked so 
when they hear from another person they are relieved. So this sense of 
human belonging has been restored at least (Janvier, 23 May 2013). 
Here, the use of ‘human belonging’ by Janvier is very powerful, showing how first 
and foremost the women wish to be accepted as equals and valued human beings. 
This can then create opportunities for them to be understood by others, and the 
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NGOs explicitly set out to provide these alternative families free of stigma and 
judgement. 
Because of this community, they share the same experiences, they 
understand each other. When for example you say “I have been raped”, for 
example while giving a testimony during a meeting, you will find that 
others will come and comfort you. They will tell you “do not worry. You 
will live because you survived”. So they comfort each other instead of 
rejecting [each other]. This helps them so much. They even say: “I have 
found a home to rest”. “I have found a home where I can talk and have 
some people listen to me” (Vestine, 4 June 2013). 
Shared experiences of the genocide also influence the relationships between the 
staff members and the beneficiaries, with the majority of the staff members I met 
being either international workers or returnees/survivors themselves. This has an 
impact on the relationships created, where the staff members who are also survivors 
of the genocide are forming meaningful bonds with the women. 
But those who have really bad trauma, they come here. Because we have 
Maman L., she got [a lot of] training about counselling, she knows how to 
talk to them. And herself, she had a very bad experience during the 
genocide. She lost her five children during the genocide, her husband… and 
for her it is easy to communicate with them because she can understand 
their pain and sorrow. And for them it is easy to be open (Vestine, 4 June 
2013). 
The identity of the staff members and of the beneficiaries of the NGOs might 
have an impact on the sense of belonging forged within these organisations, 
especially in a context of recent ethnic violence. In a sense, survivors’ organisations 
acknowledge the specific needs of genocide survivors, and the strong relationships 
created within these organisations maintain exclusive ethnic group boundaries. This 
is something these organisations constantly need to mediate, where the recognition of 
the survivors’ specific needs and rights can foster social distance with other 
vulnerable individuals.  
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To conclude, the previous two sections analysed the post-conflict needs and 
experiences of some women who experienced sexual violence during the genocide 
through their own voices, and through the voices of the NGO staff members who 
work with them. It demonstrated that reconstructing meaningful relationships with 
the local community is prioritized by both groupings, since social/self-acceptance is 
often perceived as the key to social reintegration and improved living conditions. 
The final section will now analyse whether these ideas influence the work done by 
five NGOs in Rwanda. 
Holistic and Needs-Based Approach 
Organisations A and B 
The first two organisations I observed in Rwanda were both international 
organisations located in Kigali but with their headquarters in the United States 
(Organisation A) and in the United Kingdom (Organisation B). Working as partners 
on similar issues, they share an office in a very nice district of Kigali, where a lot of 
international workers are living, attracting restaurants, clubs and other NGO offices. 
The organisations were clearly identifiable from the street, with a sign outside the 
gate identifying them. They had their offices in the second floor of the house, a small 
space that was mostly reserved for the staff members and not necessarily designed to 
accommodate the beneficiaries, unlike the other organisations I observed.  
I first interviewed Janvier. We met in his office and conducted the interview in 
English. Sitting across his desk, the interview started very formally, but soon enough 
it became more relaxed, with Janvier laughing and smiling and sharing some details 
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about his personal life. But the main focus remained on the work of Organisations A 
and B, and their current priorities. 
The current focus of Organisation A, created in 2008, is to provide financial 
support and assistance to the children born out of rape during the genocide, mostly in 
terms of access to education, support for their mothers, and more generally, support 
for the survivors of the genocide. As for Organisation B, created in 1995, the focus is 
to provide technical and financial support to holistic programmes administered by 
survivor-led organisations. This organisation acts as a capacity-building organisation, 
helping survivors’ organisations to implement their own projects. 
We are two organisations although we work in one place, but the mission of 
[Organisation A] is a world where the rights of survivors are respected, in 
dignity. So that's the main mission and we work with survivors’ 
organisations to achieve this, building their capacity (Janvier, 23 May 
2013). 
Based on this information, Organisations A and B are two organisations that 
acknowledge and recognise the specific needs and rights of the survivors of the 
genocide, which, as discussed above, has important benefits but also some 
limitations. 
We fund other programmes like income-generating, educational, health 
programmes, and care treatment for women who are infected with HIV. As 
for [Organisation B], it is registered in the US, not in Rwanda, but they 
have a partnership with [Organisation A]. (…) And the main objective is 
first to raise awareness about the women and children, women who were 
raped during the genocide and as a result have children. So the main work 
is advocacy and raising awareness through photographs and through the 
media. We are also providing educational support for the children (…) but 
also connecting mothers to health facilities (Janvier, 23 May 2013). 
Providing holistic support to survivors of sexual violence and their offspring is a 
priority for Organisations A and B, since it is believed that targeting one area only 
does not benefit the survivors.  
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We are looking at how we can support the mother and the child in a holistic 
manner because providing school fees alone is not enough. We may 
provide the money, but then the child cannot go to school because the 
mother is harassing him. That's now our approach, looking at how can we 
take a holistic approach to supporting our target group (Janvier, 23 May 
2013).  
This was also supported by Laura, who I interviewed in a café popular with 
international tourists and workers, located in the district of Kacyiru. We had 
scheduled to meet at the organisation’s office later that day, but out of coincidence 
met in that café. I found this very revealing of the presence of international aid 
workers and volunteers in Rwanda, where certain spaces seem to have been designed 
especially for the Westerners now inhabiting the country. 
I think one of our recent approaches, what we call a wrap-around approach, 
so thinking that if you just give one target intervention, maybe health, 
there's still many, many problems that these women face so a wrap-around 
approach being targeting lots and lots of different areas, so it could be 
health, education, income-generation and bringing it all together. Maybe 
legal advice, counselling and realising that these are multiple challenges 
and that different women need different parts of that program (Laura, 23 
May 2013). 
According to Laura and Janvier, this holistic approach and the programmes 
implemented are of course influenced by donors’ interests, but are also led by the 
beneficiaries themselves, following a bottom-up approach that allows survivors to 
share suggestions and criticisms of the programmes.  
The more we work with the beneficiaries, the more they or we identify 
additional needs. For example, with Organisation B it started with a 
photography project and then the women said: "what would make a 
massive difference to us is school fees." So then we responded to this need, 
and then they were saying: "we really need help with talking to our children 
about what's happened". So we responded to that need as well (Laura, 23 
May 2013). 
This was also supported by Janvier (23 May 2013), who repeated Laura’s idea: 
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Our programmes are drafted from what the beneficiaries think the priority 
is for them. So what we do is, for example, when we did the educational 
support for the children, and as we interacted with the mothers, our 
psychologists together realised that mothers were having issues now, of 
telling their children how they were born... issues of disclosure. So I don't 
sit here and say: "the women need this". No, I speak to them, and then they 
tell me: "this is what we need". And I develop projects, I make decisions 
guided by their wishes.  
This bottom-up approach ensures that the voices of the beneficiaries are not only 
heard, but also influence the types of programmes implemented. However, since this 
organisation also needs to respect the interests of its donors, its staff members are put 
in a position where they need to mediate with both groups of actors in order to 
operate, as will be explained in more detail in Chapter Eight. 
Finally, this bottom-up approach also means that support varies depending on the 
individual, as staff members try to understand the source of the ‘problems’ for each 
woman in order to provide an adequate response. 
Before we go out to help them, I think we need to map why is the 
individual having this problem. Because perhaps the way I do with one 
person may not necessarily be the same approach with another person. So 
to put up one programme and to say: "we are going to help children in this 
way", is I think, to be guided by sort of like a pilot. (…) I think it's a bit of a 
challenge to design a program and say: "this is how I'm going to do it", 
without getting it from them first. Actually what we have done now is if 
there is a problem, we sit with them and ask: "what do you think is the best 
way to address this?" (…) And looking at their past, finding a way how we 
can help them to make use of the services. So, back to where we were, 
whatever we need to do, it should be from their needs. (…) Because 
otherwise, I can sit here, and say: "I want to do community counselling, 
let's say, in this district." And when I go there in the community 
counselling, I find that two women are here, another two women 10-15km 
from another, 20km away. And even where they are, they might not be 
willing to meet and share. But once we know, we go to the women and say: 
"this is what we have in mind. Do you have an idea how to go about it?", 
they will [tell] us. Some would prefer, like one woman, "I'd rather join the 
group in the other village than the group in my village" (laugh). You see? 
So, I think that approach is the best (Janvier, 23 May 2013). 
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Overall, Organisations A and B can be considered survivors’ organisations that, in 
accordance with the voices and interpretations of the beneficiaries and staff 
members, provide holistic support to women who suffered from sexual violence 
during the genocide. 
Organisation C 
Organisation C is a grassroots religious organisation that was created by a 
survivor of the genocide in order to support the widows and orphans of the genocide. 
Created in 1995, this organisation’s main purpose is to provide healing and comfort 
to survivors through holistic support. Located in a popular district of Kigali for 
international organisations and hotels, the organisation consists of two buildings 
accessed through a gate. When in the compound, the main building is used for 
offices and the large reunion hall is used for larger reunions of survivors, for mass, 
and is sometimes rented out to outside companies for income-generating purposes or 
for weddings. In the back is the guesthouse. 
The first time my translator and I went to this organisation, we were offered 
refreshments on the small terrace of the guesthouse, by a garden that was being 
tended to by a worker. Cars were parked in front of the guesthouse, there were a few 
men and women walking around, coming in and out of the guesthouse and the 
reception hall. It was busy and felt very different to the offices of Organisations A 
and B, which were mostly restricted to the staff members. Instead, this organisation 
had an openness that allowed beneficiaries to come in and out, to stop for mass and 
to meet with the staff members and the counsellor. Whilst this also meant that they 
could also be in contact with the visitors of the guesthouse and the reception hall, this 
did not seem to prevent survivors from visiting the organisation. 
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I visited their main office in Kigali, but the organisation also works with local 
communities, extending the reach of their organisation into different provinces. For 
example, they also have a health clinic outside Kigali, and another centre in the 
Eastern province.  
Actually [Organisation C] works with communities, this means that we 
have beneficiaries in different areas of the country. So for instance 
beneficiaries who live in [a district outside Kigali], we gathered them in 
one community where they have their leaders so it would be easy for us to 
reach them because we will be working with their leaders. So when you go 
on field visits in those communities, they tell us [who are] the orphans who 
need support. And other times those orphans can come here, so that's how 
we work (Vestine, 4 June 2013). 
These field visits ensure that beneficiaries do not always have to travel to Kigali for 
support. This limits their travel costs, and may not require them to take time off work 
or from working on their land. 
The main purpose of this organisation, as expressed by Eric, the Director (7 June 
2013), is to provide comfort to widows and orphans of the genocide. He mentioned 
that they focus on these groups because they remain the most vulnerable individuals 
in the aftermath of the genocide. Their vision is to help with healing, and to diminish 
the grip of the genocide on people's lives. To do so, they focus on counselling 
services and the need for community belonging. Their aim is explicitly to provide an 
alternative family for people who no longer have a family.  
Whilst the focus remains on trauma healing, it is also believed that this healing 
should be provided through holistic support, which is why they have three main 
departments: counselling, income-generating activities and a sponsorship program. 
This was discussed with Vestine (4 June 2013), who is also Eric’ daughter:  
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The main mission of [Organisation C] is to comfort widows and orphans. 
But the comfort we have to give them is holistic, so it's a special 
counselling, or I don't know how I can say, more counselling but also 
material counselling, material comfort. Because you cannot comfort 
someone spiritually, yet he needs to eat, he needs to study and you leave 
him like this. So the comfort must be whole... yeah holistic.  
This is again consistent with the voices and interpretations discussed in the two first 
sections, and follows the approach that trauma healing is a priority, but cannot be 
totally reached without extending support to other spheres of the women’s lives. 
It is me who started this department of Sponsorship Programme because 
when [Organisation C] started, the main focus was on counselling. Because 
many people were hurt because of their experiences during the genocide, 
then after the people who have been counselled realised that they needed to 
live, to survive. They could not survive without studying, without 
developing themselves, that's how an idea came that we should search for 
some people who can support them to go ahead in their studies (Vestine, 4 
June 2013). 
Sitting privately in her office, it was evident towards the end of the interview that 
Vestine is emotionally involved and committed to the women and children that they 
support. For instance, she was very emotional when speaking about a woman who 
passed away a few days before I started my observation with this organisation. She 
and her father are emotionally committed to this organisation, and an alternative 
family was truly created there. 
Organisation D 
Organisation D is another grassroots organisation, located near Kigali city centre 
and created in 1996 by Françoise, a returnee. The organisation was not announced 
outside the gate (i.e. there was no sign), but while I was waiting outside the gate one 
day, a man walked by and wondered why I was waiting to enter an organisation 
helping vulnerable individuals, which let me to believe the whole neighbourhood 
must know the purpose of this organisation, despite the lack of signage. When I first 
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visited the organisation’s offices, I was also a little curious to see the portrait of Paul 
Kagamé in the hall used for group sessions. 
During my stay in Rwanda, this organisation was always full of staff members 
and beneficiaries attending group therapy sessions, educational sessions or skills 
training for adolescents. Every morning we were welcomed in the small building 
behind the main house, where the adolescents were meeting up to sing and dance 
before splitting into groups for skills training in hairdressing or sewing and tailoring. 
I sat a few times with the hairdressing group, and the young women sat in a circle, 
laughing and chatting. The relaxed atmosphere found in this organisation was also 
replicated in my relationships with the women who suffered from sexual violence 
and other beneficiaries attending the organisation, as well as the staff members. 
Françoise welcomed me with open arms to her organisation, and took the time to 
explain the whole evolution of the organisation from 1996 until now. At first, the 
organisation focused only on providing support to women who suffered during the 
genocide, since it was believed that helping women would inevitably help the 
children. 
At first, four or five women came with the children. I welcome them, and 
went to the church to ask for a space where we could meet, where we could 
at least speak to each other and I thought: “if they tell me everything that 
happened, I can at least get people to help them”. (…) The mission, why I 
thought of this is because I thought that: “if I help the women, I 
automatically help the children. I should also help them to express 
themselves, to speak up about things that happened to them” (Françoise, 24 
June 2013). 
The original focus was to provide a safe space where the women could share their 
stories, space that was urgently needed and difficult to find at that time. 
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Our customs prevent us from speaking up about things that happened, 
because if you are a girl, a woman, mostly a girl, and you tell that you were 
raped, you could stay alone without anyone daring saying “I would still like 
to marry you, etc.”. It was a taboo. So we started by speaking up. (…) 
When I first came here, I thought that I was the only one that suffered so 
much, and I still had my children and my husband. Others were raped, had 
nothing, did not even have a house, nothing to eat, no clothes. So I thought: 
“I should help them to become themselves again, so that they can continue 
to be proud Rwandan women” (Françoise, 24 June 2013). 
The last sentence is extremely interesting, since helping others to be “proud 
Rwandan women” focuses on the gender identity of these women, but at the same 
time also provides an inclusive identity that erases ethnicity. Different from the 
previous organisations that focus on genocide survivors, this organisation originally 
accepted (and still does) women of all ethnicities. 
Only Tutsis came at the beginning because the Hutus were scared. But 
after, because we are nevertheless a Christian organisation, people heard 
that we were signing, praying, etc., and some Hutu women came but were 
still scared. We did not separate them, because I thought: “if we want to 
give a good example, to reconstruct our country we need to accept all 
women that suffered”. This is why we mixed them. We did not only accept 
women who were raped, we also accepted women who have HIV/AIDS, 
who have suffered in various ways. We did not separate them. We even did 
not ask them whether they are Tutsi or Hutu. We welcomed them. We 
welcomed them with open arms (Françoise, 24 June 2013). 
This organisation has a different perspective from the previous three 
organisations, which is that the women who suffer(ed) from rape, HIV/AIDS or 
poverty all share common experiences, regardless of the origin of their struggle. This 
was perhaps a bold move in the aftermath of the genocide, and was definitely not 
accepted by everyone. 
At first the women were scared and did not like it, mostly the Tutsis. They 
told me: “why are you mixing us like this? These people have killed us. 
Why are you mixing us?” I told them: “you know, we are all created in 
God’s image, we should not get divided. I do not know you, you do not 
know me. I do not ask you who you are, if you are Hutu or Tutsi. If you 
want to come here, just come, but do not ask the question. All the women 
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who come here do not come because they seek revenge or to gain 
something. It is only to speak, to share what happened to us. And if they are 
among us some Hutus who suffered, why not welcome them?” At first they 
did not like it but we insisted, I said: “right, we are all the same. If we want 
to show a good example, that we are all Rwandans, we cannot divide 
people” (Françoise, 24 June 2013). 
When I conducted my observation with this organisation, their work had 
considerably expanded from the initial counselling services provided to women. 
Now, the organisation provides income-generating activities to their beneficiaries, 
individual and group counselling services to survivors of the genocide, including 
survivors of sexual violence and individuals suffering from HIV/AIDS, health 
education, and finally sewing/tailoring and hairdressing training skills to adolescents 
not attending school. It is worth mentioning that while at first this sort of vocational 
training may seem to reinforce traditional gender roles, the situation is a bit more 
complex. For example, I visited many times the Kimironko market in Kigali. This 
market has many fabric stalls, where clothes can be tailor-made. Both men and 
women are hired as tailors, and from the explanations I was given, it is more one’s 
educational background than gender that facilitates this line of work. It would thus be 
too simplistic in this case to argue the income-generating activities are limiting the 
women to their traditional gender roles, since the educational background also has a 
strong impact on the type of work they can do. 
The organisation provides support to more than 3,300 individuals from all parts of 
the country. These beneficiaries, however, now have to cover their own travel to 
Kigali because the organisation does not have any funding to cover everyone’s 
transportation, or to open centres in other provinces. The individuals who come to 
the organisation are grouped based on their main need, and the services provided will 
differ according to these groupings. For example, the women who experienced rape 
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have their own group that meets once a month for group therapy (Observation, 10 
June 2013). 
We started with the women that were raped, those who have HIV/AIDS, 
and then after we realised that they had children who were staying at home 
and who had nothing. So we started to give them food, and we constructed 
41 houses in Kabeza, and then we brought here those children who are at 
home and who aren’t doing anything. We started teaching them some skills, 
such as sewing, baking bread, card making. So we have not really changed, 
it evolved like this, but we got a lot of demands after. We got a lot of 
people who came to us, that said: “we would like to be in your 
organisation”, etc. I believe that the skills training that was last added was 
how to braid hair. That’s it, since the beginning we loved others (Françoise, 
24 June 2013). 
Again, very similar to the previous organisations is this holistic support provided 
to the beneficiaries. This support is nonetheless highly dependent on the financial 
assistance of donors, and the organisation had to reduce its programmes and services 
due to lack of funding over the past few years, and the staff members are not 
working full-time because the organisation cannot afford to pay their full salaries. 
For example, the organisation possesses the installations to produce bread, and a few 
years ago they were making their own bagels to sell. When I was conducting my 
observation, the installation was still there and functional, but the programme had 
been cancelled due to lack of funding. They also provided lunch to the adolescents 
attending the training, but this also had to stop due to economic hardship 
(Observation, 13 May 2013). This economic hardship and the consequences it has on 
Organisation D will be discussed in further details in Chapter Eight. 
Organisation E 
The last organisation I observed during my time in Rwanda is a well-known 
women’s organisation that is located in Kigali, but has regional branches in each 
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province of the country. I conducted participant observation in Kigali and in the 
Eastern province. 
In Kigali, the organisation is located in a busy part of town with shops, 
restaurants, and some hotels nearby, but is outside of residential districts, unlike the 
previous organisations I observed. The main difference with the previous 
organisations is the range of services provided under the roof of this organisation, 
divided into different departments: a health clinic, counselling, social services, 
legal/judicial assistance, pharmacy, laboratory, data management, family planning 
and finance. It was evident during my participant observation that they were 
receiving more funding than the previous organisations, and that this financial 
stability has allowed them to become more professionalised, having hired, for 
example, doctors, trained psychologists and lawyers. Its funding is part private and 
part public, with the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion also providing 
funding to the organisation (Observation, 25 June 2013). Additionally, according to 
one of the organisation’s doctors (27 June 2013), the health clinic was funded by 
other NGOs from 2005 to 2010, but since then the Ministry of Health has financially 
supported the clinic’s work. 
Organisation E’s response to the needs of their beneficiaries, including women 
who experienced sexual violence, is to provide holistic support that targets different 
areas of their lives. The separation of this holistic approach into different 
departments however means that each department focuses on a specific issue, 
meaning that one individual may be helped by multiple professionals depending on 
his/her circumstances.  
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When entering the building through the main entrance for beneficiaries, one first 
walks through the waiting room of the health clinic. In general, the survivors of 
sexual violence will receive medical services first, and then, if needed, will be 
referred to counselling and social services. According to that doctor, their physical 
problems tend to worsen during the April commemoration of the genocide. When 
speaking with him in his consultation room, he proudly showed me a DVD on the 
involvement of men in fighting GBV. He received it the year before in a training 
course on GBV, describing the training now offered on this issue to doctors, and 
their role in referring their patients to the police and to the counselling services. 
The counselling services are upstairs and are comprised of one small room, 
divided on one side with two desks for the counsellors and on the other side with a 
small consultation room. The space is not ideal for holding consultations: the other 
counsellors present in the room can hear what is being said and a certain sense of 
privacy is absent. This department is, however, run in a very professional manner, 
with trained psychologists providing services, supervised by some university 
professors and, in some specific cases, European specialists. The psychologists of the 
different regional branches meet on certain occasions to discuss heavier cases and 
suggest treatment. They use a holistic approach in the counselling sessions, meaning 
that the behavioural approach, religious approach and psychoanalysis are all used, 
for example. The department has a weekly schedule, with Monday-Wednesday being 
reserved for HIV screenings and individual counselling. Thursday and Friday are 
then reserved for group therapies, and at all times the psychologists are required to 
fill in reports when not interacting with the beneficiaries (Observation, 25 June 
2013). According to Nadège (26 June 2013), their workload is considerable and it 
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can be quite frustrating at times since counselling is not a priority in the eyes of the 
government, but also sometimes even in the eyes of the beneficiaries themselves, 
who will miss their appointments. However, whilst the counselling services focus on 
trauma healing for the survivors of sexual violence, the department of social services 
is in charge of their social reintegration in their community. 
The social services department provides income-generating activities and 
financial support to these women, and their overall mission is to help the women feel 
equal to others. According to Marie (5 July 2013), they collaborate with the 
counselling department, but their work remains more practical, providing concrete 
support to women who suffered from sexual violence. For example, they undertake 
home visits to evaluate how the women are reintegrating into their community. They 
can then determine the roots of the problems (poverty, bad neighbourhood, self-
isolation, etc.) and work with community leaders to implement a strategy. This 
organisation was the only one I met during my time in Rwanda that had some staff 
members working only and specifically on the social reintegration of the survivors of 
sexual violence. This may, however, be a result of the resources available to 
Organisation E, allowing them to hire a large number of professionals working in 
different departments, and not a representation of the lack of attention given to social 
reintegration by the other organisations.  
In addition to these departments, the women are also provided legal/judicial 
assistance. Flora (5 July 2013), who works in the department of Justice, Advocacy 
and Information, explained to me how they assisted women through the gacaca 
system when these courts were running in Rwanda. They helped arrange for 
counsellors or volunteers to go with each woman to the gacaca courts in order to 
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either speak for them or to be there for emotional support. They also raised 
awareness about the importance of the women’s testimonies, since they were often 
the only way to know the truth about what happened. Their support was mostly 
needed in 2010-2011 when the women who experienced rape were very active in the 
gacaca courts, but in 2013, they were mostly in charge of helping women with other 
general legal issues, giving advice and educational training about their rights 
(inheritance, land rights, family conflicts, etc.), and the training of ‘parajuristes’ 
(volunteers who advise members of the organisation in their community). 
The holistic and professional support provided to the members of Organisation E 
was clearly well-organised in Kigali, but I also travelled to their branch in the 
Eastern province in order to observe any differences. That branch was established in 
2000, after the one in Kigali but before the other regional branches. According to the 
staff members there, this branch was more developed than the other regional ones. 
Their work is also more involved at the local community level, where they provide 
counselling services and train volunteers to help individuals living with HIV and/or 
with trauma. From 2004 to 2013, they trained 320 psychosocial counsellors, l00 
‘parajuristes’ and 80 health workers. These volunteers facilitate and raise awareness 
about the importance of social reintegration, and educate the community about the 
needs of the survivors. Each community also has their own individual responsible for 
the community’s development, who help women start income-generating groups to 
ease their social and economic reintegration. According to Jean (9 July 2013), 
everybody works together to reintegrate the beneficiaries to live in a peaceful and 
reconciliatory way with others. Their health clinic was first opened for raped women 
and those with HIV to receive medical access, but the branch now works towards 
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facilitating the reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence so they can go to 
their local neighbourhood health clinic instead of having to travel to the 
organisation’s clinic. 
However, securing funding for the Eastern branch is also a challenge faced by the 
staff members, who, in collaboration with another NGO, built a centre with 
accommodation and conference rooms that can be rented out. With the money raised 
by this centre, they are financially helping their beneficiaries through income-
generating activities and through credits. Paying the salaries of the staff members is 
however another challenge constantly faced by this branch, and Organisation A is 
currently funding Organisation E’s income-generating activities project for women 
who suffered from sexual violence.  
Discussion 
This chapter highlights a complex situation of social relationships, in which 
trauma, illness, sense of belonging, and social and structural reintegration are all 
inter-connected. The women’s voices suggest that in order to secure their social 
reintegration, the different spheres and areas of their lives have to be improved, since 
it would be impossible for them to overcome stigmatisation, for instance, without 
improving their living conditions. Therefore, the women aim towards an extended 
process of rebuilding their lives that is not limited to one specific need. This perhaps 
suggests that these women, first and foremost, want to be accepted in their 
community and nation as respected individuals who belong and hold a certain social 
status, allowing them to improve the diverse spheres of their lives. In a context where 
the genocide and the civilian survivors of the genocide are officially recognised by 
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the government, it seems that these women are mostly hoping for social reintegration 
and an identity that would not necessarily exclude them from the rest of the 
population. 
This was consistent with the interpretations of the staff members, who also agreed 
that first and foremost, these women want to be accepted in their community as 
valued human beings. This may explain why the NGOs aim to create alternative 
families of survivors as new forms of social belonging for these women. By doing 
so, the women redefine their sense of personal self, feeling supported and valued as 
human beings, which then help them to feel accepted within their local community.  
The experiences of stigmatization related in the first section also highlighted this 
shift from ethnic women to moral outcasts. At the core of their experiences is the 
moral exclusion exerted by the local community, resulting from the ideology of 
woman-as-nation (Yuval-Davis, 1994), in which the women are perceived as ‘dirty’ 
and ‘sinful’, because their bodies were spoiled during the genocide (Mertus, 1994: 
18). Indeed, the experiences related in this chapter illustrate a strong process of 
victim-blaming (Lerner, 1980; Hafer, 2004) which reinforces the social boundaries 
between these women and those who have not suffered from wartime rape (Douglas, 
1966: 4, 47). This process of victim-blaming and the ideology of woman-as-nation 
justify the social, economic and physical exclusion experienced by these women, and 
yet the NGOs I observed were unable to transform these moral norms. They instead 
focus on rebuilding the identity of these women so that they can be re-included 
within the scope of justice of their community, instead of transforming this scope of 





Chapter 7. State-Building and the Fight for Legal 
Recognition in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
I arrived in Sarajevo a few months after the end of my previous fieldwork in 
Rwanda. My first few days were spent confirming interviews and exploring the city, 
and the spatial contrasts between these two countries became instantly visible, at 
least in the two capitals. Whilst signs of the genocide could not be easily discerned in 
Kigali (except for the Parliament Building and the Genocide Memorial), the space 
was different in Sarajevo. The impact of the Bosnian war was visible on some 
buildings, on the streets of the city centre with the Roses of Sarajevo5, and even the 
Historical Museum of Bosnia-Herzegovina showed signs of the war. Throughout my 
time there, I discovered more of the city, and discovered spaces that flourished under 
Tito’s era or under the former Yugoslavia, but that are now left to their own fate. 
One of them was ‘Tito’s Park’, as named by my translator, which was a national park 
before the war, and became the front line between the Serbian and Bosnian armies 
during the siege of Sarajevo. Of all the places that my translator and her husband 
wanted to show me of Sarajevo, this was the first one they brought me to. It was not 
only significant for them that this represented the front line during the siege, but the 
husband told me how he used to come here to play when he was a child. According 
to his recollections, this park had a beautiful lake where people swam, with a 
restaurant on the side busy with customers, and families having picnics and 
barbecues all over the park. The image he portrayed of the park was very attractive, 
but so disconnected to its present state. On that day, the park was totally empty, 
                                                
5 The Roses of Sarajevo are marks from shell explosions that were filled with red resin after 
the war. 
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except for the few stray dogs that followed us around. As for the lake and restaurant, 
their current state (as the picture shows) could not reflect the flourishing description 





Discovering the surroundings of Sarajevo, and seeing first-hand the impact the war 
had on its environment and this space, made me wonder how survivors of war can 
successfully rebuild their lives when their surrounding space is a constant reminder 
of the trauma experienced? 
‘Tito’s Park’, photo by author. 
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This chapter will explore this question by analysing the voices and interpretations 
of the women I met who suffered from sexual violence and of some NGO staff 
members who work with them, before analysing how these voices and interpretations 
may influence the work done by five NGOs operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It will 
argue that various needs are still to be addressed, but that both the women and the 
staff members interviewed believed these needs could be fulfilled only through legal 
recognition of rape survivors. This is an attempt to address the social and moral 
exclusion experienced by these women as a result of the ideology of woman-as-
nation (Yuval-Davis, 1994), in which their social worth is devalorized as a 
consequence of the rape. The response to this moral exclusion is the main contrast 
between the women’s and NGOs’ experiences in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
since it is through legal recognition that the NGOs wish to re-integrate the women 
within the scope of justice of their group (Opotow, 1990: 2, Opotow, Gerson and 
Woodside, 2005: 303-306). 
Fighting for Legal Recognition 
Unlike with my interviews in Rwanda, the Bosnian women I interviewed did not 
share many details about their wartime experiences. I followed the same ethical 
procedure of not asking the women about the war in order to avoid pain or trauma, 
but there was a space for the women to take control of the conversation. They 
however did not use that space to really expand on their war experiences. These war 
stories vary on an individual basis, but certain similarities form a basis upon which a 
sense of solidarity has been solidified between these women throughout the years. 
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For example, Emina lived in a municipality near Sarajevo during the war, a 
municipality now in the Republika Srpska, near the frontier with the Federation. 
When the war first started, her life did not change drastically, until July 1992.  
That horrible year, my husband and I were still working even if the war had 
already started, but our area was quiet. Kindergartens were closed, so I used 
to bring my daughter to my mother. It was like that until the end of July, 
because one day, while I was working, the road from my job to my mother 
was blocked. These were just three kilometres, which at the same time was 
both near and far (Emina, 14 November 2013). 
When violence reached her municipality, she was brought to a concentration camp, 
where she was sexually abused.  
Very soon, the Serbs took me to the camp with a lot of other women. Some 
of [the other women] were my cousins and cousins of my husband. I was 
there for seven months and a half. During that period I did not see my 
daughter or mother, and I could not hear anything about my husband. The 
Serb soldiers were torturing us, we were raped, beaten... It is even hard to 
explain. But among all of this, I was suffering because of those three 
kilometres (Emina, 14 November 2013). 
The gendered nature of the Bosnian war is explained by this quote, with Emina being 
separated from her husband and placed into a camp where she was allowed to 
survive, but instead suffered physical, and inevitably psychological, torture. Emina’s 
experience in this camp was extremely painful, and is shared by many others. A lot 
of the women I interviewed, as well as those with whom I informally spoke, were 
brought to these camps. ‘In the camp I was abused physically and mentally’ (Lejla, 
14 November 2013). This is where the moral transgression experienced by these 
women started: their bodies became the body of the nation. 
It is difficult to explain. We all survived war in our own way. War is war 
for everyone. I was only 18 when it started. I was a child. And after four 
years of suffering, being raped, separated from my family, 'living' in camps 
with no food or water... I thought I would never be able to be a normal 
person again (Dalija, 8 November 2013). 
 227 
For some women, witnessing atrocities committed to others within the camp was a 
strong enough experience to induce psychological distress. For example, Amina (15 
November 2013), now living in Sarajevo and working for a women’s NGO, 
described at the end of our interview some of the atrocities she witnessed when 
incarcerated in a camp. Some of these stories are especially powerful, such as the 
moment when a Bosniak woman, who was already pregnant when brought to the 
camp, had to give birth surrounded by Serb soldiers who were waiting for the child 
to be born in order to terminate his life. The cruelty of the act described is extremely 
shocking, but illustrates the process of ethnic hatred and dehumanization that 
occurred during the Bosnian war. In this case, the cruel violence exerted over an 
innocent new-born baby perhaps illustrates the rationale behind using rape as a 
weapon of war, which is to humiliate the other ethnic group and attack their 
biological reproduction. I cannot be certain of the reason why these individuals 
committed this act, but it can still be hypothesized that they were aiming to prevent 
the reproduction of the enemy group.  
However, not all women were kept in a camp during the war, and for some the 
war reached into the confine of their own homes. This is the case of Sajra, originally 
from Eastern Bosnia. The description she gave of the pre-war era confirms 
arguments that inter-ethnic relationships were normalized in the former Yugoslavia. 
I got married at 18. When the war started my son was 18 months. We were 
a very happy family. I lived in the family home of my husband, and we 
were with his parents. They, unfortunately, are no longer alive. Until 1992, 
we were singing and laughing everyday in our house with our friends, who 
were mostly Serbs. But nationality was not important until 1992 (Sajra, 14 
November 2013). 
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However, things changed when the war started, and Sajra and her family were 
attacked in their own home. 
My story is very tragic. (…) After 1992, most of our friends came to our 
house, but then they beat my husband and took him to the camp. After 
seven days they came again. I was nursing the child, and they beat me and 
raped me. My father-in-law found me on the doorstep, unconscious, with 
the baby in my arms (Sajra, 14 November 2013). 
The rapes experienced by the women I interviewed occurred at the hands of a variety 
of actors, such as soldiers or local police officers - as was the case of Bakira (8 
November 2013). In the case of Sajra, this occurred at the hands of her neighbours, 
Serbs who she considered her friends before the war. Similarly to the Rwandan 
genocide, the Bosnian war brought neighbours against neighbours. This had an 
important impact on post-conflict reconciliation at the local level, which will be 
discussed in further depth below. 
Furthermore, the process of ethnic cleansing does not only include mass killings, 
but also mass displacement. It is common for rape to be used as a weapon of war to 
force women to leave their community, and for houses to be destroyed to prevent any 
return. This is what happened to Anida, who mentioned that her ‘house was burned 
by [her] Serb neighbour' (14 November 2013). It is that same neighbour, along with 
another man, that raped her at that time. 
In addition to the physical violence experienced, including sexual violence, the 
women I spoke to also experienced the loss of their family members. A few women 
survived the war with their husbands, but many of them lost their husbands or sons 
during the violence. 'The same Serb killed my husband along with 34 other men. 
There was a witness who saw him killing my husband and other Bosniaks with a few 
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of his criminals. That is the wound that has no date' (Anida, 14 November 2013). For 
some, the bodies of their loved ones have never been found and are still considered 
missing persons. ‘In July 1992, my husband was taken and until today I do not know 
where he finished his life’ (Emina, 14 November 2013). The mass killings disrupted 
family networks, and most women I spoke to experienced the loss of a family 
member, mostly men family members, whether in their close or extended family. 
I need to say that they killed my 24 years old brother. It has totally defeated 
my parents, especially my mother. She, after that day, has not stopped 
crying. We wondered what was he guilty [of]. He was an exemplary athlete 
and a good man (Sajra, 14 November 2013). 
Finally, all the women I met during my time in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained 
affected by the crimes committed against them and their family members, impacting 
their post-conflict experiences. As mentioned by Lejla (14 November 2013), ‘they 
stole my house, my soul, my school, everything’.  
For example, the women interviewed mentioned experiencing a range of emotions 
resulting from the war, such as anger, shame or fear. Being fearful was mentioned as 
one reaction in the aftermath of the war, and through the interviews I gained the 
impression that overcoming that fear was crucial for the women’s well-being. For 
example, it was important for Emina (14 November 2013) to mention that she is not 
afraid of everyone, even if she feels that some people do not want to tell the truth 
about the war. The desire to actively overcome fear and to retake control of one’s life 
was clearly visible. Engaging with the women who survived sexual violence in BiH 
was very different from the interactions in Rwanda in terms of the body language 
and emotions expressed by these women. While some women in Rwanda expressed 
sadness and a certain hopelessness towards their situation, the women interviewed in 
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BiH felt angrier and were somewhat more active in fighting for their rights. For 
some, I was probably not the first researcher they met, which means that they were 
not all new to the interview process, which could have put them at ease compared to 
others in Rwanda. However, the feeling of injustice and anger at the way they were 
treated was sometimes explicitly mentioned, but was always an emotion underlying 
my interviews and interactions with the women. As Emina (14 November 2013) 
expressed, 'I am very sad because of the injustice that was done to us'. 
In addition to these emotions, some of their reactions and behaviour in the 
aftermath of the violence might be characterised as resulting from trauma. ‘I can say 
that I am a normal person again, but I still have to use sedatives. (...) If somebody 
screams, I start shaking’ (Dalija, 8 November 2013). It is worth noting that while I 
did not bring up the topic of trauma myself, since I did not want to ascribe the term 
‘trauma’ if they do not identify their state as one of being traumatised, the term 
‘trauma’ was sometimes used by the women themselves. Even when not explicitly 
stated, the descriptions of their psychological distress still illustrate a certain degree 
of trauma. 
I felt like I had a person in my body, which was constantly choking me, I 
couldn't go to the store alone or to throw trash. If I didn't see my husband in 
front of me in the supermarket, my heart would begin to pound (Sajra, 14 
November 2013). 
These women all agreed that psychological distress is a normal reaction to the 
suffering experienced and may take a long time to overcome. 
It was very hard to come to this point where I'm now. It was very hard at 
the beginning, when I started fighting with my trauma. Once trauma is 
trauma for whole life. And you cannot get rid of trauma for good (Dalija, 8 
November 2013). 
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This quote is especially powerful, showing the long-term character of trauma, and 
that even if some degree of trauma healing is achieved, the women will never be able 
to completely overcome these past experiences. The women interviewed however 
mentioned that external support, including medication, is the first step towards 
trauma healing. 'I want to send a message to all women that they cannot cure by 
themselves. (...) You should not be ashamed. I went to a neuro-psychiatrist and even 
today I'm going. I have my treatment and I feel good' (Sajra, 14 November 2013). As 
with the women interviewed in Rwanda, all Bosnian women interviewed also 
mentioned the importance of their religious faith for their process of self-acceptance. 
Faith in Allah is [important]. I was a refugee in a place where Catholics 
were a majority. I felt the need to go to the mosque, but none of the 
mosques were near by. I decided to go to the church and pray in my own 
way. I felt wonderful! Faith gives me the strength to never give up and 
always work on myself (Lejla, 14 November 2013). 
Although the psychological distress experienced varies from individual to 
individual, some specific experiences were common, such as the loss of a husband or 
son and the lack of a resting place for these loved ones, as explained above. During 
the interviews, many women showed pictures of their deceased sons or husbands, 
and for some these photographs are part of the only remains they can keep hold of. 
Some women have either never found the bodies of their family members, or have 
never received confirmation of their fate. The absence of a memorial or resting place 
for their loved ones was extremely painful for the women I met. 
I'm a strong woman, but it was hard after everything. And it still is because 
I never found out where is the body of my husband. I would feel more 
relaxed if I could go to his grave and pray. (...) I find it hard... I'm 
constantly visiting anniversaries and places of suffering of Bosniaks, 
sympathizing with all the families who lost their loved ones (Emina, 14 
November 2013). 
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Mass graves are yet to be discovered and bodies yet to be identified in the former 
Yugoslavia, and this is something that was often narrated by the women I met. 
Perhaps this prevents these women from attaining closure with the past, but more 
immediately it prevents them from knowing the truth about the crimes committed 
during the Bosnian war.  
Furthermore, another shared element at the core of their psychological distress 
was the rape itself, and the stigma associated with it. The women I met felt 
stigmatized at different levels, and all coped with it in various ways in the aftermath 
of the violence. 'Everything is on an individual basis, it depends how strong we are 
and how ready we are to talk. A large number of women will die, but will not reveal 
that they were raped’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). This quote from Bakira 
illustrates the desire to hide the truth about one's past, and this is something mostly 
discussed with women in relation to their husbands. For example, among those 
women I met who were still with their husbands, some never told them about the 
rape while others disclosed everything to them. Some women were rejected by their 
husbands due to the rape experienced. Situations vary from individual to individual, 
but one thing that was agreed upon by all women I met - in addition to those I 
interviewed - is that there is never a good time to tell one's husband about the rape 
(Observation, 21 November 2013). When asked why in particular there is never a 
good time to bring up this topic, Emina mentioned that if one's husband was also in a 
camp, that is another story. But if the husband did not witness what happened during 
the war, the context in BiH means that the husband would not understand (21 
November 2013). I interpret this as the cultural and social norms found within 
Bosnian society rendering sexual violence a taboo subject that needs to be hidden, 
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which prevents transformative changes in the ways the morality of the rape victims is 
also perceived as spoiled by the rape.  
However, while the women I met discussed the possibility of being rejected by 
their husbands, they also discussed their rejection of their gender identities and roles, 
as well as their complex relationships with members of the opposite sex, similarly to 
the women in Rwanda. In a patriarchal society such as BiH, where gender roles are 
still very well-known, the attitudes of some women I spoke to towards the opposite 
sex might be an obstacle towards their social reintegration. A few women have 
expressed their lack of trust and disgust towards men. 'No, I don't believe in men 
anymore. After all I've gone through, I don't trust them. In the camp I was abused 
physically and mentally, and the rapists were men’ (Lejla, 14 November 2013). It is 
not surprising that some women are uncomfortable with men because of their 
experience of sexual violence. But this discomfort still impacts their personal lives 
20 years after the end of the conflict. For example, Anida (14 November 2013) 
mentioned how when a man is supposed to visit her in her home, she asks her sons to 
stay with her because of the fear she feels towards men. The difficult relationship the 
women interviewed had with members of the opposite sex was an obstacle that some 
of them had to overcome in order to engage in sexual and romantic relationships with 
men.  
The beginning was hard. I hated all men. And I started wondering if I was 
normal and [if] I liked the same sex. I thought all men are morons. I was 18 
years old when I was raped for the first time and that was my first sexual 
experience. You can imagine how I felt. It's not easy when you decide to 
make love for the first time with your husband or boyfriend, and I was 
forced [to do] it. The rapists were drunk and you can't imagine what they 
did to me. After that it was hard to make contact with other men. Even if I 
went for coffee with a man and we started a relationship, I was wondering 
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how to explain [to] him why I am arrogant when it comes to sex (Dalija, 8 
November 2013). 
I remember discusssing this with Dalija and sensing her disgust and anger towards 
the acts committed to her, especially since these were her first sexual experiences. 
Rebuilding trust towards members of the opposite sex was extremely hard for her, 
but this is something that she still managed to achieve with time. But this difficulty 
of engaging with men is not only specific to Dalija because of the nature of her first 
sexual experience, since even some women who were married during the war find it 
hard to engage with members of the opposite sex: ‘If I didn't have my husband, I 
would never talk to any man’ (Sajra, 14 November 2013). Regardless of this 
complex relationship, a major contrast with the women I met in Rwanda was that 
even if they all encountered difficulty building relationships with men, some of the 
widows or unmarried women I spoke to in Bosnia-Herzegovina did overcome this 
obstacle and either got remarried or became involved romantically with men. 'Now I 
live a completely different life. After the war I got married again, I delivered two 
more kids and I divorced again’ (Lejla, 14 November 2013).  
Furthermore, unlike with some women in Rwanda, most mothers I met in BiH 
found their motherhood extremely helpful for their well-being. It seems that most 
children of the women interviewed know about the sexual violence suffered by their 
mother during the war, and that the children have decided to support them. 'My 
daughter was five years and a half when the war began. A lot of things she saw while 
I was trapped. I did not have much to explain. She understood all and she is my 
greatest support' (Emina, 14 November 2013). 
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The loving and supporting relationship between the mothers and the children were 
emphasized by a few women. 
My kids are my life, they are as good as gold, not only because they are 
mine. They support me. We are friends. Even if they don't have the same 
father, they love each other and they survived my divorces (Lejla, 14 
November 2013). 
This quote illustrates the importance of motherhood for Lejla, but this was something 
consistent with the other women I met. Of course, this represents the experiences of 
only some women. As will be discussed in the next section, the interviews with the 
NGOs’ staff members present a different portrait of the situation, and, according to 
them, a lot of children either rejected or blamed their mother for the rape. This, 
however, was not witnessed in the cases of the women I spoke to, perhaps 
demonstrating that relationships remain very personal and can change from 
individual to individual. It is also worth noting that none of the women I spoke to in 
BiH had a child born out of rape, and those mothers might have a totally different 
experience of motherhood than those described here.  
Family relationships, especially the support received by their husbands and 
children, were described as having helped, and still helping, these women overcome 
trauma. This is especially important, since it does demonstrate that family and social 
networks are crucial for trauma healing, something that was often denied to the 
women in Rwanda. Social belonging may therefore be the key to addressing the post-
conflict needs of survivors of sexual violence in both contexts, and elsewhere. 
If I didn't have [my family] on my side, I would not be able to cope with 
my trauma. Because I have them, I didn't have much time to think about 
myself. I have four sisters and a mother. And even now, I talk about what 
happened to me because I don't want them to forget that (Dalija, 8 
November 2013). 
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Dalija is the only woman from BiH and Rwanda that I met in her home, shared with 
her sisters and mother. Dalija was quite nervous at first when we started the 
interview, smoking a few cigarettes and pacing around the room. But after getting to 
know each other, she relaxed and opened up, and introduced us to her sister and 
mother, who were sitting in the next room. I was wondering at first why Dalija was 
willing to let two strangers - one of them a foreigner - into her house to discuss her 
needs as a rape survivor, but after hearing her speak about her family support, it 
became evident she considered her home a safe space, where she is supported by the 
people she loves. We went to her house only once, but met her twice in Organisation 
H, and a bond was strengthened between us three, I believe, because of this first 
encounter in her safe place. 
Furthermore, in addition to their family relationships, I also asked if the women 
were comfortable engaging in conversations with individuals in their local 
community, such as when using public transport, etc. Again, the degrees of 
interaction with the community vary depending on the individual, but they all agreed 
that they could not find a support group outside the organisation and their family 
members. Interactions and opportunities to develop friendship with members of the 
community are indeed limited. For example, Sajra (14 November 2013) mentioned 
she feels different from other women who have not suffered like her, and this 
prevents her from developing meaningful relationships with these women. Another 
example is Emina, who used to work but now finds it extremely hard to spend time 
with people who did not experience trauma: ‘the others who have not suffered do not 
care if you need them, they phone only if they need you’ (Emina, 14 November 
2013). Based on her explanation, those who did not experience rape during the 
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Bosnian war cannot provide the level of care and support she needs.  Finally, there is 
also the example of Anida (21 November 2013), who said that she limits her 
conversations with those who haven’t suffered to greetings, since she feels unable to 
talk to others except at Organisation H. According to her, she cannot talk about her 
past because people who have not suffered are either not interested, or do not 
understand. Even some people in her extended family do not understand her. This is 
a belief shared by many women in BiH, but also by many women interviewed in 
Rwanda.  
All of this perhaps seems repetitive, but these repetitions are important to 
demonstrate the similarities between the two groups of women in their difficulty at 
forging meaningful relationships with individuals who did not experience sexual 
violence during the war. As was well-summarised by Dalija (8  November 2013):  
Women who were not sexually abused can listen to my life story, support 
me, give advice but they cannot understand me fully. You can show 
compassion to me, but it's not the same. For me, it's easier to talk to 
someone who is also a victim of some kind of violence, especially sexual 
violence.  
This difficulty in forging meaningful relationships with those who have not 
experienced sexual violence can perhaps be explained by the presence of stigma 
within the community, where the raped women are often blamed or given names. 
Similarly to Rwanda, a strong process of victim-blaming is occurring in BiH, where 
the women who experienced sexual violence during the war are perceived as sinful 
and immoral. This has the consequence that some women are now excluded from 
social interactions within their community and family gatherings, and have lost 
friends and romantic partners because of their past. And when these relationships 
survive, these women mentioned feeling vulnerable and at threat of verbal abuse, 
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which might lead some women to hide the truth about their past from their local 
community. 
I try not to leave the impression of a person who has survived an enormous 
physical and psychological trauma and torture. I live in a building that was 
built for the families of [camp] inmates. There mostly live women victims 
of sexual violence, who were also in war camps. I dislike that label, so 
when I hear someone say this, I say: "We get an apartment because my 
husband was an inmate" (Sajra, 14 November 2013). 
This quote by Sajra is very interesting, since by mentioning that she dislikes the label 
of survivors of sexual violence, it means that this label comes with certain 
assumptions and stereotypes that she does not think represent her situation. Based on 
the data presented so far, we can assume that this label possesses negative 
connotations about the moral characters of its grouping, which Sajra challenges by 
using her husband's time in a concentration camp as the justification for their living 
arrangements. However, this is something that is not always feasible, and even if 
some women decide to keep their past a secret, it is still possible that neighbours 
know the truth about the rape. The problem is not necessarily that the community is 
aware of the situation, but more their reaction. 'This is a province. Everyone can 
listen to me, but someone can abuse it, laugh...' (Dalija, 8 November 2013). A lot of 
women interviewed also believe that the Bosnian community does not understand 
what they have been through, and punish them instead of punishing the war 
criminals. 'Serb soldiers got rewarded for what they did during the war and me as a 
victim I don't get a shelter in Sarajevo. When your own people don't understand 
you...' (Anida, 14 November 2013). This again pinpoints the moral agression that 
these women currently face in the aftermath of the war, where their social exclusion 
is justified by a patriarchal understanding of their bodies as representing the impurity 
of the nation, and therefore should be excluded. 
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The women I met felt that Bosnian society was more sympathetic towards war 
criminals than women who experienced sexual violence. The lack of justice and the 
presence of war criminals in the communities were therefore mentioned in the 
interviews as traumatic elements in their lives. For example, it was described above 
that Anida’s house was burned down during the war. She also mentioned that ‘now 
it's up to my house that he [Serb man who burned her house] made his villa, with 
sports facilities and a café' (Anida, 14 November 2013). Anida then suggested that 
this is one of the main reasons why she would never think of going back to her 
hometown, since seeing her aggressors free in the streets would only increase her 
problems. 
The topic of justice created some heated conversations. The women interviewed 
all mentioned their desire for justice, but also for ‘justice to really be justice' (Anida, 
14 November 2013). First, they mentioned the problem of impunity, and the slow 
process that is justice in BiH. 'The two perpetrators of rape were arrested and have 
been released. I heard on the news last night that one again was arrested. Well it all 
goes slowly, not enough criminals are in jail' (Anida, 14 November 2013). Second, 
the women were clearly upset about the witness protection procedures, with some 
women such as Lejla refusing to testify because of the witness protection problems. 
'Victims have no support when they go to testify. If the prosecution orders me to 
testify, the police comes to my door no matter if my family knew that I was raped’ 
(Bakira, 11 November 2013). One such problem is that some women do not feel that 
their identity is sufficiently protected. 
I went to testiy to the BiH Court. And on my way back home, I met some 
friends and [we went] for coffee to my house. (...) Suddenly my sister came 
and she said that my phone had rung ten times. I looked up, I didn't know 
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the missed number. Later, I called back to see who that was. “Is that 
Dalija?”, it was a man's voice. I said: “Who is that?”. “Goran, a Chetnik 
from [a community]”, he answered. I said: “It is Edna, you are wrong”. 
And he said: “Will you forgive me?”. I just cancelled the telephone 
connection. Immediately I called the Prosecution of BiH and told them 
what happened. The point is, they [criminals] all know who is going to the 
prosecution, who is going to testify. They are all connected (Dalija, 8 
November 2013). 
In addition to the witness protection problems, the women also discussed as a 
group (Observation, 21 November 2013) that testifying in court can also be very 
emotionally challenging. This does not prevent all women from testifying, but it is 
still something they need to consider.   
I'm not afraid to be a witness against those who committed the war crimes. 
It is only sad that women who testify in court are not protected. I made the 
statement to the prosecution and after that I was called to testify. There I 
experienced a shock! First, it was the first time that I [went to a] courtroom, 
and the lawyer of the accused person provoked me. Then I started to cry. 
The prosecutor then said that we will have a 20 minutes break so I calmed 
down. Imagine, they left me alone in a room for 20 minutes! Then again I 
survived that terrible 1992... The trial resumed after 20 minutes, and the 
lawyer again continued to provoke me (Emina, 14 November 2013). 
Testifying in court also means that evidence about the rape and the killings is being 
shared. This can help shed a light on the actual events that occured during the war, 
but it also means that those involved learn private details about the women's lives. 'I 
realised that the lawyer and the prosecutor knew all about me: who I am, who my 
parents are, where I am from... They were looking for any evidence against me, but 
they found nothing' (Emina, 14 November 2013). However, while the women are 
asked to share private details about their lives, some of them do not necessarily feel 
that they are being cared for by this system. 'When they need me to testify, they call 
me and are really kind to me. And if I ask for something, all doors are closed for me. 
Is that justice?' (Dalija, 8 November 2013). 
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Furthermore, some women I met also suggested that the judicial prosecutors are 
often uncomfortable with prosecuting crimes of sexual violence. 'It seems to me that 
our prosecution would be happy if we say that the victims have not been raped and 
that the crime was not committed. It's really embarrassing' (Emina, 14 November 
2013). Bakira (11 November 2013) pushed this even further, suggesting that the 
criminals' rights have precedence over the rape survivors' right to justice. 
After testifying at the Court of BiH, we are nobody's care. The state sided 
with criminals. If during the testimony the victim sees that the offender has 
two lawyers, you can imagine how much the trial costs. And it is all paid by 
the BiH Government. On the other hand, raped women do not have the 
privilege of having the State pay a lawsuit against the criminals or refund 
their money [due to] fear and the trauma experienced. Today it is better to 
be a war criminal than a victim. The criminal defence is paid by the State, 
the family of the criminals from the RS have no problems in life. All 
glorify the criminals as if they were heroes, and RS helps their families in 
everything (Bakira, 11 November 2013). 
This quote illustrates a few issues that some women interviewed mentioned, such as 
the difficulty in prosecuting crimes of sexual violence and the resulting feeling that 
the aggressors are being favoured by the judicial process. However, this quote by 
Bakira also implies that there is a tension between the Federation of BiH and the RS 
in terms of prosecuting war criminals. This has an impact at the individual level, 
where some women who experienced sexual violence during the war now feel the 
other entity is protecting their aggressors. This is the case with the women I met, but 
this feeling is probably also shared by many Bosnian Serb women who were raped 
by Bosniaks during the war and feel the Federation of BiH is protecting them. This 
implies that a strong divide exists within the population between the ethnic 
constituent groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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Ethnicity was of course discussed with the women I met, since they themselves 
believe that they were targeted during the war because of their gender and ethnic 
identities:  
I was raped because of my nationality. They, Serbs, wanted to destroy 
Bosniaks. I can't say that Bosniaks didn't rape other women, but it is a 
minority. Serbs wanted to overtake the Eastern part of Bosnia and they did 
not choose a weapon. In fact, women were the strongest weapon (Dalija, 8 
November 2013).  
Some women were very explicit in the fact that rape was used as a weapon of war, 
and suggested that this was aimed at destroying their ethnic group. ‘The Chetniks’ 
goal was to disgust men from Bosniak women and [for them to] never have children 
again. They wanted us as a nation to disappear’ (Lejla, 14 November 2013). I asked 
the women about the importance of their ethnic identity in the aftermath of the war, 
and whether they perceive some tensions between the different nationalities in BiH. 
All of them agreed that their friendship with other women who experienced rape 
during the war transcends ethnicity. As long as there are some shared experiences of 
sexual violence, the women feel that they can understand each other. ‘In the 
organisation there are women of all nationalities. I don't mind. It doesn't make any 
difference. If we have the similar destiny, why not talk to them?' (Dalija, 8 
November 2013). Emina (14 November 2013) also agreed that through the 
organisation she met women of different nationalities who share the same goal, and 
the same suffering.  
Indeed, the women I engaged with developed a sense of belonging with other 
women who experienced sexual violence, and to the staff members working in the 
organisations. 'The president of Organisation F is my second mother' (Dalija, 8 
November 2013). This sense of belonging with the other survivors of sexual violence 
 243 
is, first and foremost, based on their shared experiences of rape during the war, 
grouping women because of their shared violent trauma and gender identities whilst 
transcending the ethnic identities that were at the core of the violence. 'I found 
myself here, in this little room with all these women. We have the same pain, we 
share our feelings and experiences. Here and through my organisation I met a lot of 
wonderful women' (Emina, 14 November 2013). This bond is easily witnessed when 
in the company of these women. For example, during the knitting sessions in 
Organisation H, it was evident that the women share a strong bond of solidarity and 
friendship. The two times that I sat in their sessions, they were in a little room with 
almost no space to move around, all sitting very close to each other. There was a lot 
of laughter and joking. They seemed very comfortable in this environment. They 
were smoking and speaking loudly. As mentioned by Emina, I could believe that the 
women rediscovered themselves in this small room. 'I feel very nice when I'm here in 
the association, in the women’s section. Only here I'm understood in a right way. I 
can share my feelings with all these women.  I feel very strong when I'm here’ (Lejla, 
14 November 2013). Sajra (21 November 2013) also mentioned how she feels safe in 
this organisation, and enjoys spending time with other women who also suffer from 
some kind of trauma. Sajra has the support of her husband, but the organisation still 
provides her with a sense of solidarity, belonging and safety that is important for her.  
This kind of organisation helped me to get over my trauma. It is much 
easier to talk about certain problems or feelings with a woman, than to a 
man.  I'm a member of [Organisation H] from the very beginning and it's 
my second home. Me and other women found our peace there. We are 
separated into groups. All of us have some kind of war trauma. We meet 
once a week. Sometimes we sit and keep quiet, another time we laugh, then 
cry... We share our feelings (Dalija, 8 November 2013). 
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Joining an association and meeting other women who also suffered from rape during 
the war also helped the women in their trauma healing. 'Only here among the women 
in the association do I feel that I am not alone, that not only I am suffering, I am 
learning how to fight with life and to live better' (Anida, 14 November 2013).  
However, their perceptions of ethnic reconciliation within their local community 
are more complex than how they experience ethnic divisions within their 
organisations. For example, Sajra (14 November 2013) mentioned how she identified 
herself first by her gender, before her nationality. In terms of nationality, she is still 
comfortable with individuals who do not identify as Bosniak Muslim. 
I am a woman first then a Bosniak. That is my nationality. But I don't mind 
having people with other religion as friends. I'll give you an example. 
When my husband and I were released from the camps, we escaped with 
our son to [a city in Central Bosnia]. There we got accommodation in a 
village where mostly Serbs lived. As they heard who we are and where we 
came from, I had the feeling that they were afraid of us. I walked up to one 
neighbour and told him: "Do not be afraid of us, you are not guilty of 
anything." After that we always greeted each other and talked. They had the 
same feeling towards us like we had for Serbs who have abused us in [our 
home town].  
Sajra also mentioned that she is not afraid of her rapists anymore, and that when she 
visits her home town, she is in good terms with some of her previous Serb 
neighbours because they did not hurt her. However, when asked if she would 
consider moving back to her home town:  
I could never return to live [there]. I just feel that we are not welcome. 
[This city] is empty, [there is] a lot of unemployed people. They want you 
to be afraid to come back. You feel it in the air that they hate you, they still 
live like it is 1992’ (Sajra, 14 November 2013). 
 Sajra thus has a complex relationship with Serbs, since she is comfortable with 
making Serbian friends outside of her hometown and establishing relationships with 
the Serbs that she previously knew, but re-establishing herself and her family in her 
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hometown seems unthinkable, partly because of the presence of Serbs in the city. 
This perhaps suggests that space and context are extremely important in ethnic 
reconciliation as it is not necessarily the ethnic attributes that prevent reconciliation, 
but also the memory of violence in that place. 
Another example of a complex relationship with members of another ethnic group 
is the example of Dalija. Dalija makes a distinction between the Serbs who 
committed war crimes and those who did not take part in the war. According to her, 
she never paid attention to her nationality and the nationality of others, but this does 
not prevent her from being ascribed a certain religion or nationality.  
I never paid attention to nationalities. I don't separate people like that. (...) I 
had a relationship (after the war) with a man who was Serb. He is not guilty 
for the war or for what happened to me. But his mother was not happy 
because I was a Muslim and I just gave up, I didn't want to be with him 
anymore (Dalija, 8 November 2013). 
 In this case, Dalija was willing to establish a romantic relationship with a Serbian 
man, but regardless of the minimal importance she gave her ethnic identity, the label 
'Muslim' was nonetheless imposed on her, complicating that connection.  
These are only two examples, of course, and every woman has a different 
experience with Serbs or Croats. For example, none of the women I met came from 
the city of Mostar, and their relationships with the Bosnian Croats would certainly be 
as complex as the relationships described here. These personal struggles, however, 
take place in a context wherein communities and local municipalities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina are now segregated based on ethnicity. These divisions, however, play 
an important role in the social reintegration of the women I spoke to, since the 
women are not only stigmatized because of their experience of sexual violence, but 
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are stigmatized in a community that has already disintegrated. Successful social 
reintegration is therefore difficult to secure because the individuals living in these 
same communities are themselves not fully reconciled or reintegrated. This, I 
suggest, is one reason why the women I spoke to did not focus on reconstructing 
their relationships in their communities as much as the women I met in Rwanda, and 
instead focused on their structural reintegration at the state level. 
When speaking with some women about their day-to-day needs and reintegration 
within their local and national communities, the survivors interviewed all mentioned 
the importance of being economically active. ‘I live with my daughter who recently 
got a job. Additionally, I knit and sell my products. I make real homemade juices and 
jams that I also sell. I find a way to earn a living' (Emina, 14 November 2013). Anida 
agreed with Emina that it is important to remain active, and explained how she 
would die or become crazy if she had to stay at home (14 November 2013). She 
described Organisation H as her life because it gives her the opportunity to be 
economically active. This is consistent with the stories of the other women 
interviewed, who are all unable to secure employment outside of their organisation. 
'Most of us are not ready to work' (Dalija, 8 November 2013). However, they 
perceived their economic dependency on the NGOs as a result of their unsatisfactory 
legal rights. 'We have a big problem because we have no rights. The government 
provides more rights to our executioners than to us’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013).  
Significantly, all the women I met were unsatisfied with the financial 
compensation they were supposed to receive from the state. 
No matter what we are covered with the Law for Civilian Victims of War - 
based on which we receive 250 euros a month - a woman live on the 
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margins of life. It is not enough for the basic needs. Medications are very 
expensive. Most raped women do not work. They have a personality 
disorder… (Bakira, 11 November 2013). 
Whilst Bakira’s depiction of the women who suffered from sexual violence is 
perhaps problematic and encourages further stigmatisation, her belief that the 
financial compensation received is not enough to pay for medicine and basic needs 
was shared by many others. ‘Isn't it sad that my mother is receiving 167 KM every 
month because she has lost her son? And who can survive with this amount? For 
whom has he fighted for?! Everything I have, I got from international [people]' 
(Dalija, 8 November 2013). In this case, this has led many women to believe the 
government is not interested in helping them, the raped civilian victims of war. 
From the government I expect a lot, but I doubt we'll ever get anything. 
When the state or the courts need us to testify, then they pat us on the 
shoulder. And when we come and seek for help, all the doors are closed to 
us (Lejla, 14 November 2013). 
For some, they even believe that they would receive more support abroad than in 
their home country. 
I would like our government to give us more support, so that we are put 
into the law to get health care, to be socially secured. It may sound silly, but 
sometimes I am not able to wait an hour in line at the doctor. We do not 
have any advantage. Women who are victims of sexual violence are not 
protected. What will happen to our children when we die? The brother of 
my husband told us that we would get everything we need if we went to 
live in Australia (Sajra, 14 November 2013). 
Dalija (8 November 2013) also hoped to leave BiH: 'If I could take my family with 
me outside of this country, I would go. I was offered to go, but only me. I didn't 
accept'. This seems quite paradoxical, that civilian victims of war believe they would 
receive more support from another country than their own state, which witnessed the 
atrocities committed during the war, but it is something that many women believed. 
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They shared a belief that they were sub-citizens, and that the post-conflict 
settlements between the two entities created further challenges. 
We do not have the option of returning to our original homes. For example 
if I want to go back to my pre-war home, the perpetrators are still free, so it 
means I'm not safe in my house. I repeat, it is better to be a war criminal 
than the victim, at least in our country. Mostly, these [raped women] are 
women who have lived in the present-day territory of RS, which is of 
genocidal creation, resulting in our blood. Raped women simply cannot 
exercise their right to retirement, or those who have this right do not go in 
the RS. Most of the women never went to their birthplace after the war 
(Bakira, 11 November 2013). 
Resettlement has been an issue mentioned by many women interviewed, who all 
lived in what is now Republika Srpska during the war. It is perhaps less of an issue 
for other raped women, depending on the current ethnic composition of their 
hometown.  
Finally, the women I spoke to also mentioned their desire to create a special legal 
category for civilian victims of war that would be specifically for survivors of sexual 
violence. 'I expect from the state to separate the category “raped women” from other 
women who have some trauma. Now we are all the same, the widows and me are the 
same. This is not fair' (Dalija, 8 November 2013). Dissatisfaction with their current 
rights was the topic that angered all the women I interviewed. Their tone and body 
language changed when speaking about this, and it was obvious that whilst being a 
member of a survivors’ organisation provides them with some services and 
opportunities (trauma counselling, income-generating activities, sense of belonging, 
etc.), the main need still unaddressed more than 20 years after the end of the violence 
is their legal recognition. ‘We have to fight for ourselves. For example, nobody is 
asking us if we need something, how we buy medicines... There is no law that 
applies only to the victims of sexual violence' (Dalija, 8 November 2013). As 
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expressed by Bakira, but also underlying my every encounter with the women who 
experienced sexual violence in BiH, is the feeling that, 'from all this, the government 
is showing us that we are undesirable in the society’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013).  
While the women in Rwanda mostly experience their moral exclusion by their 
local community, it seems that the women in BiH mostly experience this exclusion 
by the post-conflict state. As mentioned above, since these women live in 
communities that are already divided, legal recognition would allow a personal 
relationship between these women and the state, institutionalising their rights and 
services without first having to reintegrate their community. This may be a reflection 
of the lack of process of nation-building, where the lack of integration between the 
three constituent groups means that survivors of sexual violence do not need to first 
integrate their society in order to improve their living conditions. 
Voices of the NGOs’ Staff Members 
Through their work and individual experiences, the staff members of five NGOs 
operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina have developed individual perceptions and 
understandings of the post-conflict experiences of women who survived sexual 
violence. It is worth noting that I am including Bakira’s perceptions in this section as 
well, because of her role as a practitioner. However, as can be observed in her 
responses, her position as a practitioner is never far removed from her personal 
experiences as a survivor of sexual violence. 
First, all staff members interviewed believe that women who experienced 
ethnicized sexual violence still suffer from a certain degree of trauma decades after 
the end of the conflict. I met with different psychologists while in BiH in order to 
understand that trauma. 
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One have symptoms of PTSD, some of them hardly fall asleep, some 
women are re-experiencing the traumatic event and have problems falling 
asleep and have nightmares, they are afraid of everything... These are the 
main symptoms. I have not met a single woman who does not have some 
kind of a problem. They all take medicine either to sleep or for relaxation. 
Women who did not immediately began to talk about the trauma, it is now 
[harder with them]. They don't want to talk, but the trauma is so strong and 
simply they cannot continue with their normal life. They need faith and 
confidence in a therapist so that they can start to talk (Nejra, Psychologist, 
21 November 2013). 
This quote illustrates the various forms that trauma can take, but also the different 
solutions offered: namely, medicine and trauma counselling. Moreover, Adna, the 
psychologist at Organisation F (6 November 2013) also suggested there are different 
types of trauma, with varying degrees of seriousness: 'Those women who lived here 
and who were refugees, they had a bit different, or let me say, less dangerous kind of 
trauma [than the survivors of rape]’. It was either expressed or assumed by some 
staff members that there was a certain continuum of trauma ranging from survivors 
of war, to survivors of war with deceased family (mostly sons for the women), to 
survivors of rape, and finally to survivors of rape who were forcibly impregnated. 
‘The greatest pain is to lose a child, and the greatest humiliation is to be raped. We 
all share the same pain, and no matter how you turn your life, with such trauma it is 
terribly difficult’ (Amina, President of Organisation I, 15 November 2013). 
According to the staff members interviewed, however, there are some conditions 
that impact healing after such trauma. A key factor regularly mentioned is family 
support. ‘Where there is an understanding of the family it is much easier. [However], 
men will not easily agree to talk about his wife who was raped' (Nejra, 21 November 
2013). For example, when speaking about Bakira, Adna (6 November 2013) 
mentioned that Bakira was able to be a public figure despite her experience of 
wartime rape because ‘she had luck, because her husband supports her just like it is 
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written in the books. Her family is really strong even if they all suffered a lot.’ This 
is consistent with the voices of the women themselves, with some of them 
mentioning the importance of their family support. What is very interesting about 
Adna's quote is her mention of luck. It seems that, in her opinion, being totally 
supported by one's husband after rape may still be a rare phenomenon. 
Support from the broader local community was also mentioned as another factor 
that facilitates trauma healing. 
The second [thing that] helps is through the religious communities. We are 
religious people and faith institutions could give support. I think of it... 
During the war, the Islamic community has given a statement [when there 
were the mass rapes] in every mosque to attract attention of men to accept 
these women, to help them. That was really helpful (Nejra, 21 November 
2013). 
In this case, the religious communities themselves are perceived as important actors 
in supporting the women who experienced war rape, with faith helping women to 
accept themselves and their past. However, unlike in Rwanda where relationships 
with God were mostly personal, it seems that religious actors may also be expected 
to play a role in this process in BiH, as the previous quote illustrates. 
Furthermore, all individuals interviewed also believe that speaking about the 
events through counselling sessions is crucial for trauma healing. ‘Challenging 
situations can only be overcome through conversation. You must enter deeply into 
the core issues. Women who have closed [themselves], this [can] lead to suicide, 
excessive medication, transmitted trauma to children and families...’ (Bakira, 11 
November 2013). It was assumed that survivors of sexual violence cannot confront 
their trauma without external help and support.  
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Trauma has no date and it is never late to work on the traumatic experience 
and the treatment may still be beneficial. We will keep working on 
encouraging women to come and share their stories, to learn to fight and 
deal with their trauma, to testify against their rapists... It is never too late to 
feel free and to help oneself (Adna, 6 November 2013).  
Of course, some individuals may perceive this as respondent bias, suggesting these 
staff members perceive trauma healing as dependent on external help and support 
because of their need for funding for these programmes. Whilst this may be true to a 
certain extent, and this may have motivated a few of Bakira’s answers, it is, however, 
still consistent with the perceptions of the women themselves. The women I 
interviewed acknowledged the importance of external help and support, whether 
through family networks or the support of the organisations, to their well-being. Of 
course, these opinions come only from women who have joined an association in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and it would be important to observe if women who have not 
joined any association are also able to achieve a certain degree of trauma healing on 
their own.  
External support by NGOs can take various forms, so I asked one psychologist to 
describe her counselling sessions. The first aspect that Nejra mentioned was this idea 
of looking ahead. 
Basically it is psychotherapeutic support, dealing with traumatic 
experiences, helping in re-socialization, leaving the past behind and moving 
into the future, working on re-living. The victims begin to live normally, 
because many of them are still in traumatic experiences, and time is just 
passing them by (Nejra, 21 November 2013). 
In practice, this means that Nejra is helping the women to identify the different 
events that occured in their lives since the end of the war.  
I also have an exercise for them (drawing circles on a piece of paper). If 
the rape happened in 1992, I tell them to make as much steps as possible to 
number 2013. I want them to realise that time is passing by, and also to talk 
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about all the nice moments they have had in these years. I tell them that 
there are good and bad things in life, it's like dirty laundry – you wash it 
and put it into a closet (Nejra, 21 November 2013). 
Whilst this is done in good faith by showing the women that they lived through some 
happy moments since 1995, it also unwillingly contributes to a perception held by 
donors that trauma should not necessarily be experienced 20 years after the end of 
conflict, as will be explained in further depth in Chapter Eight.  
Nejra also targets other issues at the core of the trauma, and does not just focus on 
showing the women that a lot of time has gone by since the end of the war. This 
exercise is complemented by targeting the emotions felt, such as shame and anger. 
Mostly I insist on understanding trauma, then on processing it because a 
woman has a mass of shame or even feelings of guilt. They confuse their 
role with the role of the criminals. Criminals should be ashamed, not the 
victims. (...) Also important is to work on the feelings of anger and sadness. 
Traumatised people are usually [experiencing] anger and sadness, because 
they fell helpless (Nejra, 21 November 2013). 
Nejra therefore direclty addresses this moral exclusion experienced, where the 
women may internalize the idea that they are the ones to blame for the rape, or that 
they are deserving of this suffering. However, it is mostly the process of being able 
to speak up about one's past in a safe space, free of judgement, that renders the 
counselling sessions helpful for trauma healing. 
I encourage the patient to cry, because usually they were not able to cry. 
During the act of rape they had to be deaf and numb, they were not allowed 
to defend themselves, not allowed to get angry, or cry. That's why I insist 
that now through therapy they have to express sadness, anger, and to cry 
(Nejra, 21 November 2013). 
All of these processes are used to show the women that they are equal to others, 
especially when the women feel like sub-citizens in regards to their legal rights. 
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'Then we work to restore self-confidence. I try to show them their good side, to show 
them that they are valuable. This is very important' (Nejra, 21 November 2013).  
The difficulty in accepting oneself and feeling accepted by one’s community, as 
perceived by the staff members interviewed, was also discussed in relation to the 
stigma of rape in Bosnian society, which results in various degrees of social 
exclusion for women who experienced rape. The fact that rape and sexual 
relationships are often perceived as taboo subjects contributes to this stigma, where 
rape victims are blamed and their morality is seen as compromised by the act. 
For our mentality, [rape] is still taboo. It is said that raping is the thing that 
“one does not need to know”. It is not easy to [be] reminded every day 
[about] the rape. We usually say that it is a risk to speak, and a pity to be 
silent (Amina, 15 November 2013). 
This stigma fosters social rejection from family and friends, and encourages gossips 
within the community, which prevents these women from maintaining a sense of 
belonging and meaningful relationships with their community. This stigma also 
greatly increases for women who were impregnated as a result of rape, since in 
addition to the stigma of rape, strong moral judgements are made on women who 
were impregnated by an enemy man and who are now raising this child as single 
mothers. 
Only a few women who were raped came to counselling. They usually 
required individual treatments, and during group treatment nobody talked 
about personal experiences, it was more a general discussion. I remember 
that a few women became pregnant and gave birth to a child whose father 
was the rapist. This was their second secret that will stay with them until 
they die (Adna, 6 November 2013). 
The stigma was therefore understood as impacting the women’s willingness to 
disclose the truth about their past.  
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I think stigma exists, but also again, I want to return to the beginning, when 
war happened. Women were encouraged to speak. And they had big hopes 
that something would happen, [something] positive, that citizens and 
family, neighbours and the government would respect and help them. But 
no, most of them decided to stay silent’ (Petra, President of Organisation J, 
19 November 2013).  
This, however, depends on the individual, and was witnessed in my interviews with 
the women themselves, where some women never told their husbands about their 
rape and other women told their family members, including their children. This quote 
by Adna explains the progression some women have experienced, starting from 
keeping their rape a secret to testifying in court: 
First of all, women who were victims of sexual violence took a long time to 
start talking about it, due to our culture, environment and cultural 
characteristics of our society. There were few women that [mentioned] 
sexual violence as a problem, either in groups or in individual sessions. (…) 
Recently it appears that more and more women [go] on trials, as witnesses 
for war crimes of rape. Now after 20 years they tell stories about rape. 
When I asked one of them why now, she told me: "my husband was killed, 
and I was raped. At that time I had two daughters, two and four years. I was 
able to go to America, where I was struggling in life, and for their 
education. Now they are adults and have their own families. They are only 
now able to understand my story. That's why I recently decided to tell them 
the truth and also to appear as a witness in court. If I had told them earlier, I 
would not have been understood in the right way" (Adna, 6 November 
2013). 
In Adna’s example, the possibility of being understood by others was an important 
factor in this woman’s decision to open up about her rape. This is why staff members 
described family support as especially important for the healing of survivors of 
sexual violence. However, the staff members interviewed also discussed the family 
rejection experienced by many women:  
Unfortunately, there are few cases where men accepted and supported his 
wife, who was a victim of sexual violence. It happens that even today the 
victims of sexual violence are still tortured, but now from their families. 
Women certainly know what can happen and that's why they do not decide 
to talk (Adna, 6 November 2013).  
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It is also believed by Bakira (11 November 2013) that the number of husbands who 
accepted their wife despite the rape resulting in pregnancy, and who in turn accepted 
the child as their own, remains minimal. These perceptions were shared by the staff 
members interviewed, but it was again stressed that these situations vary from 
individual to individual. When asked why some families might exclude the women 
and others not, Bakira (11 November 2013) suggested the following explanation: 
Women who have been immediately accepted by the family were usually 
with their husbands or family members in the camps. Therefore, they were 
aware that women did not have a choice. Such husbands or families are the 
only ones able to figure out sexually abused women. Some men went out of 
the country thinking that nothing would happen to their wives and children. 
They found it difficult to accept that their women were raped, and that's 
why they left them.  
There are a variety of ways in which family networks have supported or not 
women who experienced rape during the Bosnian war. The fact remains, however, 
that disclosing the truth about one's rape to others remains an important choice in the 
lives of these women and may lead to stigmatization, which is why some women do 
not make that choice.  
I met women who have the support of their families; the husbands and 
children know that the woman was raped. Many husbands left their wives 
because they were raped. There are women who are hiding from their 
husband and children that they were raped. There are women who are 
testifying in court, but their families do not know. I know a case where the 
husband knows that his wife was raped, but he is abusing her now, and she 
suffers because she is financially dependent (Nejra, 21 November 2013). 
For some, the risk of the family finding out about the rape prevents them from 
gaining access to the services provided by the NGOs. This is why some 
organisations, such as Organisation J, extended their services to other regions of the 
country. Some women might not have the time or money to travel to the 
organisation, but some women also do not want to explain to their family why they 
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had to leave town that day (Observation, 19 November 2013). Providing local 
services to survivors of sexual violence can thus increase the reach of these services, 
by including women who would not otherwise travel to the organisations. 
Moreover, whilst family relationships were frequently discussed by the staff 
members interviewed, some also expressed their perceptions regarding social 
exclusion faced in the community. These staff members mentioned that women may 
be labelled within their communities as rape survivors, bearing with it all the 
negative connotations associated with rape.  
I spoke with them, most of them and they saw what happened to women 
who started to speak openly about their experiences, some of them [the 
communities/neighbours] marked them as negative person, or they always 
tried to find some explanations for why it happened. “This with her”, or 
like that (Petra, 19 November 2013). 
I push this argument further, suggesting that in addition to these negative 
connotations, a moral judgement is made on these women, as the quote by Petra 
suggests, where the moral character of the rape survivor is questioned. Furthermore, 
even if some women decide to remain silent, the neighbours might often already 
know what happened during the war, which can perhaps provide one explanation 
(along with the destruction of their homes) as to why all the women I interviewed did 
not permanently return to their previous home. For example, Adna was not raped 
during the war and yet: ‘during the war I lived in Grbavica. I knew exactly which 
women were raped’ (Adna, 6 November 2013). 
The stigmatization exerted by Bosnian society against rape survivors was 
acknowledged by all staff members, who agreed that raising awareness, educating 
the younger generations about the use of mass rapes during the war, and a change of 
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attitudes within Bosnian society were all needed in order to reduce the stigma and 
social exclusion experienced.  
All the people who live in BiH, we need to work more regarding raising 
awareness on this topic, so that each person shows respect to women who 
survived sexual violence, and don’t blame her. I really think that we made 
mistakes in that process, and now [the survivors] are starting to speak 
openly and people are realizing that each of us need to change our attitudes 
regarding survivors of sexual violence and to give them respect, so that 
they really feel the dignity in their lives (Petra, 19 November 2013). 
These attitudes are perhaps difficult to transform when rape, and the mass rapes 
committed during the war, remain taboo and are not necessarily discussed with the 
young generations. 
Last week, [we screened] the film “For Those Who Can Tell No Tales”, 
that is a film about women who survived sexual violence in Visegrad, and 
after that film we had a panel discussion. And then really we realized most 
of the people did not understand that problem. It was a full cinema, more 
than 100 people, but they really did not understand what happened to the 
women. They want to forget that story. Especially the youth, most of them 
mentioned that it was the first time they heard that these kinds of problems 
exist in our country. It means that we also need to do advocacy work and 
raise awareness to prevent similar things in the future (Petra, 19 November 
2013). 
 However, it is also believed by the staff members that stigmatisation and social 
exclusion vary based upon the region where survivors live. First, the staff members 
explained how survivors now live in different parts of the country, but also all over 
the world, such as the UK.  
Sarajevo was in the middle and a place where they could find safe shelter. 
Mostly, those women were Muslims and the Serbian soldiers expelled 
them. How they came here and what they have been through, that is their 
own story. But I know that they were finding their way to survive. Mostly 
they moved into empty flats, and the owners were Serbs who went to 
Serbia. This solution was temporary. After the war, they had to go back to 
their home or somewhere abroad. Some of them decided to stay in Sarajevo 
of course, or in some other cities in our country. The biggest problem was 
that their houses in their hometowns were destroyed (Adna, 6 November 
2013). 
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The migration experienced during the war means that many women are now 
living outside their hometowns, with many living in Sarajevo. Their current place of 
residence, however, has an impact on their legal rights, due to the differences 
between the RS and the Federation of BiH. The legal rights of rape survivors were 
the main factor discussed when speaking about their social reintegration. The staff 
members perceive the lack of legal and state recognition as the main obstacle faced 
by these women, and argued this needs to change. ‘What we think when we speak 
about integration, survivors' integration, it is very important that we, for example in 
BiH, have a law that treats all survivors the same way’ (Petra, 19 November 2013). 
The absence of a law for survivors is believed to impact their full reintegration, 
including access to justice, employment, and housing.  
This population [survivors of sexual violence] has not been entered into the 
law of our country as a legal group, so this is our third attempt to change 
things with the Federal government so that they [can] include this group of 
people into the law, to recognize them so that they can equally use the law 
when they need it – [with access to] social help, health care, dwelling 
issues, personal non–materialistic damage compensation for the time spent 
in war camp with option to get them back to the work force to make them 
self-sufficient (Tarik, 14 November 2013). 
There is, however, already some state support available for the civilian victims of 
war, where they can receive monthly financial support. However, according to the 
members interviewed, this support remains minimal and non-specific to the survivors 
of rape, and most women are unaware of their rights. ‘Women do not know their 
rights’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). This was also expressed by Petra (19 November 
2013): 
I realized that some survivors do not have basic information regarding their 
rights. (…) I visited some survivors and I tried to help them. When I saw 
them, they didn't have [some] basic things. You know, in one family I saw 
that the mother did not have [enough] to give bread to her daughter, and 
 260 
then I asked her: “ok, did you receive your status? Did you apply for 
status?". She looked at me like “what is status?”, she didn't understand me, 
and then I explained: “OK, do you have financial support every month?”.  
She told me: “no, I don't have, I have never heard about it”. And then I 
realized that she did not have any information. After that we helped her and 
she finally received status. And in this canton, but I'm sure in other places 
in BiH also, we can find a lot of similar cases. It means that survivors need 
to have [that] information.  
This strong focus on legal rights can be explained by Lucy’s comments, the 
programme manager of Organisation F, who after our interview mentioned how in 
contrast to other post-conflict societies, BiH is a mid-developed country, meaning 
that the women’s basic needs are often covered. Instead, she argued, they need 
empowerment, self-fulfilment and the establishment of women’s rights (13 
November 2013). Whilst only Lucy explicitly mentioned this, this belief was 
underlying every interview conducted with the staff members in BiH. 
The current financial compensation granted by the state is, however, described by 
the staff members as crucial for the women’s social reintegration, especially those 
who might not be able to secure employment. Employers normally do not know 
about the women’s past, but the consequences of the rape, in addition to other factors 
such as education level, may still prevent some women from being employed. ‘When 
it comes to recruiting these women, the employer can't really know their story. But 
these are usually women with low education or are mentally or physically unable to 
work’ (Adna, 6 November 2013). To address this, many staff members argued that 
income-generating activities within women’s organisations are necessary for 
financial stability.  
We would like to bring our members to normal life through employing 
them and making them financially independent - knitting etc. - so they do 
not feel like they are not able to participate everyday life. (…) Accepting 
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these people as self-sufficient members of society will then be easier 
(Tarik, President of Organisation H, 14 November 2013). 
These income-generating activities, which will be discussed in more details in the 
next section, however, are often not enough to cover the totality of the women’s 
expenses. For example, the consequences of rape often include physical injuries or 
illness that still demand treatment. As mentioned by Nejra (21 November 2013), ‘any 
person with trauma after sexual abuse can have a house, an apartment, a job, but 
usually they all have health problems like high blood pressure, problems with the 
stomach...' The costs associated with these treatments or medicine are sometimes 
hard to cover by the women. 'We don't only ask for money, we need treatment’ 
(Bakira, 11 November 2013).  
Financial compensation from the state is important in these cases, but to receive 
this compensation, women need to disclose the truth about the rape experienced. 
‘Those women who have reported sexual violence, and if it is confirmed that they 
were victims of that crime, receive a decent monthly fee. All this is thanks to 
[Organisation F]. But those who do not speak do not have anything’ (Adna, 6 
November 2013). This may prevent some women from accessing compensation 
because of their reluctance to disclose the truth about their past, but this is not 
something that was discussed by the staff members when discussing the need for 
more legal rights. Indeed, all NGO staff members interviewed mentioned the 
importance of legal rights, but the process in which the women would be qualified to 
receive these rights (which would probably necessitate that they officially disclose 
their experience of rape) was not discussed. This could be problematic for some 
women, but this is still perceived by the staff members interviewed as the main 
solution to reintegrate survivors, since it would institutionalise the holistic services 
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appropriate for them, such as medical services, financial compensation, housing 
benefits, and more. As mentioned by Tarik (14 November 2013): ‘[for our 
beneficiaries] to be recognised by the law is our top priority’. 
However, at the time I was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the adoption of a law 
specifically for survivors of rape was proving difficult. Petra (19 November 2013) 
believed that this could be explained by the belief that these are only women’s 
problems: 
The other aspect, I really think most of them in this post-war period do not 
take very seriously this problem, because most of them think it is a problem 
only for women. [They think] that women need to work for women. But 
now it is a problem for all of us, men and women. And we need to ask 
together [what are] the [women’s] needs.  
The absence of a specific law for rape survivors was the main disappointment 
expressed by the staff members, and there might be a gender element associated with 
the failure to pass a law, in which the crimes of sexual violence committed against 
women, yet alone against men, are not legally recognized to the same extent as other 
war crimes. The next section will then analyse how the voices of the women and the 
perceptions of the NGOs’ staff members may influence the work done by five NGOs 
operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and how the fight for legal recognition has been 
included in the work of these organisations.  
 
Claiming Legal Rights through State Lobbying 
Organisation F 
The first organisation I was introduced to in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a women’s 
grassroots NGO that focuses on advocating for the inclusion of a gender perspective 
 263 
in law and policies. The organisation is located not far from the city centre, higher on 
the hills in a residential part of town where people were going about their daily 
business; at the corner of the organisation’s street were police guarding the gates of 
an embassy. The neighbourhood was quiet, and residential houses and small 
apartment buildings surround the organisation. There was no sign on the street to 
identify them, as one might expect bigger organisations such as Oxfam or MSF to 
have, or even some organisations in Rwanda. The only hint we had that this house 
was actually the office of an NGO was the address, and a small printout with the 
name of the organisation on the doors. One would not be able to identify this 
building when driving or walking past without having a closer look. There was also 
no movement, or ins and outs; the doors were locked, and my translator and I had to 
wait for someone to let us in.  
When we first visited the organisation, there were only three staff members on the 
premises. No beneficiaries were present. This was in clear contrast with most 
organisations in Rwanda. This is where I met and conducted interviews with Adna 
and Lucy, the clinical psychologist and programme manager of this organisation.  
Adna was among the signatories who formed this organisation in 1996. Sitting in 
the conference room, with our scarves and coats on because of the cold in the 
building, she calmly answered my questions. Her calming and soft presence in the 
room gave me no doubt that survivors of the war might feel comfortable opening up 
to her. By the end of our meeting, the dynamic resembled more a conversation and 
sharing of ideas than a formal interview process. She explained that the first services 
provided were counselling services to women who were sexually abused during the 
war, and to those who returned to BiH in 1996-1997. According to her, 
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This type of women had the same or even worse problems. They lived in 
the Eastern part of Bosnia and they had to come back to Sarajevo; their 
houses in their home towns were destroyed, mostly they have lost their 
husbands... they couldn't find themselves in that chaos. There were also 
women who had been forcibly expelled from their homes and came to the 
new environment without any income, homeless (Adna, 6 November 2013). 
The first women who were provided counselling services were thus women, rape 
survivors or not, from what is now part of the RS and whose prospects of returning 
to their home town were shattered for multiple reasons, such as the changed political 
and ethnic context and the destruction of their homes, amongst others. The 
counselling offered involved many specialists, such as a psychologist, psychiatrist, 
social worker, and volunteers who provided psychosocial support. Whilst these 
services were open to women who were affected by the war, Adna, however, noticed 
a difference between those who were raped and those who were not. 
Only a few women who were raped came to counselling. They usually 
required individual treatments, and during group treatments nobody talked 
about their personal experiences, it was more a general discussion (...) 
Women who were victims of sexual violence took a long time to start 
talking about it, due to our culture, environment and cultural characteristics 
of our society. There were few women that mentioned sexual violence as a 
problem, either in groups or in individual sessions (Adna, 6 November 
2013).  
This perceived difference perhaps explains why many organisations in both Rwanda 
and BiH regroup survivors of rape together, and why a law specifically for rape 
survivors is demanded in BiH. 
The idea to start with psychosocial support came as a result of the consequences 
of the war, but also ‘because at that time you could not get access in the government 
or in our municipalities [to psychosocial services] because they did not have the 
capacity to face those problems’ (Lucy, 13 November 2013). This gap was instead 
filled by grassroots and international NGOs, leading Lucy to suggest that ‘[the 
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NGOs] are the ones who have the expertise of working with those women’ (Lucy, 13 
November 2013). Whilst the psychosocial programme ended a few years ago, the 
organisation still runs a SOS Line where beneficiaries can phone for advice, and can 
receive one-on-one counselling sessions with Adna. However, due to the capacity 
limits of the organisation, a lot of cases have to be referred to other organisations or 
to state institutions (Lucy, 13 November 2013).  
Following the implementation of this programme, the organisation expanded its 
mission, which now focuses broadly on empowering women in the public and social 
sphere. According to Lucy (13 November 2013), the focus may change depending on 
the political and social climate, but in general the organisation focuses on human 
rights, gender equality and peace and reconciliation, all influenced by UN Resolution 
1325, resolution which promotes the inclusion of women in peacebuilding processes.  
To achieve these goals, the organisation hosts conferences, publishes reports, and 
organises activities for educational purposes and to raise awareness. The rationale for 
focusing on gender rights is connected to the previous analysis of staff perceptions, 
in which basic needs are mostly covered in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but gender equality 
is yet to be achieved. 
In Africa, I worked with HIV/AIDS children, women who don't have 
education at all, are illiterate, but here in Bosnia it's so different. It's more 
on the strong patriarchal point of view. [The women] don't have access to 
everything (Lucy, 13 November 2013). 
The organisation’s focus has changed since its inception, and has moved away 
from more direct services of psychosocial support to focus on education, advocacy 
and empowerment. Unlike my observations in Rwanda, the focus was removed from 
income-generating activities and counselling services. For instance, Organisation F 
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aspires to integrate women’s rights and sexual rights into the schools’ curriculums in 
order to educate the younger generations about these aspects, and hopefully lead to a 
change of attitudes in Bosnian society (Lucy, 13 November 2013). However, despite 
the change of focus towards women’s rights, the organisation still wishes to engage 
and support male and female victims of gender-based violence, including women 
who experienced ethnicized sexual violence.  
It's [also] probably to bring back the psychosocial support again, to go back 
to very basic principles. (…) We still receive a lot of calls [on the SOS 
line]. It's sometimes men as well who are calling… you know those 
domestic issues. And they cannot get information in the government, 
sometimes they are afraid as well [to talk about it] to the police, so that's 
why they are calling this SOS line. So we want to go back to this, and we 
hope that we can get funding to have like a crisis centre (Lucy, 13 
November 2013). 
As this quote illustrates, funding is an issue. Throughout the interview, Lucy stood 
by the radiator, trying to warm up, and the tone of the conversation heated up when 
discussing the civil society sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a woman who worked 
in this sector in different countries, Lucy was clearly disappointed by the sector in 
BiH, which despite its strengths, still seems to possess limitations, as analysed in 
further depth in Chapter Eight. 
Organisation G 
The second organisation I was introduced to is a well-known organisation because 
of its founder: Bakira Hasecic, a rape survivor from the Bosnian war. Bakira is well-
known in the Bosnian community, and everyone has their own opinion about her, 
whether researchers, members of the general public or staff members from other 
organisations.  
Bakira Hasecic is everyday talking about rape, [about] how to protect raped 
women. She is fighting for their rights, she was a witness at the court on 
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many cases and she is not hiding her identity. All this means that her 
trauma is still very much alive! And can you imagine what would happen if 
she kept her feelings inside. (…) She knows all the rapists by heart, where 
they are now, if they are prosecuted... (Adna, 6 November 2013). 
This quote by Adna is extremely interesting, since it presents a complexity and even 
contradiction with some of the things she mentioned above. Adna and other staff 
members indeed suggested in the interviews that speaking about one’s past is a 
crucial step towards trauma healing. This is exactly what Bakira is regularly doing, 
but according to Adna, this keeps her trauma alive. This at first may seem like a 
contradiction, but it may instead suggest that the objective of making survivors of 
rape speak about their past is to allow them to accept themselves, and to look ahead. 
Perhaps the fact that Bakira is perceived as constantly speaking about the past is 
understood as her not having reached a degree of trauma healing that allows her to 
look ahead. This understanding, however, may be quite problematic, since it suggests 
that a survivor of rape speaking openly about the rapes committed during the war is 
still perceived as traumatized. This not only contributes to sexual violence being 
silenced in Bosnian society, but also may constrain the actors who are allowed to 
speak about it, i.e. not the survivors themselves. 
Furthermore, whilst I personally did not immediately observe any concerns with 
the organisation, except the absence of members in the organisation’s office, other 
researchers have expressed concerns regarding the protection of their members’ 
anonymity (Helms, 2013; chapter 6). Bakira and her organisation might produce 
different types of reactions, but the work done by this organisation should still be 
analysed. 
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My translator and I met Bakira, her daughter and another staff member in Bakira’s 
office, a short tram ride from the city centre. When entering her office, I was first 
intrigued by the numerous pictures of war criminals and related newspapers articles 
glued on the office’s walls. Bakira then asked us to have a look at her computer, 
where she showed us Facebook pictures of a house being rebuilt. We were informed 
that this house was located in the RS, and was the scene of the killing of 70 Bosniak 
Muslims during the war. The local authorities were thinking of raising the water 
level of the river nearby, which would have submerged a few houses, including this 
one. Bakira interpreted this action as Bosnian Serbs trying to get rid of evidence of 
ethnic cleansing in the RS. Opposition to raising the water level started in the 
locality, but was rejected on the grounds the house was already destroyed and no one 
lived there, so it would not be an issue if it was gone. Bakira’s organisation thus 
raised some money, and with the help of volunteers, rebuilt the house in 15 days. 
According to her, police officers verbally abused them during the process - officers 
that included some of Bakira’s rapists (Observation, 11 November 2013). Seeing 
this, as well as the photos and newspaper articles on the wall, gave me the 
impression that this organisation was motivated by demands for justice, recognition 
and accountability for the crimes committed during the Bosnian war. 
Unlike with other NGO staff members, interviewing Bakira was extremely 
complex since her position as a practitioner overlaps with her position as a survivor. 
I approached our conversation by focusing on her experience as a practitioner, since 
it became clear at that point in my fieldwork that her public involvement as a woman 
who had experienced sexual violence was uncommon, and not necessarily 
representative of the post-conflict experiences of the majority of survivors. Bakira 
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also had an authoritative presence in the room that I slowly started to perceive as 
self-importance throughout my time with this organisation. For example, during the 
interview process, she was quite dismissive of some questions, and unlike with all 
other research participants (women included) where the interviews resembled more a 
conversation, I imagine my interview with Bakira better resembled ‘elite interviews’. 
At one instance, she asked her daughter to join us and answer questions on her behalf 
while she was overseeing the process and also undertaking some tasks on the 
computer. Whilst I did not have the occasion to see her interact with members of her 
organisation, I did wonder how the survivors I met would respond to her attitude and 
approach.  
Organisation G started as an association that supported women of all ages who 
were raped during the war. This is still the purpose of this organisation, but since 
2006, men who were sexually abused during the war have also been invited to join. 
Beneficiaries come from all nationalities, including Roma, and membership is on a 
voluntary basis (Bakira, 11 November 2013). When discussing the work done by this 
organisation, it became evident the focus was first on legal rights.  
Our biggest success is that we, in the Federation, got legislation, a law on 
civil war victims, by fighting and testifying in the ICTY and the Court of 
BiH. This applies only to women with recognised status of women victims 
of war and who have a place of residence in the Federation. We also have 
health care, child allowance... (Bakira, 11 November 2013). 
Justice for the crimes committed was also discussed by Bakira and her daughter as 
a way to end impunity. ‘If someone is deciding to commit such a crime, this will 
remind him that he would be under the hand of justice, he will not go unpunished’ 
(Bakira, 11 November 2013). There was, however, a strong geographical component 
of this organisation, which was fighting for the legal recognition of survivors of 
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sexual violence but only in the Federation of BiH. Indeed, Bakira makes a clear 
distinction between the importance of lobbying the government in the Federation of 
BiH, as opposed to the RS. This comes from the understanding that most rape 
survivors who were living in the RS during the war are not returning home. This 
understanding clearly influences the work done by the organisation in trying to 
secure recognition and rights for survivors in the FBiH. 
This law doesn't exist in the RS, but we do not need to take care of it. I say 
this because only a few Bosniak women returned to RS. It is hard for them 
every day to face the rapist or murderer of their family, or to be under the 
pressure every day after the trial (Bakira, 11 November 2013). 
I interpret this as even if this organisation welcomes members of all nationalities, 
there might still be certain divisions amongst the survivors, with Bosniak Muslims 
being perhaps prioritized in the fight for recognition. Whilst it is true that many 
Bosniaks did not return to the RS, there are without doubt women who have 
experienced sexual violence living in that entity. This could perhaps suggest that, for 
this organisation, Bosnian Serbs living in the RS who were victims of sexual 
violence during the war remain segregated from this fight for recognition because of 
their place of residence, and probably also ethnic identity. In a sense, ethnic politics 
are still very powerful in BiH, and this also impacts the work done by NGOs 
operating in the country. However, Bakira also suggested that women living abroad 
of any ethnicity should not be allowed to receive the same compensation from the 
government as those living in BiH: ‘It would not be fair if women who live abroad 
also receive compensation’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). It would thus be wrong to 
suggest ethnic identities are the main reason why some women might be prioritized 
over others.  
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Women and men of all nationalities are in our organisation. They hang out 
every day, visit each other and do not pay attention to nationality. A victim 
is a victim. She has no nationality. You'd be surprised when you see a 
group of 40 people all happy together and cooperating, helping each other, 
going together to the doctor (Bakira, 11 November 2013). 
In addition to advocacy work, the organisation also provides different services, 
such as financial assistance, workshops and counselling services.  
We only apply to projects that are actually implemented in the form of 
workshops. The last time we had workshops with UNDP. At the end of 
each workshop, participants adopted conclusions that concerned the 
victims’ needs. These conclusions are referred to the authorities. But they 
mostly end up in a drawer and none of them have started yet to implement 
or apply them in any way. The workshops are mostly about health care, 
communication skills at the trial, how to overcome trauma, how to deal 
with victims of trauma. (…) Lately, we organised a session for our 
members with a therapist, and they can call the therapist themselves. It's 
never too late to start talking, and this is the beginning of healing (Bakira, 
11 November 2013). 
Moreover, even when these services are provided, these can still become channels 
to lobby the government, as is the case with workshops that aim to influence policy-
makers. ‘We made a brochure [with] concrete conclusions, [with] what we really 
need. It is still somewhere in someone’s drawer, and none of the authorities ensure 
that they are implemented’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). These services are also 
dependent on donors and are not prioritized to the same extent as the fight for justice 
and recognition. 
We occasionally can help women. We depend on donations from the state 
budget and the international community. But there is no specific project. 
The victim [can] say she needs a cow and that it will feed five children, but 
you cannot give it to her (Bakira, 11 November 2013). 
This is not drastically different from the work of Organisation F, but while 
Organisation F focuses on empowering women within the public sphere, 
Organisation G focuses on a specific type of civilian victims of war: survivors of 
sexual violence. In both cases, however, the main objective is very similar, which is 
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to influence policy-making and enable their beneficiaries to gain equal status as 
citizens, as opposed to sub-citizens. This comes at a time where the changing of state 
institutions and state policies present some opportunities for these organisations to 
influence the outcome of the process of state-building, and ensure that survivors of 
sexual violence are integrated in the reconstruction of the country. 
It is all called our fight for justice and truth so that it could never happen 
again to anyone. (…) We are left to continue fighting and to constantly 
send the message that something like this will never be repeated. This 
message must constantly be present everywhere, because women finally 
have the right for protection. (…) We mostly help ourselves, but we lack 
the help of the state (Bakira, 11 November 2013). 
Organisation H 
The third organisation I was introduced to in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
recommended to me by Dalija. According to her, if I wanted to hear the stories of the 
survivors, I had to visit this organisation. I was first invited on a Thursday, since this 
is the day where the survivors of sexual violence meet to knit together. 
The organisation is located in a busy commercial district of Sarajevo. Surrounded 
by shops, cafés and restaurants, there are no signs that this grassroots organisation is 
located in this area. The busy atmosphere surrounding the organisation almost gives 
it an anonymous feel, where individuals are able to come and go without necessarily 
being noticed. This is a clear contrast with Rwanda, where some organisations were 
either clearly noticeable through signs on the street, or had their own house/building 
segregated from other premises. It was starting to become clear that the space held 
by the organisations was of course influenced by the funds available, but also 
impacted the space available for survivors in both places: segregation but recognition 
for survivors in Rwanda; lack of recognition but ‘integration’ for survivors in BiH. It 
is very common for organisations in Rwanda to have their own premises and to be 
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identified from the street, but my time in Bosnia-Herzegovina with these five NGOs 
draws a different portrayal. Whilst some organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (such 
as Organisation J) may better resemble the space used by organisations in Rwanda, it 
seems that the organisations I observed in Sarajevo were integrated in the 
surroundings, as with any other shop. 
Once there, my translator and I met first with Tarik, the president of the 
organisation, a man who was himself tortured during the Bosnian war. The 
organisation was created in 1996 and includes citizens of BiH who were kept in war 
camps during the war. In 2013, the organisation included around 6,000 members, 
more than a third of whom were women. It has branches in a few municipalities, and 
its main goal is to research and raise awareness of the crimes committed in camps 
during the war, as well as supporting camp survivors (Tarik, 14 November 2013). ‘In 
2000, we were looking for data from Foca, Rogatica, Kresevo, Kiseljak… we were 
trying to identify people in need of help to get them back to their normal lives’ 
(Tarik, 14 November 2013). 
Organisation H aspires to provide a variety of services that would support the 
camp survivors in different spheres of their lives, but needs remain too large to fulfil. 
Looking at the very beginning, we made [some] minor steps for [a] few 
individuals but they were short-term solutions. That is why we are [now] 
seeking for long-term solutions. Food help and packets with used clothes 
are not the only things we need, like we got from the Germans in 2003. We 
need medicines and we get 2,000KM, which is not even 0,30 pf per person, 
and the majority is in need for more than that. The fact is that projects like 
that cannot meet the requirements of 6,000 people (Tarik, 14 November 
2013). 
As this quote illustrates, part of the programmes depend on local and international 
donors. This mediation between the needs of the camp survivors and the perceptions 
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of the donors will be addressed in Chapter Eight, but here it is worth spelling out that 
this organisation cannot successfully operate without the financial support of donors. 
It therefore constantly needs to apply for funding and to propose projects that could 
be of interest to these actors. This is not an easy process, as described by Tarik: 
Unfortunately we were not taken seriously neither from the local 
government or the international community, so the process that we’ve taken 
is going harder and harder but we are trying to send projects and 
suggestions to the local as well as international donors (Tarik, 14 
November 2013). 
And when some programmes are funded, it does not necessarily cover the needs of 
all of the beneficiaries. 
We have good cooperation with the Swiss and American embassies, where 
they send 30 people in need of psychotherapy to the mountains, but that is 
once a year for 30 members, so eight organisations send three or four 
members. That is nothing (Tarik, 14 November 2013). 
This dependency on local and international donors seems to limit, and at times 
preclude, the provision of programmes to civilian victims of war, which will be 
addressed in Chapter Eight. 
Regardless of the need for funding, this organisation still provides general support 
to individuals who were kept in war camps during the war, often tortured, beaten and 
sexually assaulted. There is a sub-section of the organisation that focuses specifically 
on individuals who were victims of rape during the war, and mostly women have 
joined this sub-unit. ‘Of course they [survivors of sexual violence] come to us as we 
are the only organisation providing some sort of support for them’ (Tarik, 14 
November 2013). This organisation is evidently not the only organisation that 
provides support to these civilian victims of war, but it is true that within the 
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organisations I observed in Sarajevo, this organisation was the most involved in the 
personal lives of its beneficiaries.  
For example, Organisation H provides income-generating activities through 
knitting sessions. Women who experienced sexual violence meet once a week to knit 
together, and then sell their products on the street and in markets. The second time I 
visited the knitting group, the organisation had hired a designer who, for the next few 
months, was going to help the women design and knit products more ‘fashionable’ 
for selling purposes. This was especially interesting to witness, since the main 
income-generating activity provided reinforces the gender stereotypes found in a 
patriarchal society, in which women are traditionally involved in feminine skills such 
as knitting. BiH provides various employment and educational opportunities for 
women, so it is quite revealing that income-generating activities would be restricted 
to this traditional skill, especially considering that some of these women were 
formally employed before the war. 
However, whilst this income-generating activity group was described as very 
important for the women I met, the organisation still kept a strong focus on the legal 
recognition of its beneficiaries. 
It is a shame that war sex crimes have not been recognised in the form of 
law. They [the survivors] have problems with being a witness, meeting 
those criminals responsible for sex crimes, they even meet their assaulters 
on the street walking freely and all that happens due to the lack of an 
organised system of law (Tarik, 14 November 2013). 
The issue of recognition within the law may seem quite repetitive so far, but clearly 
demonstrates that organisations with different types of beneficiaries (women; 
survivors of sexual violence; individuals who were kept in war camps) all share the 
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same focus towards influencing policy-making and legal recognition of the 
survivors’ needs. For the three organisations discussed so far, this is their priority, 
even if they provide other types of programmes for survivors.  
Organisation I 
The fourth organisation I met in Sarajevo is an organisation that focuses 
specifically on mothers who were living in Srebrenica during the war. When I was in 
Sarajevo in 2013, there was a gallery near the Sacred Heart Cathedral: Gallery 
11.07.95. This Gallery acts as a reminder of the crimes committed in Srebrenica in 
1995, culminating on July 11, 1995, into what many consider a genocide against 
Muslims. This gallery had a strong impact on my desire to speak to an organisation 
dedicated specifically to those who survived or lost family in Srebrenica, as well as 
also observing the position that survivors of sexual violence might have in this 
association. 
Based in Sarajevo, a short tram ride from the city centre, we met Amina, the 
president of the organisation, in her office. Before conducting the interview, we sat 
in their conference room and had an informal discussion with staff members and 
beneficiaries. They showed us products made by some women, mostly food items 
such as jam and preserves. These were produced because of the cooking skills of the 
mothers and their access to the food items needed, such as strawberries or other 
fruits. Again, the production of jams and preserves was an important income-
generating activity for these mothers, but it still did not challenge gender norms, as 
advocated by many staff members. Reflecting the warm Bosnian hospitality, we 
were then invited to have lunch with the women, and a refusal on our part would 
have been greatly frowned upon. The women were laughing around the table, 
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chatting in Bosnian and asking a few questions about my presence in Bosnia and in 
their organisation. Observing them, it was quite interesting to witness a certain 
hierarchy, where Amina had a certain authority or respect in the room that everyone 
acknowledged. Despite this hierarchy, it was evident that the women cared for each 
other and shared a strong friendship. This ‘sisterhood’ that I witnessed was 
consistent with the voices of the women I interviewed, who all agreed that they 
forged a strong sense of belonging to the other women in their organisation. In this 
case, shared suffering and understanding are very powerful in bringing individuals 
together. After being unable to witness the dynamic between the staff members and 
beneficiaries in Organisations F and G, it was a welcome change to see in practice 
the relationships that I witnessed in the day-to-day practices of NGOs in Rwanda.  
After lunch, we were invited in Amina’s office to conduct the formal interview. 
As with Bakira’s office, one wall was covered with newspapers articles and photos 
reporting about Srebrenica and the work done by this NGO: one newspaper article 
showed Amina and other members protesting by holding signs in a street; another 
one showed a picture of former US president Bill Clinton when he visited the mass 
graves in Potocari in September 2003. Amina then explained how the organisation 
was created in 1996 at the federal level, and was granted in 2002 a permit at the state 
level in order to operate throughout the country. At first the organisation included 
8,116 women, who all shared the same purpose of learning the truth about what 
happened to their husbands, brothers or sons (Amina, 15 November 2013). ‘As our 
men were taken from us and trapped, we did not know their fate’ (Amina, 15 
November 2013). Initial activities thus centred on discovering the truth about their 
missing family members. 
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Every month we organised a demonstration. We wanted to warn the world 
that we do not know where are the male members of our family, and to 
invite the world to stop the bloodshed in our country because they could 
prevent it (Amina, 15 November 2013). 
The focus then changed once the women started to learn about the fate of the 
missing. At this point, the organisation started to advocate for the proper 
remembrance of their family members, probably providing them with a sense of 
closure (something that not all women I spoke to have reached because of the 
missing bodies of their husbands, for example). 
When we found out they were all dead, we tried to help to ensure the 
people money and everything we need to find the bodies of our loved ones. 
In 1996 the ICTY had already started working and they came for the 
exhumation of the bodies. They started to take out the bodies of our 
children, and we identified them. After that, we needed to find a place for 
burial. We conducted a survey among 12,500 women of Srebrenica on 
where they wanted to bury their loved ones. One location was suggested by 
the authorities, another location we proposed - that was the place where 
they were all killed and where we were raped - that is in Srebrenica 
Potocari, and a third location was the Sarajevo Canton. And so 83% of us 
said that it had to be in Potocari. The High Representative in BiH, 
Wolfgang Petritsch, ruled that it would be in the Potocari cemetery, in the 
RS. We mothers said: "If our children did not have the right to live, we 
mothers have the right to bury them back where they came from." (…) So 
we got a place of burial in 2001. We laid the foundation stones, in 2002 
were placed the tombstones and on March 31th 2003 was the first funeral 
and 6,000 coffins went to Srebrenica (Amina, 15 November 2013). 
As this quote suggests, the space where the bodies of their loved ones should be 
buried was an important decision by the women, but also involved political actors. In 
a sense, mass graves remain a political vehicle and by having the bodies buried in 
Potocari, this organisation and political actors are confirming that genocide was 
committed on this soil. 
Following the ‘opening’ of the cemetery in Potocari in 2003, the organisation 
continued its work by raising awareness of the war crimes that occurred in this 
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region. For example, it made a request to the European Parliament in 2008 to adopt a 
resolution on Srebrenica, and this was adopted in 2009. ‘We woke up Europe, 
because every 11th of July the flag in front of the European Parliament is at half-
mast. So they remember and remind the world that genocide occurred in Srebrenica’ 
(Amina, 15 November 2013). In addition, the organisation is also fighting for justice 
for the crimes committed: ‘We are searching for truth and justice’ (Amina, 15 
November 2013). This fight for justice is occurring in the national courts and in the 
ICTY, but the organisation has also targeted the United Nations and the government 
of the Netherlands because of their perceived failure in Srebrenica. 
By resolution 819 we were supposed to be protected, and we did not. We 
got the rejection of the Court in Strasbourg. But it will be remembered that 
we were looking for justice. Maybe in 50 years [we] will have someone 
who will open that question - the question of the protection of human 
beings. So we consider this as our success and our failure at the same time 
(Amina, 15 November 2013). 
This organisation is constantly fighting for their rights to be protected by either 
international or local actors. It also supports those children who lost their parents 
during the war and women who were sexually abused (Amina, 15 November 2013).  
There is a strong focus on motherhood in this organisation, and it seems the 
trauma of losing a husband or son is the primary suffering that bonds the members of 
this organisation, transcending ethnic divisions and other types of trauma. Amina 
herself speaks about the members of the organisation as ‘mothers’, and whilst she 
recognizes that some of them were victims of sexual violence in Potocari, this is not 
at the forefront of the organisation’s mission.  
This strong focus on motherhood is a clear contrast to the first organisation I 
observed, Organisation F. As mentioned above, Organisation F advocates for gender 
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rights and for changed norms in a more patriarchal society. In this case, however, 
Organisation I is working within the more conservative parameters of gender roles. 
By using their position as mothers, this organisation undertakes some actions that are 
probably more accepted by the society, since they are conforming to the stereotypes 
of caring mothers. It is thus consistent with their position as caring mothers that they 
advocate for a place of burial for their loved ones, and for the crimes in Srebrenica to 
be remembered. This perhaps explains the importance of this organisation, and the 
support it gathered from Bosnian society. For example, a previous member of the 
OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina mentioned that when this organisation was 
protesting in the streets, political actors had to listen (25 April 2015). 
 Organisation J 
Finally, my translator and I decided to leave Sarajevo and make our way to a city 
in central Bosnia-Herzegovina, where we were invited to meet a well-known 
women’s organisation. Unlike all the organisations we met in Sarajevo, this 
organisation has its own property, comprising of two large buildings. This is perhaps 
explained by the financial support received and the reputation of this organisation, or 
perhaps because of its location outside of Sarajevo. We were invited to wait in the 
kitchen of the back building, which now serves as a safe house for women who are 
victims of domestic abuse. The building was cold, and as we were trying to warm up 
with tea, we could hear a few women coming in and out of the house, very 
discreetly. The house was not at its full capacity at that moment, but ordinarily can 
accommodate up to 25 people for up to six months (this can, however, be extended 
in some cases). This number apparently decreased from 60 to 25 in 2003 due to a 
lack of funding. This safe house was the first thing we observed in the organisation, 
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and it suggested that the organisation either changed its focus from survivors of 
wartime sexual violence, or expanded its mission to include services for victims of 
domestic abuse. 
We were then invited to meet Petra, the director of Organisation J, in her office. 
Organisation J was established in 1993 and its main focus was to support women and 
children who experienced sexual violence during the war. One of the first services 
provided during the war itself was medical support. 
We established our medical department where women could get medical 
support, as I mentioned gynaecological support and regular medical 
support. And also I want to mention that at that time, especially when we 
speak about gynaecological support and help, some of the women didn't 
want to come to BiH and to [Organisation J] with their pregnancy. The 
pregnancy was a result of the war rape, and they wanted to stop that 
pregnancy. Some of our doctors helped them regarding their abortion. In 
that period, it was a big stigma so they didn't want to go to the hospital and 
do it that way (Petra, 19 November 2013). 
The medical services offered were not only treating injuries from the rapes, but also 
offered abortions to those impregnated as a result of rape. Of course, these treatments 
came hand in hand with counselling services. 
Through psychological support we tried to give them counselling, 
individual therapy work and then we developed group therapy work, where 
women with different trauma were included in the group therapy. They 
tried to help each other, to express their emotions or recover from their 
traumatic experiences and give new meanings after the therapy work (Petra, 
19 November 2013). 
Once these more immediate needs were covered, the organisation realised that 
women who were raped during the war also had personal problems that prevented 
their trauma healing and social reintegration. For example, some women were unable 
to take good care of their children, so the organisation opened a kindergarten and 
nursery. Furthermore, many women were living in precarious conditions due to 
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financial instability. The organisation thus implemented vocational training 
programmes.  
Some of them decided to keep their children with them, but they had a lot 
of economic problems because they didn't have support, some of them from 
families, from society, and then we tried to organise vocational training for 
women, especially for women who did not finish secondary school. During 
the war, most of the women and girls needed to [leave] their school to save 
their life or like that, and then we organised vocational training for them, 
such as working on the silk, tailoring, hairdressing, printing on the textile 
machine, working on the computer, like that. And what we also succeeded 
in that period was to sign a protocol with our public institutions, the 
department for employment. It means that they, together with [Organisation 
5], organised final exams where they can give them a certificate after they 
finish the vocational training. It means that when they receive the 
certificate, the certificate is valid and then they can record it in their 
working book or card, and then they can find easy jobs. It was very, very 
important (Petra, 19 November 2013). 
This vocational training is again similar to other organisations, where feminine skills 
such as tailoring and hairdressing are being taught. This training, however, also 
provides computer skills that could help the women find employment as 
administrative assistants.  
Finally, the organisation also realised that many women had to leave school as a 
result of the war, so they helped these women to return to school to finish their 
secondary education or university degree (Petra, 19 November 2013). Organisation J 
uses a needs-based approach in its work, which not only justifies why these services 
were added to the medical and counselling services provided originally, but can 
perhaps also explain why it is now including other vulnerable individuals, such as 
victims of domestic violence and trafficked individuals. This approach is also similar 
to the one used in Rwanda, where the organisations provide support to the different 
spheres of the women’s lives.  
 283 
In addition to these services, the organisation also includes an education and 
awareness aspect to its work, very consistent with the work done by the other 
organisations I observed in the country: 
From 1996 we also tried to educate our community, our representatives 
from government's institutions on what is trauma, how they can recognize 
some psychological consequences, how they can develop sensitive 
approaches to survivors, whether he's a doctor, nurse, teacher, or some 
other person who work in a municipality or like that, and they tried to 
develop sensitive approaches to vulnerable categories. After that period, we 
also spoke about domestic violence because survivors of domestic violence 
have a lot of psychological consequences and then it is very important that 
we have very a sensitive approach when we communicate with them (Petra, 
19 November 2013). 
It was explained in the second section that this organisation attempts to transform the 
gender norms in Bosnian society through educational activities with the younger 
generations. This last quote suggests that education is also provided regarding the 
trauma and psychological consequences of rapes and domestic violence, which may 
again lead to transformative changes at the local level. 
Discussion 
Certain similarities between the experiences of the women interviewed with the 
experiences of some women in Rwanda can be seen, mostly in terms of a restricted 
sense of belonging, stigmatization and the need for trauma healing. These similarities 
are explained by a shared ideology of woman-as-nation in each context, which 
justified the use of women’s bodies as a battlefield during the ethnic violence, and 
now justifies the imposition of their bodies’ impurity into their sense of social self 
(Mertus, 1994: 18; Yuval-Davis, 1994: 413). 
However, the main difference observed lies in the type of social reintegration the 
women are demanding. The women interviewed in BiH all wished for legal 
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recognition of their rights, which they believed would facilitate their social and 
economic reintegration. This is in line with the perceptions of the staff members, 
who also perceived state and legal recognition as the main solution for the 
reintegration of the survivors. The interviews conducted suggest that, for these staff 
members, counselling services, medical services, education and training, income-
generating activities, housing support and community awareness are all programmes 
that respond to the needs of the survivors. However, to facilitate these programmes, 
legal recognition of the survivors of wartime sexual violence is a necessary step. This 
may therefore explain why lobbying the government for legal recognition of the 
survivors of sexual violence is a main priority universally adopted by all five 
organisations analysed in this chapter. Legal recognition, in this case, is therefore the 
response prioritized for the reintegration of these women into the boundaries of 
fairness of the in-group (Opotow, Gerson and Woodside, 2005). By targeting the 
institutionalization of their rights, the women and the NGOs aim to provide access to 
the resources available to the in-group, providing opportunities for these women to 
socially and structurally reintegrate their society (Opotow, 1990: 2; Tugendhat, 1993: 
5-7). 
Finally, the analysis of the women’s and NGOs’ experiences in Rwanda and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has highlighted important contrasts in terms of social 
reintegration for the survivors of sexual violence. Not only are the women’s 
perceptions of their social reintegration divergent, but so is the NGOs’ response.  
It can therefore be argued that the main contrast is found in the proposed solution 
to the micro and macro exclusion experienced by the survivors of sexual violence. In 
Rwanda, the state proposes to redefine the nation, its values and its identity (nation-
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building). The women then attempt to redefine their own identity in the process, 
aided by the NGOs that aim at challenging the gender norms and stigmatisation 
faced by the survivors of rape. In BiH, since there is no strong attempt to redefine the 
nation, multi-ethnic state-building instead opens up possibilities for ethnic groups to 
have their rights institutionalised and interests protected by the political elite 
(McGarry and O’Leary, 2004: 17; Lange, 2015: 683). The women then want to 
address their micro and macro exclusion by being legally recognized by the state, 
with the NGOs lobbying the state on their behalf. 
These chapters therefore demonstrate that the women moved from ethnic women 
to moral outcasts in the aftermath of the violence, but that their need for social 
belonging remains embedded within the local context, witnessed through contrasting 
priorities of social reintegration. The interviews conducted with the staff members 
have however highlighted the influence of other actors: donors and the state. It is 
therefore crucial to broaden the analysis to these actors, analysing whether the 
women’s experiences are embedded within the aid sector. The following chapter will 
therefore analyse if the relationships between the NGOs-donors-state can explain 





Chapter 8. Mediated Relationships: NGOs, States and Donors  
This chapter examines whether specificities of the NGOs response in Rwanda and 
BiH can be understood by the aid structure in each context, resulting in the NGOs 
undertaking a role of mediating their beneficiaries’ needs and the donors’ priorities.  
I argue that the programmes implemented by the NGOs I observed are partly 
determined by their relationships with local and international donors, and by the state 
in which they operate. In Rwanda, the state has a stronger control over the type of 
programmes implemented in comparison to donors (Kagamé refusing American aid 
is one example of such control), while in BiH it can be argued that the international 
community has on occasions a stronger decision-making power over the programmes 
implemented in comparison to the post-conflict state. The NGOs response therefore 
differs, with actors prioritizing capacity-building and civil society development in 
BiH, as opposed to individual and community empowerment and reconciliation in 
Rwanda. Consequentially, in BiH, NGOs mostly target the legitimization and 
institutionalization of the women’s voices, which does not necessarily entail their 
increased agency or empowerment. In Rwanda, the focus is mostly on 
empowerment, both personal and economic, but, again, this does not result in 
increased voice or agency for the women I met (Batliwala, 2007: 563; World Bank, 
2014: 7). Indeed, the experiences of the women suggest how their social 
reintegration cannot be fully achieved solely with the support of the NGOs. Instead, 
changing gender norms should create transformative changes in the way the 
women’s bodies continue to embody the nation in the post-conflict state (Hamilton, 
K., 2000: 53). In this chapter, I therefore nuance the argument that both the agency 
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and autonomy of NGOs are seriously constrained by their relationships with states 
and donors (Bennett, 1994: xiii; Tarry, 2000: 109) by suggesting that NGOs actively 
mediate the experiences of survivors of sexual violence with the strategic interests of 
both donors and states. These mediated experiences are therefore not directly the 
experiences of the women, but experiences that NGOs reconstruct in order to secure 
funding and assistance from international donors and the state in which they operate. 
It is worth noting that throughout this chapter, interviewees use ‘International 
Community’ to refer to one set of actors. This is extremely problematic, but reveals a 
common understanding of international actors sharing the same vision and priorities 
in terms of international aid, in practice acting as one body. Interestingly, whilst the 
‘International Community’ refers to the same agents within each country, it actually 
refers to a group of different actors. For example, a lot of projects in BiH are 
currently funded by the European Union, and the financial reviews of the 
organisations observed suggest financial sponsorship by specific European states. 
Therefore, the ‘International Community’ refers mostly in this case to European and 
Western donors, which still does not mean that they share the same vision and 
priorities. However, in the Rwandan context, political tensions between the Kagamé 
regime and Western countries have seen Western aid considerably reduced over the 
past few years (which will be discussed in more depth below), and instead, during 
my stay in Rwanda in 2013, China had replaced Western donors and was financing 
most construction projects in the country, building new roads and infrastructure (The 
East African, 29 December 2012). However, while China was perceived as an 
important donor to economically boost the country, the NGOs I observed still mostly 
turned towards Western countries for financial support.  
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NGO and Donor Relations 
The aid sector is globally characterized by mutual dependency between NGOs 
and the national/international donors (Hayman, 2006: 16-19; Whitfield, 2009: 1). 
The situation is not different in BiH and Rwanda, but considering that BiH was 
under international supervision for many years, this raises the question of how this 
mutual dependency has shaped the aid sector in BiH in contrast to Rwanda.  
The data I collected suggest that regardless of international supervision, the aid 
sector in each context is characterized by similar dependency on the financial support 
of international, local and state donors, where donors can choose where the money 
should be directed. Each of the NGO staff members I interviewed voiced the struggle 
they faced, and still face, in receiving grants for their work.  
If you look at the donor mapping, from 1997 up to 2011, their funding 
actually is only 3%, which is cross-cutting, which is divided into four 
sections: women, returnees, youth, and integration. So we are sharing the 
3%, which is divided into four sectors. How can the organisations access 
those funds in general in Bosnia-Herzegovina? (Lucy, Organisation F, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 13 November 2013) 
Furthermore, according to Tarik (14 November 2013), calls for proposals 
launched by national and international donors, including those by private 
organisations, sometimes receive 100 to 200 applications each, which means that his 
organisation might have designed an important project proposal but access to 
funding is so competitive that it will still not receive funding. Sometimes they do not 
even know why they were rejected, and failure to secure funding for important work 
can be interpreted as a lack of support for the target population. ‘When you take in 
consideration all those years, it is logical to feel abandoned. I will get back to the 
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point again where those people (beneficiaries) feel like they do not exist and of 
course they are disappointed’ (Tarik, 14 November 2013).  
This inevitably impacts the scope of the programmes offered. For example, 
Organisations A and B in Rwanda had to reduce their targets in order to ensure the 
financial assistance to children born out of rape for attending schools would be 
sustained over the years, regardless of the donors’ decisions to keep or remove 
funding. 
Currently, does the funding vary? Do you have a year where you can help 
a certain number of children and then the year after you have fewer 
donors and you have to cut back on some programmes? Fortunately, that 
has not happened. We have been consistent and initially, we started with 
150 children. We had little funding, so when the funding came on, we 
scaled up to 500. More funding came up we scaled up to 800. Our target 
was 1,500, but when we reached 800, we said: "ah, we need to be careful of 
the future". So we held it there and what the foundation is doing is to build 
reserve, to ensure that those who we are committed to now will be able to 
be supported through their education. So currently we are not taking on any 
new students until we have reserved enough money to see them through 
(Janvier, 23 May 2013). 
This quote demonstrates well the strategic decisions taken by organisations, which 
are always aware of the possibility of losing their core funding in the near future. 
This threat was constantly on the minds of the staff members, who, even when 
funding is allocated, need to plan ahead for the time when the funding will be 
withdrawn. The chronic threat of financial cuts necessarily influences the NGOs’ 
decision-making processes when deciding which programmes to implement or not. 
Indeed, some NGOs may be more willing to implement short-term projects with 
measurable goals, since it might allow them to fully implement their project, instead 
of risking starting a project that they will be unable to see to term. 
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This need for financial support also means the organisations I visited in both 
countries have to make strategic decisions to attract donors. These may vary 
depending on the nature of the donor itself (whether a government body, individual 
donor or international organisation). I however noticed that underlying all these 
various strategies is the attempt to provide the human stories behind their 
programmes, hoping for individual donors to personally connect with their 
beneficiaries. For instance, it was explained above how Organisation C in Rwanda 
implemented a sponsorship programme for students. This programme is, however, 
completely dependent on international and local donors. 
We started with very few students, like five or six, then because many 
people were interested to help those orphans, we have gained more 
sponsors through mini organisations around the world, from Germany, 
from the US, from the UK and other individuals who were willing to 
support those orphans. (…) So what I do, we have many orphans who come 
to us, orphans we fund. (…) I make profiles of these orphans, take pictures, 
put all the information that the person who would be willing to support 
might need, and I send them to organisations. So the organisations search 
for sponsors and we communicate with each other in that way (Vestine, 4 
June 2013). 
By creating the profiles of these children, Vestine attempts to humanize these stories, 
but more importantly, she is working towards deconstructing the stereotypes and 
social constructions associated with the label ‘orphans’, to show the individuality of 
each child. This same process was witnessed with survivors of sexual violence, 
where in order to convince donors to support specific programmes for them, NGOs 
attempt to challenge reductionists’ understandings of war survivors as unworthy of 
help, by reconstructing their moral value.  
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Of course, when this process of re-humanization is achieved, the personal 
relationship that individual sponsors develop with the person they are financially 
supporting provides them with the right to influence where this money will be used. 
We always present our needs to the [sponsors]. And if the sponsor says: "I 
would like to sponsor a child for secondary school or university", you have 
to use that money according to the need of this sponsor. If you want to 
change, you must tell him before. For example, if you are supporting an 
orphan in university and the person stops suddenly to study, you cannot use 
that money for another person who needs studying before we have phoned 
the sponsor. The sponsor always had the last word about how this money 
will be used (Vestine, 4 June 2013). 
Accountability is therefore not only required for institutional donors, but also for 
individual donors who may in some occasions have the power to influence how the 
money is spent. 
Organisation D in Rwanda also depends on individual donations for some of its 
programmes, such as counselling services. For example, in 2012, Organisation D 
received 2,700,000 RWF from personal donors, funding 48 counselling sessions 
benefiting 1,440 individuals. These personal donations come from around the world, 
with funds collected in Rwanda, the United States, and Switzerland, among others. 
Their dependency on international individual donations also means that some groups 
are sometimes invited to visit the organisation. On one occasion (31 May 2013), we 
were sitting outside with survivors of rape (around 30 women), and a few women 
from the United States - members of the same church - were invited to sit with us to 
hear the survivors’ testimonies. The encounter led to some Rwandan women sharing 
their stories of suffering during the genocide, and some American women sharing 
their own personal stories of suffering, such as domestic violence. Some American 
women were taking pictures of the Rwandan women when they were sharing their 
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stories, even if they were crying or showing some distress. This made me extremely 
uncomfortable, since a certain devalorization of the Rwandan women was clearly 
happening, whereby while the foreign women wanted to show their sentiment of 
solidarity, some of them still - perhaps unintentionally – transgressed the dignity of 
the Rwandan women, and their right not to have their moments of vulnerability taken 
advantage of. It made me realise that some individuals might feel more compelled to 
act by stories of suffering than by stories of empowerment, but also that vulnerable 
groups may not always be perceived as entitled to the same respect and dignity as 
others. Of course, this involved only some specific individuals, but it made me 
wonder if the progress made by Rwanda is actually a cause of its problems, where 
despite the blatant need for support for survivors of the genocide, the lack of visible 
intense suffering has turned the donors’ attention away.  
Moreover, despite the money received through individual donations, Organisation 
D is also funded by the national government and women’s organisations established 
in Rwanda, such as ‘Pro-Femmes’. 
Pro-Femmes is helping us to support the women who work or have started 
a business, small businesses. I see Pro-Femmes as the representative of the 
government. So Pro-Femmes is actually the middleman between the 
government and the civil society? Yes, yes the middleman. And Pro-
Femmes let you determine in which project to invest this money? Yes, 
absolutely. We just need to make a report (Françoise, Organisation D, 24 
June 2013). 
Pro-Femmes currently financially supports some women in starting their own 
business. In Organisation D, one group of approximately ten women is supported per 
year, receiving around 1,000,000 RWF (around £1,000). This means that many 
women are ready and willing to start their own income-generating activity, but the 
organisation does not necessarily have the means to support them (Observation, 10 
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June 2013). This is not something unique to Organisation D, and even if the 
organisations are able to attract individual sponsors, they all still strongly depend on 
grants by international and local organisations. 
The contrast between the two contexts is instead found in the types of 
programmes funded by donors. Donors do indeed have a strong influence on the 
types of services offered to survivors of sexual violence in Rwanda and BiH. 
So sometimes I guess if we find a donor wanting to fund specific activities, 
then we might explore with the country office whether those are [possible] 
and if they are, they might go for that. We wouldn't do something 
completely different, but even if it was within our three priorities but not 
the number one priority, but they [the country office] still want to do it and 
this donor is willing to fund it, then we would go for it (Policy & 
Programmes Grants Coordinator, Organisation L, 20 May 2015). 
Some organisations even deliberately transform their programmes and services to 
align with the donors’ interests in order to secure funding. 
But some of the NGOs they are changing their focus, like for example they 
are the ones who adjust themselves with the donor in order to get funds. 
That's very typical in Bosnia. But not for us because we want to focus on 
[women’s issues]. (…) That's the problem, but we never, in my own 
opinion, we don't want to be identified like: “because the institutions or the 
international organisations want this, we will do it”. No (Lucy, 
Organisation F, 13 November 2013). 
This idea is especially interesting, since it suggests that whilst Organisation F is not 
changing its focus, other organisations in BiH do so for the purpose of attracting 
donors. This is consistent with research conducted by other scholars, such as Elissa 
Helms, who suggested that most NGOs, in the first few years after the Bosnian war, 
changed their focus in order to conform to the shifting priorities of donors (2013: 
91). This could be extremely problematic since, as Chapters Six and Seven 
demonstrate, organisations operating on the ground are often those with the expertise 
and knowledge to assess the needs of the population, in contrast to international 
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donors. Aligning the NGOs’ responses to the issues currently mainstreamed by the 
relevant donors - such as the Department of Foreign and International Development, 
UK (DFID), USAID, and UN Women - thus places the NGOs in a complex situation 
where they need to reconstruct the needs of their beneficiaries in order to align with 
their donors’ priorities.  
Moreover, when looking at the financial review of Organisation F, it was able to 
secure the largest number of grants in 2013, out of the organisations I observed. As 
the following table demonstrates, this funding comes from Bosnian state institutions, 
UN Women and international organisations. 




UN Women- Belgrade Centre for Security 
SNV (Netherlands Organisation) 
DCAF-Atlantic Initiative 
World Vision International 
Foundation Open Society Institution 
Marta Drury 
Centar Kanton Sarajevo 
Global Fund for Women 
Source: Organisation F. (2014). ‘Annual Report 2013’, pp. 35.  
If Lucy is right in suggesting her organisation did not change its focus to attract 
donors, it could perhaps suggest their work is already of interest to this variety of 
donors, work that is now focused on building women’s rights and civil society.  
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This issue of emergency relief was also mentioned by a majority of staff members 
in both contexts. According to them, both institutional and individual funding tends 
to focus on emergency situations, as well as cases spoken about in the media and 
through popular discourse. ‘Naturally things that are in the news are what people will 
ask about. So that probably gets more interest’ (Policy & Programmes Grants 
Coordinator, Organisation L, 20 May 2015). Rwanda and BiH are both perceived as 
post-conflict states that have moved, to a certain extent, away from the trauma of 
their ethnic violence. ‘BiH is not so much in the news, it is viewed as being on the 
edge of Europe so more developed, and I think for some it is maybe not seen as high 
a priority as some others’ (Policy & Programmes Grants Coordinator, Organisation 
L, 20 May 2015). The same was also said about Rwanda: 
There aren’t many who give money anymore. Do you know why? Actually, 
we were surprised because there was a group of women that was helping 
the children born out of rape. But about 3-5 years ago, they stopped. We 
did not understand because when you start something, especially for the 
children’s education, you don’t stop right in the middle of it. It surprised us, 
and the money was not sent to us, it was sent directly to the school. So we 
did not understand. When we asked them why, they said that it is because 
of the economic crisis. And the economic crisis is everywhere. And others 
told us that Rwanda is a country that is developing itself, it isn’t a country 
at war. So they go to the Congo instead. Translator: There is no 
emergency. Yes, there is no emergency. It’s a shame. (Françoise, 24 June 
2013). 
A few programmes are therefore associated with development aid (economic 
empowerment), and some with emergency relief (counselling, medical services). 
This means that some donors might expect some needs to be already addressed 
within so many years after the end of a conflict as an attempt to move towards 
development aid. 
There is a challenge with fundraising. Especially now that it is 19 years 
after the genocide. Many people ask: "why after 19 years kids are still 
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going to secondary school?", for example. And we have a big number of 19 
years, 18 years old who are going senior 4, senior 5. Someone will say that 
that person should be finishing the second maybe the first year of 
university. (…) And you know, it's a challenge then to convince the donors 
that this issue needs to be addressed (Janvier, Organisations A&B, 23 May 
2013).  
The previous quote illustrates the pre-conceptions that some international donors 
may have of the post-war context, showing a certain distinction between the relief 
that is associated with emergency response, and the one associated with long-term 
development. Another example of this was noted by staff members of Organisation 
D, who mentioned that counselling services were first funded by a Dutch NGO, but 
the NGO stopped its funding in 2000, arguing the emergency situation had ended and 
the country’s focus was now on economic development (Observation, Organisation 
D, 10 June 2013). 
The same process occurred in BiH, where the economic and political development 
of the country (i.e. relief associated with long-term development) is often mentioned 
as being part of the donors’ priorities. 
The key thing is all about economic development, and within that there is 
some specific support to some marginalised groups so we can put 
vulnerable women in there. I'm not aware of focused funding for women in 
BiH. (…) The other thing I should say is that there might be some donors 
that are more interested in the political side, in encouraging democracy and 
good democratic behaviours and patterns with people, so I suppose there is 
that civil society aspect as well (Policy & Programmes Grants Coordinator, 
Organisation L, 20 May 2015). 
The focus on political and economic reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina has certainly 
meant that funding moved from emergency relief (including support for women) to 
political and economical development, especially now that the country is attempting 
to join the European Union. 
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After the war [up to] five years actually, there was a lot of funding for 
women's issues. You know when it comes to psychosocial support, 
education, etc. But after that, definitely the funds are moving to other 
sectors. Right now we don't have enough [funding] because no one or not 
many donors are giving funding for women's issues (Lucy, Organisation F, 
13 November 2013). 
Furthermore, according to my interviewees, the need to measure the outcome of 
these programmes is also driving the aid available to organisations.  
The [donors] need something that can be measured, outcomes that are 
measurable. Counselling sometimes is not easy (laugh) to... (…) I am sorry 
to say this but people, most people don't get the value of what counselling 
can add to one's life, because this is not something tangible, you cannot 
measure it by tangible indicators. So many people have been asking: "how 
do you measure that counselling has improved this person's life?". Because 
you know, it's not like IGA: I earn 50,000RWF per month, I was earning 
20,000RWF. So that's the challenge, to convince the donors that this will 
make a difference in the women's lives. And yet, it is a very important 
aspect of building the lives of the women (Janvier, Organisations A&B, 23 
May 2013). 
When looking at the list of donors for Organisation B in 2013-2014, all of them 
were international donors (Big Lottery Fund, Inspire!Africa, The Alan and Babette 
Sainsbury Charitable Trust, L.I.F.E. for Health), and their biggest financial sponsor 
was DFID. Using the example of DFID, since it is a good example of an 
international donor affiliated with an international government and is the major 
donor for UK NGOs (Wallace, 2003: 205-6), it becomes interesting to analyse the 
programmes DFID prioritizes. An interview with DFID was denied, but it was 
mentioned by email that ‘in terms of criteria for funding different organisations, this 
varies depending on the purpose of the intervention, although DFID always places a 
high priority on delivery of results and value for money’ (email, 30 January 2014). 
This is consistent with Janvier’s perception that programmes with measurable 
outcome are more attractive to some donors than other long-term programmes such 
as trauma healing (Hudock, 2000: 18).  
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DFID’s total aid per country demonstrates a geographical focus on parts of Asia 
and Africa, and both BiH and Rwanda are included in their 2015/2016 budget. 
Figure 4: DFID Total Project Budget for 2015/2016 by Country. 
 
Source: Data extracted from DFID, ‘Aid by Location’. 
http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/location/country, 1 November 2015.  
Almost half of the budget is geared towards projects in Africa. It is however worth 
mentioning that these numbers may vary, since only a few months ago Europe was 
granted only £80,000 for the 2015/2016, but this number now reaches £10.2 millions, 






Figure 5: DFID Total Regional Budget for 2015/2016, in Millions of Pounds 
Sterling. 
 
Source: Data extracted from DFID, ‘Aid by Location’. 
http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/location/regional/.  
DFID implemented 19 projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2004 to 2016, and its 
annual budget for 2015/2016 is £999,000. It is the country with the smallest annual 
budget, representing 0.01% of the total DFID budget (DFID, 
http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/BA/, 1 November 2015). In Rwanda, 72 
projects were or will be implemented between 2002 and 2021, for a total of 
£65,818,456, representing 0.78% of the total DFID budget (DFID, 
http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/RW/, 1 November 2015). It hosts a similar 































but its 2015/2016 annual budget is considerably smaller than for these countries. 
Whilst both countries face an important post-conflict reconstruction process, the 
political, economic, and social contexts of each country still affect the aid available.  
As discussed with Lucy (13 November 2013), Bosnia-Herzegovina is not 
considered a developing state, so the needs of the population are different than those 
of developing countries, and the financial support offered aligns with the needs of a 
mid-developed country. When analysing the 19 programmes implemented, a certain 
focus towards processes of state-building, such as strengthening state and financial 
institutions, can be found, which may perhaps be a result of the international rule in 
BiH that focused on transforming multi-ethnic politics in the aftermath of the war. 
The following chart presents the programmes funded at approximately £1million or 
higher, as well as any programme directed towards reconciliation or gender rights. 
Table 6: Projects implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina by DFID, 2004-2016 






Project in BiH 
(SEPARB) 
To have a comprehensive 
medium term budget 
planning process linked to 
government priorities at 
canton, entity and state 
level, scrutinised and 
reported on by the 
parliament and civil society. 
2,999,237 Post-Completion 
SEPARB To assist the central and 
entity governments of BiH 
to establish and develop 
functioning, stable, 
professional administrations 
through the design and 
implementation of 
appropriate institutional 
strengthening strategies, the 
capacity building of civil 
2,578,144 Post-Completion 
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servants, and focused civil 






capacity for management of 
public administration reform 
across state and entity 
governments. 
2,100,000 Post-Completion 
Support to Flood 
Recovery in Serbia 
and BiH 
The establishment of flood 
defence measures in Serbia 
and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the 
restoration of public 





Project in Bosnia 
The creation and adoption 
of a functional aid 
coordination architecture, to 
facilitate development and 
improvement of process of 
planning, programming and 
management of external 






mechanism developed to 
strengthen DEP and relevant 
government stakeholders to 
devise effective strategic 
policy and financial 
planning at all levels of 
government. 
918,358 Post-Completion 
(12 programmes…)    
Gender 
Mainstreaming** 
To improve understanding 
around theoretical and 




Source: Data Retrieved from DFID, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 
http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/BA/projects/ 
*Only project that is currently implemented in BiH by DFID. All other projects are in the 
post-completion phase. 
** Last programme on the list. 
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The table illustrates this focus on political and economic programmes, as 
suggested by a few staff members, with all the largest programmes targeting 
capacity-building of state institutions. The important gap between capacity-building 
and gender mainstreaming is apparent in this table, with a mere £4,028 invested in 
this project from 2008 to 2010. It was the least-funded project in the country, 
preceded by Support for Organisation of Swap Workshop at £34,888. This focus 
towards strengthening state institutions can perhaps be explained by Soeren Keil’s 
argument that the need for a stronger state is perceived by international actors as a 
way to overcome ethnic politics (ASN Convention, 23 April 2015). This rationale 
was behind the Dayton Accords, where US elites shared ‘a domestically informed 
view that “liberal legalist” frameworks would not only make multiethnicity possible 
but that the creation of multiethnicity itself was a valuable aspiration’ (Kennedy and 
Riga, 2013: 164). In this case, it is hoped that through strengthening the Bosnian 
state, the relationship between the three main constituent ethnic groups will be 
resolved.  
It can therefore be suggested that this understanding of conflict resolution 
necessarily impacts the grants available for BiH, which prioritize capacity-building 
and strengthening civil society as part of a broader process of democratic 
consolidation and state-building. In practice, this privileges state policies that reform 
state institutions and civil society, and provides another explanation why the 
organisations I observed mostly prioritized state lobbying and legal recognition for 
their beneficiaries as a means of securing a location in civil society for them (as 
explained in Chapter Seven). In this case, the local and international aid received is 
focused towards increasing and legitimizing the voices of these women, but, as we 
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saw in Chapter Seven, this does not necessarily lead to increased agency or 
empowerment. To achieve increased agency and empowerment, both the state and 
the population should share the belief that behind the increasing voices of the 
survivors of sexual violence are valued human beings who suffered, and still suffer 
from a moral transgression of their rights.  
In Rwanda, not only are the number of projects implemented greater than in BiH, 
but the actual funds granted are also immensely higher. The programmes 
implemented cover different areas, such as poverty reduction, health, education, 
economic and financial planning, as well as conflict resolution and gender rights. 
More projects are currently being implemented, and these also include programmes 
of gender rights and genocide reconciliation, as the table below illustrates. It is worth 
noting that only the programmes receiving the most funds are included in this table, 
followed by the best-funded gender rights and genocide reconciliation programmes 
on the list. 
Table 7: Projects Implemented in Rwanda by DFID, 2002-2021 
Title of Project Description Amount (£) Status 
General Budget 
Support to Rwanda-
Second Three Year 
Phase 
To improve the 
effectiveness of the 
government budget in 
achieving the economic, 
social and governance 
targets of the Economic 





Equitable access to quality 
education that provides 
opportunities of livelihoods 




To sustainably increase the 





poor farmers by 
transforming Rwandan 
agriculture from a 
subsistence-based to a more 
commercial-based sector 
that accelerates agricultural 
growth. This will help 
address challenges that may 
limit agriculture 
productivity, reduce the rate 
at which poverty is falling, 
increase inequality and 
hamper improvements in 
food security and 
malnutrition. The 
programme will result in 
increased agricultural 
productivity, food security 
and incomes of poor 
households and contributes 
towards the MDG’s by 
helping to eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger and 
promoting gender equality 




Accelerated reduction of 
extreme poverty in targeted 




Support to the 
Poorest in Rwanda 
To increase the coverage of 
social protection and to 
strengthen social protection 
systems for the poorest by 
providing financial aid to the 
Rwanda Local Development 
Support Fund (RLDSF) and 
technical assistance to 
RLDSF and the Ministry of 
Local Government. This will 
benefit an additional 55,000 
poor households 
(approximately 217,680 
individuals) each year with 
social cash transfers, helping 
them to meet their basic 
needs and to better manage 
risks. This contributes 
33,141,532 Implementation 
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towards our MDGs, and will 
contribute to reduced 
poverty, vulnerability and 
hunger in Rwanda. 






To strengthen violence 
prevention mechanisms for 
women, girls and boys in 
Rwanda by scaling up 
promising practices in 
violence prevention. This 
will contribute to tackling 
the social norms which lie 
behind violence against 
women and children. This 
contributes towards our 
MDGs by promoting gender 
equality and the 
empowerment of women, 
contributing to a reduction 
in violence against women, 
girls and boys. 
4,600,000 Implementation 
(2 programmes…)    
United 
Kingdom/Rwanda 





To offer community based 
care including anti-retroviral 
treatment (ART) and 
comprehensive services to 
2500 HIV + women 
genocide survivors and their 
families. 
4,249,447 Post-Completion 
(8 programmes…)    





To increase the use of 
research and evidence to 
inform reconciliation and 
social cohesion processes in 
Rwanda by 2016, by 
supporting Aegis Trust to 
develop an accessible 
archive, to strengthen 
research on the Rwandan 
Genocide and to develop 
and roll-out a peacebuilding 
education programme to 




Source: Data Retrieved from DFID, ‘Rwanda’. 
http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/RW/projects/ 
When looking at this table, there are sharp contrasts between those programmes 
funded in BiH and those in Rwanda. First, there are no programmes in BiH that 
target reconciliation between the three main constituent groups, unlike with Rwanda, 
where the aid available actually aligns with the policies of nation-building and 
reconciliation.  
I guess it's [the programmes] partly grant-dependent, so different grants or 
awards will target some areas, so you can get grants like DFID. The British 
Government Fund for International Development is really pro income-
generating activities... So I guess it comes two-ways: our beneficiaries sort 
of identified needs and our partners identified needs, and then we have to 
find grants that match that. (…) DFID is backed by the UK government, so 
they have certain criteria that they want projects [to include] and not others 
(Laura, Organisation A&B, Rwanda, 23 May 2013). 
Moreover, the funds available for gender rights and genocide reconciliation, whilst 
small in contrast to the highest-funded programmes in Rwanda, are still considerable 
compared to the £4,000 for gender mainstreaming in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Second, the Rwandan programmes all prioritize community empowerment - more 
specifically poverty reduction - instead of state-building, and the amounts reserved 
for community empowerment are considerable. This perhaps explains why all the 
organisations I observed provided holistic support to the women who suffered from 
sexual violence, focusing on their personal well-being and empowerment. Indeed, 
the donors’ alignment with the government’s campaign for poverty reduction 
(Hayman, 2009) means that even women who suffered from sexual violence during 
the genocide mostly receive programmes that prioritize their economic 
empowerment. Chapter Six however demonstrated that unfortunately, economic 
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empowerment has not yet lead to increased voice and agency due to the continued 
stigmatisation of rape survivors and its resulting moral exclusion.  
In both contexts, the lack of transformative changes in the revalorisation of the 
survivors of sexual violence can be partly explained by the changing donors’ 
interests throughout the years following the conflict. This shift in priorities is 
contextual and is mostly removed from the bottom-up approach that was mentioned 
by many staff members in my interviews. For instance, when asked specifically 
which issues are now prioritized by international donors in BiH, Lucy (Organisation 
F, 13 November 2013) answered:  
Actually, after the war, you know there was a lot of funding going to 
providing psycho-social support, providing capacity-building with those 
institutions, social workers, psychologists, like what we were doing during 
that period, and it's pretty much a lot of different networks with supporting 
domestic violence, supporting trafficking, those areas for the last five years. 
And then after that it came again with this issue about social inclusion, 
developing the gender action plan, or national action plan of Bosnia. (…) 
And then recently the 1325 [UN Resolution 1325] in support of the 
women's participation in peace and reconciliation, because they don't have 
a voice in terms of decision-making when it comes to participation in the 
policy-making. So it's changing once in a while according to what’s on the 
ground, what the international community [wants] as well.  
According to this quote, what is constantly missing from the international priorities 
is the social reintegration of these women. During my interview with a staff member 
at the UN Trust Fund, it was mentioned that social reintegration programmes are 
under-funded within the issue of sexual violence in armed conflicts. This was partly 
explained by the length of the programmes for social reintegration. 
It's a long process, the reintegration process has been running for almost ten 
years now, and they are equally important to provide for such extent. 
Reintegration is not a two to three years program, it's really something 
much longer both for the ex-combatants as well as for the survivors. So I 
think that’s also something that has to be calculated when we do 
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programming, that is not that fast as especially if you are doing medical 
reparation or something like that, or even livelihood, but to really work 
with community-based interaction and really look at stigma and the 
reconstruction of the social fabric, it takes a lot of time (staff member, UN 
Trust Fund, 23 April 2014).  
However, later on in the interview, she also mentioned that programmes of social 
reintegration in conflict zones often privilege the reintegration of ex-combatants, 
instead of civilian victims of war. 
I think especially in conflict settings, this might be just my personal 
opinion, often it tends to be that when the conflict ends, the most direct 
things to happen are the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 
the ex-combatants. That is something that the international community 
often provides a lot of funds for, and the victims or survivors of the conflict 
and GBV are kind of asked to wait basically. And sometimes in the best 
case scenarios after a while more attention are given to them. There is so 
much more than these few ex-combatants that caused all this harm and I 
think that creates also a lot of tensions in this society when you see that 
often the perpetrators are given support for reintegration before actually the 
women or the survivors, or the conflict-affected communities. I can 
understand that they feel neglected and the interests of the donors are not as 
great after 20 years of when the peace was negotiated (staff member, UN 
Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). 
These quotes reinforce the argument that donors may rely on short-term, measurable 
goals, which are not compatible with trauma healing, social reintegration and overall 
increased agency. More importantly for this research, I however argue from these 
quotes that whilst the reconstruction of the social fabric of both the ex-combatants 
and the survivors of sexual violence require long-term involvement, reintegration of 
ex-combatants takes precedence. Of course, some individuals may suggest that it is 
imperative that individuals involved in the violence are demobilized, but is 
underneath the focus on ex-combatants a tacit understanding that women’s 
reintegration is not as strongly in the interests of international donors as 
demobilization? The invisibility of the moral exclusion of the survivors of sexual 
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violence is then again reproduced in the donors’ priorities of post-conflict 
reconstruction.  
This is detrimental for the women, since the donors also have the power to 
influence national policies (Whitfield, 2009: 2). According to the 2005 Paris 
Declaration, which makes official state ownership over the aid received, donors need 
to align and harmonise their priorities with the receiving state’s policies (Paris 
Declaration, 2005: 3-8).6 However, in practice, this sphere of influence is reciprocal 
between states and donors. For example, the Dayton Accords were imposed by the 
US and EU as an attempt to implement a peace settlement, one that institutionalised 
multi-ethnicity. It is therefore not surprising that Western donors do not target 
programmes for ethnic reconciliation. Since BiH is currently attempting to join the 
European Union, it may provide European donors with a certain power to influence 
instead local governance policies. Moreover, Western aid has considerably decreased 
in Rwanda as a result of the tensions and disagreements between Western political 
leaders and Kagamé’s regime. In this sense, humanitarian aid is also used to 
politically influence the recipient governments to adopt policies that align with the 
donor-states priorities (Whitfield, 2009: 1). This further complicates the mediation 
role of the NGOs I observed, that then not only need to align with the donors’ 
priorities and the state’s ideology (as will be argued in the next section), but may also 
find themselves in the crossfire when a donor’s priorities and the state ideology do 
not align. 
                                                
6 Both Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina have adhered to this declaration. 
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However, since DFID is not an international donor focused on gender-related 
issues, the UN Trust Fund and UN Women are instead good examples of important 
international donors that provide funding specifically for programmes related to 
women’s rights. The UN Trust Fund is an intra-agency fund (including UN Women, 
UNFPA, UNICEF, etc.) that funds programmes related to issues of gender and 
gender-based violence. In 2014, they oversaw 78 programmes worldwide (staff 
member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). On their website, it notes that:  
The UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women, an inter-agency 
mechanism managed by UN Women on behalf of the UN system, supports 
innovative and pioneering programmes aimed at preventing and responding 
to all forms of violence against women and girls. Since 1996, the UN Trust 
Fund has awarded US$95 million in grants to 368 initiatives in 135 
countries (UN Women, https://grants.unwomen.org/). 
When analysing the following map of the grants awarded globally by the UN Trust 
Fund since 1996, there is a certain regional dispersion where, even if some countries 
received more grants (India and Peru are the two countries with the highest number 
of grants allocated with 17 and 16), no clear priority zone can be seen, unlike with 








Figure 6: Grants Awarded Globally by the UN Trust Fund since 1996. 
 
 
Source: Data retrieved from UN Women, ‘Grants Management System’. 
https://grants.unwomen.org/.  
When looking at BiH and Rwanda, BiH was awarded five grants (totalling 
US$1,578,981) and Rwanda eight grants (totalling US$3,121,392) over that period.  
However, all UN institutions depend financially on the amount of money UN 
member states are ready to allocate them. For example, in 2014, UN Women 
received US$14,833,741 allocated to the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against 
Women, and US$1,922,731 allocated to the UN Trust Fund for Gender Equality (UN 
Women, 2015). In comparison, UNICEF received US$5.169 billion in 2014 
(UNICEF, 2015), and the UNDP received US$793 million in core funding and 
US$3.8 billion for specific projects and countries (UNDP, 2015: 41). 
You know this may sound like a lot, but in the end when it comes to 
programming, you may be talking about hundreds of thousands of dollars 
only. Which for a problem of this magnitude, it doesn't come to... almost 
anything. And that is sometimes the problem with trying to find out what 
the international community is doing. Because of, in the Security Council 
or in the general assembly, you hear all of these things but sometimes the 
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programming on the ground is peanuts, it's very, very small (staff member, 
UN Women, 23 April 2014). 
This probably explains why organisations that are successfully funded by UN 
Women still need to rely on other sources of financial support to cover their 
programmes, since even the funding provided by this UN agency is insufficient to 
cover all expenses of one organisation, as demonstrated in the table below. 
Table 8: List of Donors for Organisation J, BiH, 2013-2014 
Donors 2013-2014 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office UK 
Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sarajevo 
Embassy of the United States in BiH 
TIDES Foundation- US 
Christlicher Friedensdienst cfd, Switzerland 
Ministry of Security, BiH 
Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, BiH 
Organisation J’s canton 
Organisation J’s municipality 
Narko-NE 
King Boudouin Foundation and GIZ 
Women’s World Day of Prayer, Germany 
Louis Leitz Stiftung, Germany 
Organisation J’s international branch 
UN Women- Project Office in BiH 
Foundation Open Society Institute 
Source: Organisation J. (2014). ‘Annual Report 2013/14’, pp 1-32.  
With the money received from the UN member states, UN Women and the UN 
Trust Fund send annual calls for funding proposals for projects lasting two to three 
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years, with funding requests ranging between US$50,000 and one million dollars. 
NGOs, UN country offices and local governments are all eligible to apply (staff 
member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). The call for proposals can either be quite 
general or thematic if funding for a particular issue is available. For example, two 
years ago the UN Trust Fund established: 
A special funding window on addressing violence against women and girls 
in conflict, post-conflict and transitional settings, and there we funded four 
programmes working in eleven countries for around 3.5 million dollars. 
(…) Currently some of our programmes are very transitional justice 
focused, and focus of course on accountability but also focus on reparation 
and reconciliation, etc. (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). 
According to the staff members interviewed, UN Women and the UN Trust Fund 
do not have certain issues that are prioritized through funding, except in the cases of 
special funding windows. Otherwise, the funds granted depend on the quality of the 
proposals. As explained, ‘this is a program of such magnitude, you know violence 
against women in general, and we are a small funding in that sense, so we have very 
rigorous criteria’ (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). When asked to 
provide more details about the funding process, it became evident that the UN Trust 
Fund operates independently from thematic or geographical priorities. 
We have a very rigorous process where we actually involve all these 18 
different UN agencies in the review, technical review of these proposals 
and based on the scoring, so based on the strength of the proposal, we then 
provide funding. So this is done first on the sub-regional level, where 
people have this regional or national knowledge, and then that's sent up. 
The shortlist of applications is then sent to HQ, where we have a committee 
of all these different UN agencies that sit together. So if you have a 
program focusing on children then maybe UNICEF are the ones to review 
[it] because they have that expertise, or if it is about HIV and violence 
against women then UNAIDS for example will take part of that. So we try 
to of course have a regional balance in the places where we work, but really 
it is based on the strength of the proposal. So sometimes we wish to fund, 
we can see that the needs are very large and especially in that area, so you 
wish you can get a very strong proposal from there but we cannot, we really 
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have to work with what we get and fund the best programmes (staff 
member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). 
The previous quote provides a clear insight into the funding process, but also 
illustrates a complex situation in which the target population or countries with 
important needs are not necessarily funded by UN Women, which can be detrimental 
for the beneficiaries themselves. By operating this way, the beneficiaries are 
dependent on the NGOs’ ability to draft successful grant proposals, effectively 
putting the NGOs in a mediating role between UN Women and the beneficiaries. 
This could be problematic for some grassroots organisations that might not have the 
expertise or knowledge of drafting high-quality grant proposals. This is why 
Organisation K provided grant-writing workshops to their local partners in Rwanda, 
Burundi and the DRC, in order to increase their opportunities and skills as mediators 
(17 July 2014).  
Of the around 2,500 proposals received every year, only 1% are successful. In 
terms of budget, in 2013 the US$8 million trust received proposals for a total of 
US$1.1 billion (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). The difficulty in 
securing funding from UN Women is witnessed anywhere in the world, but it was 
mentioned that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda received greater support on this 
issue than other countries. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda in particular [receive] much more 
[support] than any other countries. Even with the huge gaps that you 
observed and that they neglected, both Rwanda and BiH are cases of 
sustained support from the international community, even on this issue for a 
long period of time. Both support to survivors as well as impunity issues, 
not [any] other countries has had that kind of response with an international 
court, plus the national court following up, with the number of convictions 
that there has been, etc. (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014). 
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The explanations for this are unclear, since according to both staff members, the UN 
Trust Fund does not prioritize specific countries. Regardless, Rwanda and BiH have 
still received greater support from the international community than other countries 
for issues of sexual violence. The focus however differs in each country. 
In Rwanda we definitely worked with survivors of sexual violence in the 
past, although I know that in recent years our UN Women office is much 
more focused on gender response, budgeting of national authorities and 
economic empowerment, working with women on cross-borders trade. 
They target all women engaged in cross-borders trade rather than 
specifically sub-set of survivors of the genocide (staff member, UN 
Women, 23 April 2013). 
In BiH, the country office was granted around US$1,000,000 for a period of three 
years. The focus is more on legal aid, however, helping women to navigate through 
the judicial process, and on referral and coordination processes (staff member, UN 
Women, 23 April 2013). Despite this perception held by these staff members, the 
amount granted to the UN Trust Fund for the prevention of gender-based violence is 
still very negligible compared to other humanitarian support.  
For example, peacekeeping operations for 2014/2015 were awarded a budget of 
US$7.06 billion (United Nations, 2015: 2/3), and I described above how the UN 
Trust Fund fares in comparison to other agencies such as UNDP and UNICEF. 
Just to put things in perspective, 8 millions dollars would give you money 
to set up a decent reparation programme for example for survivors of sexual 
violence in one small country like Liberia or Sierra Leone - out of 190 
countries and more in the world, so one type of intervention in one small 
country. And obviously peacekeeping operations, the big ones, cost 
between 600 million and 1.2 billion dollars. All the humanitarian appeal, 
the hundreds of millions for each big crisis, DDR [disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration] programmes are sometimes, the big ones, 
are ten of millions, hundreds of millions sometimes. So it's very little, very, 
very little money (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014). 
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However, even if gender-related issues in post-war countries receive less attention 
than other humanitarian support, such as assistance to ex-combatants, both staff 
members mentioned that the issue of sexual violence in armed conflicts is currently 
receiving a greater share of attention than other topics related to gender-based 
violence. ‘Compared to the smaller world of international community support to 
gender equality, women's empowerment, women's rights [and] violence against 
women in general, the issue of sexual violence in conflict does receive plenty of 
attention comparatively within that much smaller pool’ (staff member, UN Women, 
23 April 2014). And yet, programmes are clearly still lacking, suggesting the 
difficulty of securing assistance for victims of gender-based violence, showing the 
certain invisibility of these victims. It is hoped, however, that this sector will receive 
more money in the next few years after the years of austerity are over: ‘These 
windows come and go’ (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014).  
The limited availability of funds inevitably leads to fierce competition between 
organisations, especially those who have a small annual budget. For example, if 
these organisations apply for funding from the UN Trust Fund, the Trust Fund needs 
to adjust the funding allocated in order to ensure that a smaller organisation can 
successfully absorb the amount granted. 
Actually before we used to give grants for $100,000 for three years and this 
year we lowered it to $50,000 because we see that the majority of women's 
organisations who really dedicate their full attention to these issues cannot 
absorb $100,000. We read their proposal but we think this would be ten 
times their annual budget. It's very clear that it is very difficult for them to 
absorb that amount of money (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 
2014). 
Smaller organisations are, however, often the actors that directly target issues of 
sexual violence, as was witnessed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. Bigger 
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international NGOs will often include some programmes on GBV and sexual 
violence in armed conflicts, but these are part of their larger agendas. 
We always compare ourselves with child protection, which is often easier 
to raise funds for issues affecting children generally, and one of the main 
differences that I see is that all the big INGOs in the GBV world are not 
exclusively focused on GBV. And there isn't a UN agency focusing on 
GBV. It's a huge part of UN Women mandate, it's a big part of several 
agencies’ mandate, hence why we have inter-agency funds.  But the same 
thing happens with INGOs. Some of the INGOs that sent proposals to the 
UN Trust Fund that seem to work on violence against women, this is a 
small percentage of their portfolio. All of the main child protection actors 
work exclusively on child protection. That makes a bit of a difference (staff 
member, UN Women, 23 April 2014). 
There is thus a dilemma faced by donors that goes beyond the quality of the 
applications received. Indeed, it seems that the size of the organisation will influence 
the amount granted by donors; bigger NGOs can absorb larger funds as opposed to 
smaller NGOs. However, smaller NGOs are often the actors who work directly on 
specific gender-related issues, such as specific support for survivors of sexual 
violence. As was well-summarised by the UN Women’s staff member:  
In development, you have this thing where all the chains, all this links in a 
chain, and the money tends to stay in the first few, and less and less trickle 
down, and then when you get to the ground, with the people who are 
actually doing the work, it is a lot less money. This is one of our biggest 
problems (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014). 
For example, when looking at the financial report of Organisation C in Rwanda, 
the organisation I met in either country that was the most active with women who 
suffered from sexual violence, their funding sources are limited to other 
organisations and their partners in the US and UK. Even the financial assistance 
provided by the Ministry of Health in Rwanda was only allocated for their health 
clinic, which was not specific to survivors of sexual violence.  
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Table 9: List of Donors for Organisation C in 2010 
Donors 2010 





Ministry of Health, Rwanda 
INSPIRE!Africa 
Source: Organisation C. (2011). ‘Annual Report 2010’, pp. 1-45.  
In a sense, this organisation is an organisation that engages on a daily basis with 
women who suffered from sexual violence, but their funding is limited compared to 
other bigger organisations, such as Organisation E, in Rwanda. 
Table 10: List of Donors for Organisation E in 2010 
Donors 2010 
Pro-Femmes 




Source: Organisation E. (2011). ‘Annual Report 2010’, pp. 1-53.  
Based on this annual review, Organisation E received in 2010 funding from both the 
umbrella organisation Pro-Femmes, which acts as a middleman between grassroots 
organisations and the Rwandan government, and from FARG, the assistance fund for 
survivors of the genocide.  
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Finally, whether small or large, all organisations need to mediate and negotiate 
their presence within that sector, and maintain good relationships with donors. 
Maintaining good relationships also entails mediating the relationships between the 
beneficiaries and the donors’ needs and interests. As explained by Laura 
(Organisations A&B, 23 May 2013): 
A person contacted us the other day and wanted to sponsor some students 
through school, which we said: "that's fantastic", but then she said: "why 
can't we bring our university students here to help out". And well... if it is 
managed well it could be really beneficial, and a really good partnership, 
but on the other hand, it could always be a waste of our resources having to 
organize a big group of students... But there are definitely ways we could 
do it, but there's always the constant challenge between getting money and 
pleasing our donors, and then also making sure that the beneficiaries are 
protected, and get what they need and not what other people want them to 
have. And then obviously, as with all development work, the type of 
sustainability of it. Making sure the projects are followed-up, making sure 
they do work. 
In this case, the organisation found itself in a difficult position where its desire to 
please and attract donors may actually divert resources and attention from the people 
they are supporting. A certain disconnect between the interests of the national and 
international donors, and the actual needs of the beneficiaries are observed in each 
context.  
What the international community wants, because ok, transitional justice 
that's a hot topic right now but local communities or the women in these 
municipalities don't even know how, what's transitional justice, what is 
related to transitional justice, what is happening with these people, there are 
a lot of women and family children who don't have basic services, who 
don't have access to health insurance, and you're talking about something 
that is beyond their comprehension to understand. And you give millions of 
money to fund those conferences, why don't you focus on the very basic 
things? (Lucy, Organisation F, 13 November 2013). 
In this case, and as the quote suggests, large sums of funding for women’s 
empowerment and involvement in the political sphere are offered in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina, but if some groups of women, such as the survivors of sexual violence, 
are unaware of their rights, a certain disconnect between what is funded and what is 
actually happening will remain observable.  
Aligning with State Ideology 
Grassroots and international organisations do not operate in a political vacuum, 
where their agency is completely independent and removed from local political 
actors. For example, Médecins Sans Frontières constantly need to negotiate with 
local governments for access and provision of services, as was the case of the Ebola 
Response or the war in Sri Lanka. This is especially true for NGOs working in 
conflict and post-conflict societies, which are still operating in a political and social 
context that is framed by the past experiences of violence. There are thus some 
requirements that NGOs need to fulfil in order to be allowed to operate.  
For example, organisations operating in certain countries require state permission, 
often entailing a government permit, to operate. The need for government approval 
can sometimes mean the organisations have to align with the government’s ideology 
in order to be granted a permit. In the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, the 
organisations I observed did not mention any strict requirements or ideology they 
had to follow. For example, when speaking with Organisation L, an international 
women’s organisation operating worldwide but with headquarters in the US and UK, 
the Policy & Programmes Grants Coordinator in London (20 May 2015) mentioned 
that she was not aware of any restrictions or ideology their organisation needs to 
follow in BiH, unlike with Rwanda or other countries. ‘We have a lot more control 
on us in Rwanda from the government and we have to do a lot to comply with them, 
and we have difficulties with governments in other countries as well. I haven't 
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specifically heard about that in BiH’ (Policy & Programmes Grants Coordinator, 
Organisation L, 20 May 2015). Good relationships with the state still need to be 
maintained, including for possible partnerships, but Bosnian state control over 
international and grassroots humanitarian organisations seems limited. 
However there are a few laws and policies regarding the establishment of funds 
and associations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as the ‘Federation Law on the 
Associations of Citizens’ (1995), the ‘Law on Humanitarian Activities and 
Organizations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (1998), the ‘Law on Foundations and 
Funds’ (1998) and the ‘Law on Associations and Foundations (RS)’ (2001). These 
laws are very general, with only a few ideological requirements. A political 
requirement can be found in Article 29 of the ‘Federation Law on the Associations of 
Citizens’ (1995), which stipulates that a ‘relevant ministry will refuse a request for 
enrolment if by its statute goals [the association] instigates or invites to forcible 
violation of constitutional order, independence, unified or territorial integrity of 
Federation’. Moreover, Article 2 in the ‘Law on Humanitarian Activities and 
Organizations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (1998: Article 2) stipulates that:  
Humanitarian activities, as defined by this Law, shall encompass activities 
by which humanitarian aid in the form money, goods and services, without 
compensation and without conditions concerning territorial, national, 
religious, political and other affiliations, shall be provided to natural and 
legal persons who, through no fault of their own, find themselves in need 
for such aid (because of reduced health and working capability, state of 
war, elemental catastrophes, etc.)  
Finally, Article 3 of the ‘Law on Associations and Foundations (RS)’ (2001: 
Article 3) also stipulates that:  
The statute and activities of an association or foundation may not be 
contrary to the constitutional order, or directed at the violent overthrow of 
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the constitutional order, nor may they be aimed at disseminating of ethnic, 
racial or religious hatred or discrimination prohibited by the Constitution 
and the law. 
These legal documents all prohibit ethnic, racial or religious discrimination in the 
provision of services by humanitarian organisations, and organisations guilty of 
discrimination may face fines or removal of their permit. Furthermore, it is 
interesting to note that the laws in the Federation of BiH also prohibit challenges to 
the territorial integrity of the Federation, which is a powerful ideological statement 
by the government. These laws therefore impose a certain ideological alignment on 
the organisations wishing to operate in BiH, but this state control remains rather 
limited. 
Rwanda is however different, with the government exerting a stronger control 
over the NGOs registered in the country. First, NGO permits need to be renewed 
every year, as is the case with other countries such as Burundi, and reports need to be 
provided to government bodies for the permit’s renewal. These measures are not 
extraordinary, but are taken very seriously by organisations working in Rwanda. 
I would say that the requirements are similar from country to country, but 
we take things very seriously in Rwanda. In Rwanda we do not accept that 
for example a NGO comes and decides to start their activities like this, like 
in other countries where there’s some non-sense. In Rwanda, it is stricter 
(Organisation K, 17 July 2014). 
For Organisation K, this is perhaps stricter than in Burundi and definitely different 
than their experience in the DRC, but this state control over what humanitarian 
organisations are allowed to do or not is not something specific to the Rwandan 
context. 
In the DRC, we asked for our permit three years ago and we still have not 
received it. It is very, very long. The project will maybe end before we get 
it. I know another organisation that had the same experience in Haiti, who 
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asked for a permit and the project ended before it got it. It did not prevent it 
to work, as it is not preventing us from working in the DRC because we got 
the local approvals and everything, but let’s say that in Rwanda, well this is 
it, we know that we need to be careful about what we say. But the fact that 
a country asks us for a permit, this is normal. Otherwise anyone would do 
whatever. So there is a control over who comes work in the country, what 
they are doing, where the funds come from, and this is legitimate for a 
government (Organisation K, 17 July 2014). 
Pushing this even further, whilst a certain level of state control over the work 
done by humanitarian organisations is legitimate, I would also argue that it is directly 
in line with the Rwandan government’s policies of post-conflict reconstruction, 
where a certain level of social control is exerted in order to prevent divisionism. In 
this case, the control that is extended to grassroots and international organisations is 
part of these efforts of eradicating divisions by ensuring that organisations are not 
holding discourses or programmes that are harmful for the reconciliation process. A 
representative of the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion hinted at this during 
an interview, expressing that partners have to align with the government strategy for 
gender mainstreaming in order to coordinate these efforts (15 July 2013). As 
mentioned by a staff member, ‘we cannot develop a project if the main lines of the 
project do not align with the main lines of the country’ (Organisation K, 17 July 
2014).  
But more importantly, not only do NGOs have to align with the government 
policies, but the Rwandan government actively uses NGOs to implement its policies 
of nation-building. Indeed, I argue that NGOs and donors prioritize programmes of 
community empowerment because of the strong influence of the Rwanda 
government, where strong control over the aid sector means that NGOs are expected 
to pursue nation-building. For the most part, aligning with the state ideology of 
national unity is not necessarily a difficult challenge faced by NGOs operating in 
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Rwanda, but organisations whose beneficiaries are limited to survivors of the 
genocide can still be seen as dividing the population. 
A lot of Comic Relief has to sit with government ideas here. So for 
example, the government here are really promoting inclusion, and not 
wanting projects solely for survivors which is a controversial topic, but it is 
very hard for us to get funding from Comic Relief now because they are 
working with the Rwandan government and don't want to be seen as sort of 
benefiting one group only (Laura, 23 May 2013). 
The previous quote illustrates this tension between inclusion and the need for 
programmes targeting survivors of the genocide. This is a dilemma faced by 
Organisations A and B which affects their access to funding, but also represents a 
broader moral dilemma of whether responding to the needs of their beneficiaries also 
creates a social distance between the survivors and the rest of the population who 
share similar needs. 
I think the challenge for the future of Organisation A is that the country's 
sort of policies and ideas is all about reconciliation, and not sort of 
highlighting the differences and you could debate that survivors 
organisations are still keeping things quite separate. And I think like with 
the grant from Comic Relief, I think we have to think more and more 
creatively about how to be more open and to work with all communities 
and things. On the other hand, we sometimes believe that survivors need 
specific assistance, and once they have that they will then feel more able to 
reconcile and be part of the community. So I think that's an on-going 
debate, the government definitely not anti any of the work we are doing and 
supported, but I think there's always an ongoing challenge with what is the 
current agenda and the current step forward, and making sure we fit with 
that and don't rub anyone up the wrong way (Laura, 23 May 2013). 
Survivors of the genocide, including survivors of sexual violence, are recognized by 
the state in Rwanda, but this special recognition may still contribute to a certain 
social isolation if the beneficiaries’ engagement and interactions with non-survivors 
remain limited. Recognition of the specific needs of genocide survivors therefore 
provides opportunities for NGOs to directly target survivors, but in doing so they 
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might struggle to secure funding if their programmes are perceived as encouraging 
divisions within the population, which is inconsistent with the government’s priority 
of nation-building. 
Furthermore, the government still possesses some humanitarian priorities that 
may not always be the priorities of the grassroots and international NGOs. For 
example, there is a strong focus on individual economic empowerment - helping 
individuals to become active economic agents - that is sometimes inconsistent with 
programmes for gender equality.  
If [the government] says this year, we want every farmer to own a cow, or 
this health service for everyone, well they will put some pressure over 
everyone to contribute. But a project on violence against women, there 
cannot be expenses for agriculture, herding, healthcare other than for 
women who experienced violence. So this is when there can be some 
challenges at times.  (…) It happened for example this year during the 
March 8th celebrations. The authorities wanted us to pay for some expenses 
for vulnerable populations. It was not corresponding to the main lines of 
our project. Our partners received a lot of pressure, they put pressure on our 
team and it goes up to me and I say: “well no, we cannot, it does not fit into 
our project. We can do something else but not that”. So there is that type of 
pressure (Organisation K, 17 July 2014). 
State pressure can then be exerted on organisations to develop new programmes that 
target the state’s priorities. This staff member was, however, quick to clarify that this 
is not something specific to Rwanda, and this type of pressure is also felt in the DRC. 
This is probably felt strongly in Rwanda because the government has a lot of state 
programmes that it wants to implement, and one way of doing so might be to have 
humanitarian organisations on board and contributing to the state programmes 
(Organisation K, 17 July 2014). 
There is therefore a constant mediation faced by some organisations between 
ensuring the needs of their beneficiaries are met while maintaining good 
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relationships with donors for funding purposes, and, in the Rwandan context, 
ensuring good relationships with the state. This perhaps also explains why 
institutional capacity-building is not prioritized in Rwanda. Unlike in BiH where 
NGOs are involved in state-building, state-building in Rwanda is strongly associated 
with national security, meaning that only state actors can engage in capacity-
building. Ensuring good relationships with the state therefore means that despite 
international criticisms over processes of state-building and democratic governance 
in Rwanda, none of the NGOs working in that context pursue state-building. 
Moreover, aligning with the state ideology not only provides an organisation with 
the opportunity to operate in Rwanda, but strong ties with the government are often 
believed to lead to more funding opportunities. For example, Organisation E had 
strong ties with the government, and the resources available for this organisation 
were greater than those of smaller grassroots organisations. There is, of course, no 
evidence demonstrating certain NGOs are favoured over others, but as was well-
summarised by a staff member in Organisation K (17 July 2014): 
Let’s supposed that the government got some funding to work on an issue 
such as gender-based violence, and that within that funding there are some 
funds available for the civil society. Well that money will go to the civil 
society. Now what is the process, what are the criteria, will anyone have 
access to that money, will if we are on very, very, very good terms with the 
government (laughs), if we never criticized, will we have more easily 
access [to the funding] than others? I would think so. But this is not written, 
this is not official. But we can suppose so.  
 
Discussion 
This chapter demonstrated that the NGOs operating in BiH and Rwanda 
constantly mediate their relationships with donors and state actors in order to ensure 
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the needs of women who experienced sexual violence are met, while attracting 
sources of funding and aligning themselves with the state ideology toward post-
conflict reconstruction (Whitfield, 2009: 1). Donors’ interests influence the type of 
programmes implemented, perhaps not to the extent where organisations drastically 
transform their aims and objectives, but to the extent that some programmes might 
become prioritized over others in order to secure funding (Hayman, 2006: 16-19). 
For example, this chapter has demonstrated that capacity-building is currently 
prioritized by donors in BiH, with community empowerment being the priority in 
Rwanda. Through their mediation role, NGOs therefore to a certain extent 
reconstruct the women’s experiences in order to align with the priorities of the 
international donors and the state in which they operate. This has the impact that 
whilst the women who experienced wartime sexual violence share a common moral 
exclusion in the aftermath of the violence, the NGOs’ responses currently differ as a 
result of these contextual donor priorities. This chapter argued that in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the NGOs’ response mostly targets the legitimization and 
institutionalization of the women’s voices (legal recognition), which does not 
necessarily entail their increased agency or empowerment. In Rwanda, the focus is 
mostly on empowerment, both personal and economic (holistic support), but again 
this does not result in an increased voice or increased agency for the women I met, 
since in both contexts there is a continued association between the impurity of these 
women’s bodies and their morality (Mertus, 1994: 18). I argue that in both cases, the 
NGOs attempt to reintegrate the women first and foremost as members of the nation, 
which however requires a transformation of the ideology of woman-as-nation. The 
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strategic interests of donors may however not prioritize programmes that would 
foster these transformative changes (Hamilton, K., 2000: 53). 
Moreover, this chapter argued that as a result of the ‘New Policy Agenda’, NGOs 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda have been attributed the role of fostering post-
conflict reconciliation - in this case of promoting processes of social reintegration for 
the survivors of sexual violence – which resulted in NGOs undertaking the role of 
mediator between the individual experiences and the post-conflict state (Fisher, 
1997: 443; Tarry, 2000: 109). Indeed, organisations are required to align with state 
policies and ideologies, which in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not necessarily a constraint, 
but in Rwanda brings different challenges. It was demonstrated that the Rwandan 
government exerts stronger control over NGOs operating in its territory than the state 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where in Rwanda NGOs are expected to pursue nation-
building. This confirms the argument that the Rwanda state has a strong control over 
its population, including civil society. This chapter has also argued that state 
ideologies and policies likewise influence the donors themselves (and vice-versa), 
who in return will tend to fund NGO programmes that already align with state 
ideology and priorities. 
This is especially important, since it demonstrates that the NGOs find themselves 
as the actors who mediate the micro and macro exclusion experienced by the 
survivors of sexual violence, through their programmes and services. Influenced by 
the needs of their beneficiaries, their donors’ priorities and their state policies, the 
organisations I observed continually mediate the macro-policies of the post-conflict 
state with the individual experiences of post-conflict reconciliation.  
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This thesis has thus demonstrated so far that the contrasts found in the ways the 
women who suffered from sexual violence wish to be socially reintegrated and in the 
ways the NGOs support these beneficiaries are in fact embedded within the different 
policies of post-conflict reconstruction implemented by the post-conflict state. 
Therefore, I argue that the women who suffered from sexual violence moved from 
ethnic women to moral outcasts in the aftermath of the violence, and that this 
exclusion is contextually shaped since the priorities for social reintegration are 
different in Rwanda to BiH. Addressing these priorities then requires different forms 





Chapter 9. Conclusion 
This research has sought to explore the post-conflict experiences of women who 
survived wartime sexual violence, contrasting the experiences of the women I met in 
Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a conceptual focus on their social belonging 
and social reintegration within their community. It has also sought to explore the role 
played by NGOs to mediate this social reintegration. It has focused on two broad 
main research questions: 
1. How are women who suffered from wartime sexual violence experiencing 
social belonging 15-20 years after the end of ethnic violence? 
2.  How do NGOs and state policies influence these experiences of social 
reintegration? 
Social vs. Legal Integration of the Survivors of Sexual Violence 
The empirical findings of this research first suggest that the women I interviewed 
in both contexts still suffer from stigmatisation and social marginalisation almost 20 
years after the end of the ethnic violence as a result of several factors, such as the 
trauma experienced, the stigma of rape, the illnesses associated with rape, financial 
struggles, and so on. These experiences, as related in Chapters Six and Seven, were 
shared by the women in the same context but also across the two contexts, despite 
individual variations. Indeed, the stigmatisation and exclusion experienced varies 
from individual to individual, with some women feeling completely excluded while 
some others feel reintegrated to a certain extent within their community. These 
experiences, I argue, are a result of the ideology of woman-as-nation, in which the 
women’s bodies were used as a battlefield upon which the nation could be destroyed 
during the ethnic violence (Douglas, 1966: 142; Yuval-Davis, 1994: 413). Their role 
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as embodiment of the nation (Eisenstein, 2000: 47; Mayer, 2000: 18) made them 
vulnerable to crimes of sexual violence during the war, but more importantly, it 
justifies their moral exclusion in the aftermath of the violence. Indeed, the 
stigmatisation experienced, as described in Chapters Six and Seven, is a result of 
processes of victim-blaming in which the women are blamed for their experience of 
sexual violence, suggesting that the rape was committed because of their behaviour 
or moral character (Lerner, 1980: 96; Hafer, 2004, 122). This process of victim-
blaming does not occur to the same extent with other civilian victims of war, 
therefore I suggest that there is something distinct and inherent about rape as a 
weapon of war that fosters victim-blaming. This may be a result of the patriarchal set 
of moral values, where the ‘dirtiness’ of the women’s bodies has been transferred to 
their moral value.  
However, what is common for all women interviewed is that regardless of the 
social inclusion experienced, they all developed a strong and meaningful sense of 
belonging with other survivors of sexual violence that is not reproduced with non-
survivors. Alternative families have been formed in each context, based on shared 
experiences of sexual violence, and these social bonds prove difficult to reproduce 
outside of these groups. Indeed, another crucial empirical finding of these chapters is 
that regardless of the similar experiences of marginalisation, the women I met in 
Rwanda and the women I met in BiH had contrasting ideas as to how their social 
reintegration should be achieved. In Rwanda, the women mostly wish to be accepted 
and reintegrated into their local community, and to feel like valued members of the 
community. In contrast, the women in BiH mostly wish to be legally recognised by 
their state, to have their specific rights as civilian victims of war, and as citizens, 
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recognized by the post-conflict state. In both contexts, this need for social 
reintegration is an attempt to transform the boundaries for fairness of their national 
or ethnic group, securing a place for the survivors of sexual violence within the 
group’s scope of justice (Opotow, 2004: 105; Opotow, Gerson and Woodside, 2005: 
305). I argued in this thesis that the contrasts found in the response to this moral 
exclusion are a consequence of the macro-policies of post-conflict reconstruction 
implemented in each state. 
As Chapter Five demonstrated, the Rwandan state is characterized by an 
important process of nation-building, where ethnicity has been outlawed in favour of 
a broader national Rwandan identity, and where gender-sensitive policies were 
implemented to promote women’s rights and gender equality. Despite the limitations 
of these policies, the state has been highly involved in redesigning what it means to 
be Rwandan. This creates individual opportunities for re-identification and 
repositioning within one’s local community (Sarkin, 1999: 800; Loizides, Kovras 
and Ireton, 2010: 6). I suggest that this provides opportunities for the women who 
suffered wartime rape to be relocated within their community, which is why their 
social reintegration has become the key to meeting their physical and safety needs. 
This is, however, contrasted by the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, where ethnicity 
has been institutionalised within state institutions, based on the rationale that 
ethnicity can only be accommodated through strong state institutions (Linz and 
Stepan, 1996: 33; Hechter, 2000: 138). I argued in Chapter Five that state 
employment and public services are still structured around ethnic identities. This 
promotes group rights over individual rights. This creates a political context where 
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the women I met believe that their physical and safety needs can only be achieved 
through legal recognition by their state.   
Chapters Five, Six and Seven therefore contribute to both the fields of gender and 
conflict studies, showing how macro-processes of post-conflict reconstruction have 
an impact on the lived experiences of civilian victims of war, specifically on the 
women who survived a certain type of crime: sexual violence. The academic 
literature already provides a framework from which post-conflict reconstruction 
through state/nation-building can be theorized, and this research contributes to this 
framework by demonstrating how these policies impact social belonging for 
marginalized groups in the aftermath of ethnic violence. To my knowledge, this is a 
novel contribution to both academic fields, and may have policy implications for 
peacebuilders in post-conflict societies. 
Mediated Experiences of Survivors of Sexual Violence 
In addition to analysing the experiences of the women I met, this thesis also shed 
a light on the work done by some key NGOs working with this type of beneficiary, 
and the complex relationships they maintain with their donors and the state in which 
they operate, which provides original data on the role of NGOs in post-conflict 
societies. Chapters Six and Seven first provide the empirical findings that despite the 
similarity of the crimes experienced in both contexts, the NGOs operating in Rwanda 
and those operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina privilege different approaches. I 
demonstrated that both sets of NGOs provide the necessary programmes of trauma 
counselling, income-generating activities and medical services. However, the main 
contrast can be found in their strategy to facilitate the social inclusion of these 
women. My data showed that the NGOs in Rwanda prioritize the social recognition 
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of these women by providing them holistic support. They then attempt to support 
them in all spheres of their lives, and consequently help them to feel empowered 
within their community. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the NGOs I observed instead 
prioritize the legal recognition of the rights of the survivors of sexual violence, 
actively lobbying the state on the women’s behalf.  
This argument was supported by my empirical findings in Chapter Eight, where I 
also suggest that the NGOs’ mediation role is further complicated by their 
relationships with donors and the state in which they operate. The NGOs I observed 
all struggle financially, resulting in their financial dependency on national and 
international donors. I demonstrated that this dependency relationship influences the 
types of programmes offered by the NGOs in both contexts, where the donors’ 
understandings and ideologies of post-conflict reconstruction influence how NGOs 
respond to the needs of the survivors of sexual violence. Moreover, organisations are 
required to align with state policies and ideologies. In Bosnia-Herzegovina this is not 
necessarily constraining, but in Rwanda this can bring different challenges. I 
demonstrated that the Rwandan government exerts a strong control over NGOs, 
which are required to align with the state’s ideology of national unity. Their complex 
relationships with the donors and the states have the consequence that despite the 
similarity in the crimes experienced, the NGOs’ responses in BiH and in Rwanda 
privilege different approaches. Indeed, NGOs in Rwanda mediate the social 
relocation of their beneficiaries within the local community (prioritizing 
empowerment), while NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina mediate the social integration of 
their beneficiaries within the political institutions (prioritizing inclusion of women’s 
voices in the political agenda). I argue that these contrasts are a result of the 
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mediation role exerted by NGOs in each context, where since the state policies 
favour the construction of ethnic and national identities while the women suffer from 
a loss of self, the NGOs are the actors that mediate these experiences through their 
programmes. These mediated experiences are therefore not directly the experiences 
of the women, but experiences that NGOs construct in order to secure funding and 
assistance from international donors and the state in which they operate. This data is 
important for theories of post-conflict reconstruction, since it demonstrates that 
nation-building, whether through the strengthening of ethnic or civic identities, will 
not foster post-conflict reconciliation for certain civilian victims of war – such as 
survivors of sexual violence - if it focuses solely on addressing the ethnic divisions at 
the core of the violence instead of challenging the ideology of woman-as-nation. The 
same is true for state-building, where even if the ethnic rights of the survivors of 
sexual violence are institutionalized, their social location on the margins of society 
prevent them from fully accessing these rights. 
The implication therefore is that the crimes experienced during ethnic violence 
remain embedded within the local political context, and that regardless of the 
universality of suffering and consequences of these acts, the responses remain 
localised and contextualised. These chapters provide an important and novel 
contribution, since whilst previous research has been conducted on NGO responses 
in each country and on the dependency relationships between state-NGOs-donors, to 
my knowledge no existing research has contrasted the NGO responses of two 
countries for crimes of wartime sexual violence, connecting them to the macro-
processes of post-conflict reconstruction. By moving away from the NGOs-donors, 
donors-states and NGOs-states relationships to a broader analysis of the impact of 
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post-conflict reconstruction ideologies on the NGO sector, this thesis provides an 
original understanding of the mediation role that NGOs play in post-conflict 
societies. It demonstrates that beyond NGOs having the responsibility of promoting 
reconciliation for marginalized groups (Fisher, 1997: 443), they are crucial actors in 
bridging the gap between the individual desires for social reintegration and the 
macro-policies of identity construction. 
Ethnic Identity to Moral Self 
The main theoretical contribution of this thesis concerns its application to 
intersectional scholarly work on post-conflict and gender studies (Cockburn and 
Zarkov, 2002; Eifler and Seifert, 2009; Helms, 2013). Indeed, this study provides an 
original understanding of women and nation in the context of nation/state-building. 
Expanding on the literature of nation-as-woman, the theoretical findings of this study 
are that the women who suffered from sexual violence moved from ethnic women to 
moral outcasts in the aftermath of the violence, and that this exclusion is contextually 
shaped since the priorities for social reintegration are different in Rwanda than in 
BiH. Addressing these priorities then requires different forms of post-conflict 
inclusion. 
To demonstrate this, I argued in Chapter Two that during the ethnic violence, 
women who experienced wartime rape were socially located outside the scope of 
justice of their ethnic enemies, which made them vulnerable to these crimes. In the 
aftermath of the violence, a shift occurred whereby these women suddenly found 
themselves outside the scope of justice of their own ethnic or national communities. I 
argue that regardless of the ethnic or civic nation found in the post-conflict state, 
there is a shift from ethnic identity to moral self in the aftermath of the violence, 
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where underlying these difficulties of ethnic and gender identification is a deeper 
loss of moral self that is caused by the consequences of wartime sexual violence. 
Using Mann’s (2004) and Opotow et al’s (2005) typologies of ethnic violence and 
moral exclusion, I developed an original model that captures this shift. I suggest that 
once women’s bodies were used as a battlefield, a shift occurred where the impurity 
of their body was transferred to their moral character. This shift results from the 
nature of sexual violence as a crime that encourages victim-blaming in patriarchal 
settings. Therefore, since the kin group could not justify the impurity of these women 
through their ethnic identity – identity they share(d) with their group - the kin group 
justified it instead as a result of the women’s own immorality. This, I argue, remains 
the main moral transgression that these women experience in the post-conflict 
period. This new model has important implications, since it situates the underlying 
post-conflict social exclusion experienced by the women with whom the NGOs 
work, and will contribute to furthering our knowledge of the experiences of these 
civilian victims of war, possibly applying this same model to other contexts where 
sexual violence was used during ethnic cleansing. 
Ethical Reflections 
Conducting research with women who suffered from wartime rape in post-conflict 
societies is a very difficult process, with important ethical issues and logistical 
challenges. For ethical reasons and for ease of access, only women who are members 
of non-governmental organisations were interviewed and included in this thesis. The 
experiences of these women may therefore vary from those of women who now live 
abroad or who are not members of any organisation. Choosing women who are 
already members of NGOs also had the result that all women identified as Tutsi or 
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Bosnian Muslim. It is generally accepted by the academic literature and national 
discourse that the highest number of rapes were committed against these groups. 
However, Hutu women, as well as Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat women, were 
also victims of wartime sexual violence. Further research could therefore include the 
experiences of women who identify as belonging to different ethnic groups, perhaps 
showing the similarities or differences that their ethnicity plays in their post-conflict 
experiences. For example, are the needs and rights of the Tutsi and Bosnian Muslim 
survivors of sexual violence more easily recognized than those of the Hutu or 
Bosnian Serb women? 
Moreover, for theoretical reasons, this research only focuses on women who 
survived wartime rape. I am definitely not denying that men were also the victims of 
this type of abuse during the wars. As much as the post-conflict experiences of the 
women who survived wartime sexual violence is under-studied, the experiences of 
the male survivors of sexual violence are even less researched. Another avenue for 
further research could therefore be to analyse the social inclusion and belonging of 
men who experienced sexual violence during these conflicts. 
Finally, because of the difficulties of conducting this type of research, a limited 
number of women were officially interviewed. Their experiences provide a valuable 
and original insight into their lived experiences, mostly when contrasting the 
experiences in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is however worth stressing that I 
am not attempting with this research to generalize these experiences to all women 
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Annex 1: Research Participants 
Name Socio-demographic Characteristics 
Agathe Rwandese; Tutsi; 30-40 y/o; single; no children; no occupation; 
lives in a locality in Kigali Province 
Valentine Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has 
children; cultivates her land; lives in a locality outside Kigali 
Province  
Olive Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the genocide; child 
killed in the genocide; tailor; lives in Kigali Province 
Rose Rwandese; Tutsi; 30-40 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has 
children; owns a small business; lives in Kigali Province 
Céline Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has 
children; no occupation; lives in Kigali Province 
Joséphine Rwandese; Tutsi; 50-60 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has 
children; no occupation; lives in Kigali Province 
Célestine Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has 
children; cultivates her land; lives in a village outside Kigali 
Marie-Louise Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; separated from her Hutu husband; has 
children; no occupation; lives in Kigali Province 
Oda Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has 
children; no occupation; lives in a village of survivors and orphans 
Jeannette Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; single; child born out of rape; tailor; 
lives in the Eastern Province 
Emina Bosnian Muslim; 40-50 y/o; married; has children; sell knitting and 
food products; lives in a town in the Sarajevo Canton, FBiH 
Dalija Bosnian Muslim; 30-40 y/o; single; no children; no occupation; 
lives in Sarajevo 
Sajra Bosnian Muslim; 50-60 y/o; married; has children; no occupation; 
lives in a village in Sarajevo Canton, FBiH 
Anida Bosnian Muslim; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the war; has children; 
no occupation; lives in Sarajevo 
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Lejla Bosnian Muslim; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the war and divorced; 
has children; no occupation; lives in a village in Sarajevo Canton, 
FBiH 
Bakira Bosnian Muslim; 50-60 y/o; married; has children; works for 
Organisation G; lives in Sarajevo 
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Annex 2: Database of Questions for the Survivors of 
Sexual Violence 
 
• If you want to tell me about yourself, about your day-to-day challenges, about 
your past, how you met this organization, etc. 
• What is the most important service that your organization provides you? 
Why? 
• Are there some activities, services or training not provided by your 
organization that you would like to see implemented? 
• How do you feel when you are at the organization? With the other women? 
• What are the needs that you have in your day-to-day life? 
• How did your family reacted after learning of your sufferings during the war? 
How are they now reacting? 
• How is your community/ethnic group reacting after learning about your past 
sufferings? 
• Do you have friends outside the organizations? Are they all from your ethnic 
group? Have they all suffered from a similar trauma? 
• Are you invited to social gatherings in your family? In your community? 
How does it makes you feel? 
• Do you think that all Bosnians/Rwandan are equal? 
• Do you think that you are equal to other Bosnians/Rwandan?  
• Does your family and community think that you are as valuable as other 
Bosnians/Rwandan? 
• What defines you the most: being a woman or a Bosniac, Croat or Serb/Tutsi, 
Hutu, Twa? 
• Why were you targeted during the war? 
• Have you forgiven your aggressors? The other group? 
• How is religion helping you to heal? 
• Can you describe a normal day for you? 
• How have your social relations with your friends and family changed after 
the war and after joining the organization? 
• How is your relationship with your children? 





Annex 3: Database of Questions for the NGO Staff 
 
• When was the organization created? What is its mission? 
• What programs does your organization provide to survivors of sexual 
violence? Which ones have priority, are the most important? 
• How is the decision of implementing some programs made (headquarters, 
government, etc.)? 
• How does the need for funding from international or local donors affect the 
choice of programs implemented? 
• What are the challenges that your organization faces? 
• How stigmatized, excluded are the survivors of sexual violence? Their 
children? How are they perceived within the community? 
• How strong is the stigma of rape? Of bearing children outside of marriage 
bonds? 
• How is social exclusion addressed by your organization? 
• How does the specific Bosnian/Rwandan context, government efforts, makes 
social exclusion, stigma hard/easy to address? 
• Are some survivors of sexual violence more easily reintegrated into their 
community/family than others? Which factors influence this social 
reintegration? 
• Are women living in rural areas more stigmatized than those in city areas? 
• What are the main needs of the survivors of sexual violence? 
• How do you reconcile the gender and ethnic identities of the women? Is the 
ethnic identity of the woman taken into account when providing counselling? 
Different counselling based on the ethnicity? 
• How does religion plays a role in the process of trauma healing? 










  1 
  
2 3 4 5 6 
    
a b c 
Total 
All 109,383 7,811 3,584 26,019 1,117 5,361 71,348 3,04 3,565 
Women 57,646 4,402 1,733 12,262 476 1,641 36,388 1,464 2,164 
Unsko-Sanski 
All 3,722 508 103 3,267 - 322 15,658 506 1,014 
Women 1,906 99 72 1,409 - 110 9,027 207 693 
Posavski 
All 3,004 - 14 1,233 90 295 837 97 136 
Women 1,438 - 9 654 46 97 409 37 64 
Tuzlanski 
All 27,437 433 258 6,501 275 995 25,365 849 922 
Women 12,729 274 131 3,142 96 285 12,294 412 537 
Zenicko-
Dobojski 
All 17,747 1,82 380 4,512 111 546 8,383 307 373 
Women 9,585 959 245 1,972 42 109 4,342 160 247 
Bosansko-
Podrinjski 
All 137 - - 1,007 - - 296 127 169 
Women 100 - - 588 - - 196 95 101 
Srednjo-
Bosanski 
All 21.457 808 326 4.659 284 1.440 13.088 488 497 
Women 11.466 400 188 2.144 152 447 5.949 174 237 
Herzegovacko-
Neretvanski 
All 16,181 3,49 156 1,659 250 1,178 5,639 565 411 
Women 9,772 2,15 123 911 106 431 2,986 347 263 
Zapadno-
Hercegovacki 
All 2,484 547 49 1,037 28 180 1,277 62 23 
Women 1,504 402 31 457 3 35 690 15 18 
Sarajevo 
All 14,757 - 2,078 1,768 - 71 - - - 
Women 7,801 - 822 824 - 7 - - - 
Kanton 10 
All 2,457 205 220 376 79 334 805 39 20 
Women 1,345 118 112 161 31 120 495 17 4 
Source: Institute for Statistics of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (2013). ‘Social 
Welfare’. p. 30-33. 
1. Persons who do not have enough income for care; a. Beneficiaries of Humanitarian Aid | 2. Beneficiaries of 
Subventions | 3. Mentally and Physically Handicapped Persons | 4. Persons with Behaviour and Personal 
Breakdown | 5. Persons with Socially Unacceptable Behaviour | 6. Persons in state of different social welfare; b. 
Civilian Victims of War; c. Members of Family of Civilian Victims of War 
 
